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ABSTRACT 
The finance-growth literature identifies financial integration as a vital catalyst for driving the growth 
performance of both nascent and advanced economies. Financial integration is viewed as a process by 
which technology and capital is mobilized and efficiently distributed across national borders to enhance 
consumption, investments and output growth. However, the benefits of financial integration for economic 
growth are not unanimous and sometimes evade even the most advanced economies. To promote 
economic growth, financial integration is required to stimulate competition and efficiency in domestic 
banking markets without eroding bank profitability or stability. Understanding the effects of deeper financial 
integration on the conduct and performance of banks and economic growth therefore forms the central 
theme of this thesis. The study employs several panel data estimation methods to test these hypotheses 
using data from 405 banks across 47 African countries over the period 2007-2014 and compares the 
results for five sub-regional markets.  
The findings reveal that deeper financial integration has significant positive effects on overall bank 
profitability in Africa. Specifically, the study finds that financial freedom and cross-border banking enhance 
bank profitability in Africa and across the regional economic communities. The study finds that higher 
operating cost in the 2007-2014 period reduced bank return on assets but increased overall bank 
profitability. This reflects the need for banks in underdeveloped banking markets to increase their 
diversification, expansion and advertising costs in periods of integration and rising competition to ensure 
overall profitability. The study also finds a direct negative relationship between deeper financial integration 
and competition changes on bank stability. However, the findings support a U-shaped relationship between 
competition and bank stability, suggesting that beyond certain thresholds, higher competition will induce 
greater stability in Africa‘s banking markets. This study, therefore, identifies deficiency of competitiveness 
as a fundamental variable hindering emerging markets from enjoying the stability benefits of financial 
integration. Quality regulation and control of corruption are also identified as vital factors for improving bank 
stability in Africa. The study further shows that financial integration enhances competition, efficiency and 
bank lending behavior in Africa, resulting in banking convergence in Africa and the regional economic 
communities. In examining the causal nexus between competition and bank efficiency, the results support 
the quiet-life hypothesis in Africa, especially in the EAC and reject the quiet-life hypothesis in the AMU and 
ECCAS sub-regions. The study further finds evidence of the efficient-structure hypothesis in Africa, 
especially in the AMU and SADC sub-regions. Also, though the study finds no significant nexus between 
financial integration, bank lending and economic growth in Africa, the evidence supports the feedback 
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hypothesis in the EAC while the supply-leading hypothesis is supported in the AMU, ECCAS and ECOWAS 
sub-regions. Also, while a positive causal nexus from financial integration to economic growth exist in the 
AMU sub-region, this relationship is negative in the ECCAS sub-region.  Overall, the results suggest that 
the effect of financial integration on bank performance and economic growth vary significantly across the 
regional economic communities of Africa. It is, therefore, imperative for bank managers, regulators and 
policy makers to pursue tailored interventions for each regional economic community while exploiting 
opportunities for inter-REC collaborations and peer-learning for Africa‘s gross integration and growth.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
The debate about the economic benefits of financial integration stems from a longstanding debate on the 
nexus between finance and economic growth. This debate has attracted a lot of research interest due to 
the critical role played by financial institutions in the economy. According to Baele et al. (2004), financial 
integration is the state when, or the process of ensuring that all potential financial market participants in a 
given region, common market (or globally) share similar traits, such as facing identical regulatory 
environments, having equal access to a set of financial products and being treated equally when they are 
active in the market. Therefore, a deeply-integrated financial system promotes market freedom, 
harmonization and greater flow of capital and institutions across and within national borders. Berg and 
Krueger (2003) therefore assert that accurate appraisal of the policy and practical implications of the 
relationship between finance and economic growth, based on sufficient empirical evidence, has far-
reaching implications for the wealth of nations.  
Theoretically, it has been argued that financial sector development promotes output growth and economic 
development (Bagehot, 1873; Schumpeter, 1911). According to the World Bank (2018), financial sector development 
is the state or process of reducing the costs of financial transactions through enhanced and cheaper 
information acquisition, contract determination and contract execution among counter parties in financial 
markets. In view of this, Bagehot (1873) theorized that the existence of large and well-developed capital markets 
promotes efficient distribution of capital to relevant productive investments for higher economic growth. Schumpeter 
(1911) popularized this theory in a seminal paper which highlighted the domestic revenue mobilization and growth-
critical allocation roles played by banks in an economy. This supply-leading view emphasized that a deep, liquid and 
diversified financial system improves economic stability and enhances economic growth through efficient resource 
allocation. In line with this, King and Levine (1993) explained that financial institutions facilitate real output growth by 
reducing information asymmetry, transaction cost and the risk involved in resource allocation in an economy. 
Therefore, banks increase capital accumulation and distributive efficiency in an economy and create the macro-
economic framework needed to stimulate economic efficiency and growth.  
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In contrast, several studies1 provide evidence to back the demand-following hypothesis of Robinson (1952) 
which stipulates that economic growth precedes financial sector development while a third view presents 
evidence of a so called ‗feedback‘ effect, where causality runs in both directions (Pradhan et al., 2014).  
However, Andersen and Tarp (2003) noticed that limiting the samples to Africa and Latin America results in 
an inverse relationship between financial sector development and economic growth. In view of this, most 
developing countries in Africa and other regions operated tight monetary regimes characterized by 
repressive legislation and restrictive policies until the late 1970s (Stiglitz, 1993). These restrictive policies 
were aimed at promoting industrial growth and financial stability, among others. However, McKinnon (1973) 
and Shaw (1973) observed that government intervention and financial repression impacts negatively on the 
distributive efficiency of financial markets and constrains economic growth (Andries and Capraru, 2013). 
Therefore, following a broad assertion about the positive nexus between financial sector development and 
output growth, most emerging economies started implementing reforms to liberalize their financial markets, 
stimulate competition and promote better distributive efficiency (Pradhan et al., 2014). This, however, did 
not start in Africa until the mid-to-late 1980s.  
The liberalization of financial markets in Africa triggered a paradigm shift in the pattern of financial market 
activities on the continent and promoted regional and international financial integration among African 
countries (African Development Bank, 2010; Beck et al., 2014; Leon, 2016). According to Claessens and 
van Horen (2014), Africa‘s banking sector saw a surge in cross-border activities, with banks setting up 
subsidiaries and branches in other countries (Diallo, 2016). These transformations have the potential to 
enhance financial deepening and promote economic growth through increased lending and investments 
(Leon, 2015). However, Beck et al. (2014) and Motelle and Biekpe (2015) opine that deeper financial 
integration and cross border banking in Africa could also increase financial fragility and adversely affect 
economic growth. Therefore, financial integration in Africa has implications for the conduct and 
performance of financial intermediaries in the region, which in turn, affects economic growth and 
development.  
Generally, it has been argued that financial integration and financial market development have a positive 
effect on financial intermediary performance, financial stability, and economic growth (Hewartz and Walle, 
2014). According to Ahmed and Suardi (2009), integration results in effective consumption smoothing 
through increased competition and efficient resource allocation. This assertion is based on the view that 
                                                          
1
 Panopoulou (2009); Kar et al. (2011) among others 
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increased competition resulting from financial integration reduces the franchise value of banks, providing an 
incentive for them to pursue efficiency goals as a means to remain profitable (Boyd and De Nicolò, 2005; 
Weill, 2013). According to Berger (1995) the reduction in franchise value also stimulates financial 
intermediaries to seek out new clients in previously untapped or underserved markets in their bid to stay 
profitable in an increasingly competitive market (Buch and Heinrich, 2003). This increases bank lending 
activities to the private sector and encourages innovation and investment activities. Therefore, Demsetz 
(1973) concludes that financial integration has the potential to increase the productivity of capital and spur 
economic growth in developing countries. In contrast, Marcus (1984) argues that increased financial 
integration-inducted competition drives banks towards increased risk-taking behavior2 which has negative 
implications for the profitability of financial intermediaries and the growth performance of an economy. 
Besides, increased competition affects the pricing power of banks, reduces their lending rates and 
negatively affects their profitability. Therefore, Ghosh (2016) suggests that financial integration could 
enhance banking efficiency but reduce bank profitability. This is possible where the loss of pricing power 
and reduction in intermediation spreads outweighs the efficiency gains from a higher competition. 
In view of the ongoing assertions, the pursuit of financial integration in Africa raises several important 
concerns about its potential effects on the competitive conduct and performance of financial intermediaries 
as well as the effects of these outcomes on the growth performance of African economies. This 
underscores the need for continuous studies on the effects of Africa‘s integration and the interaction 
between financial markets and the real sector for better policy formulation. 
 
1.2 Research problem and motivation for the study 
The role of banks in the economy cannot be overemphasized, especially in Africa and similar regions 
characterized by bank-dominated financial systems. Generally, banks have been noted to facilitate 
economic growth by reducing information asymmetry between surplus and deficit spending units (Masood 
and Ashraf, 2012). This ensures effective intermediation and efficient resource allocation. The health and 
wealth of financial intermediaries in Africa is therefore crucial for the ultimate development of the continent 
(Chen and Liao, 2011; Athanasoglou, et al., 2008). However, the continuous pursuance of deeper financial 
                                                          
2
 See Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2007); Jimenez et al. (2013) for evidence supporting this franchise-value hypothesis  
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integration3 in Africa and the expansion of cross-border banking activities present banks with new 
opportunities and threats that could affect their ability to contribute positively to economic growth and 
development.  
According to Klein and Weill (2016), the ability of banks to contribute significantly to economic growth 
depends on how efficiently and profitably they manage the growth-risk nexus of their core business of 
lending to promote consumption and investment activities in the economy. Besides, a profitable banking 
system is better able to withstand shocks and provide needed consumption and investment funds to 
stimulate economic recovery and growth (Athanasoglou, et al., 2008). Therefore, understanding the nexus 
between financial integration, its effect on the competitive conduct of banks and their profitability is a crucial 
exercise for optimal policy formulation, especially in bank-dominated financial markets. Also, achieving 
greater competition and efficiency enhances the ability of banks to offer more diversified portfolios of assets 
at lower costs to economic agents, thereby promoting greater investment activities and economic growth 
(Chen and Liao, 2011; Love and Peria, 2015; Klein and Weill, 2016). This thesis therefore tests the central 
hypothesis that deeper financial integration improves the competitiveness, efficiency, profitability and 
stability of banks in emerging markets, enhances bank lending behavior and promotes economic growth. 
Over the years, several studies have attempted to understand the drivers of bank profitability in Africa (Qin 
and Dickson, 2012; Francis, 2013). However, these studies failed to account for the effect of financial 
integration on bank profitability across Africa. Also, studies examining the effect of financial integration on 
bank profitability in emerging economies largely employ one of several measures of bank profitability in 
their analysis without accounting for its effect on overall profitability, limiting the interpretation and policy 
application of their findings. Besides, the literature on Africa is sparse and offers no evidence of the bank 
performance outcomes of financial integration in the context of the regional economic communities which 
form the foundations of Africa‘s regional integration drive. It is therefore crucial to employ a standardized 
composite measure of bank profitability similar to that in Luo et al. (2017) to examine the comparative 
effects of the varying integration efforts across Africa‘s regional economic communities. To the best of the 
author‘s knowledge, no study on Africa has investigated this comprehensively. This study offers to fill the 
gap using evidence from the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), East African Community (EAC), Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) 
                                                          
3
 Where regulatory and other conditions in the banking markets will be so closely identical that pricing of financial 
assets will be uniform across national borders. 
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and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)4. This comparative assessment is expected to 
deepen the empirical understanding of the role of both de jure and de facto financial integration in 
determining bank profitability in Africa. 
Overall, deeper financial integration in Africa is expected to progressively remove entry barriers at the local 
and international levels to allow for increased capital mobility and cross-border participation. This is 
expected to stimulate competition and promote efficient resource allocation. However, increased banking 
competition has implications for the risk-taking behavior of financial intermediaries (Marcus, 1984). 
According to Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2013), financial integration affects the market structure of banks and 
reduces their market share. This stimulates risky lending practices as banks struggle to maintain their profit 
margins5. This has major consequences for the stability of banking markets and the real economy (Motelle 
and Biekpe, 2015). It is therefore imperative that bank management, regulators, and policy makers are 
continually provided with the empirical evidence on the effect of financial integration and resulting 
competition changes on bank risk-taking behavior in Africa. Against this background, this thesis offers to 
test the relationship between financial integration, competition changes and bank risk-taking behavior in 
Africa, with emphasis on the sub-regional differences across five regional economic communities. The 
effects of quality regulation and corruption are also assessed. 
Also, competition changes resulting from deeper financial integration in Africa is expected to stimulate 
higher efficiency in the banking sector. The need to improve on the efficiency of Africa‘s banking systems 
serves to enhance the scope and scale of bank lending activities through cost-cutting innovations and other 
strategies. This highlights the need for a continuous empirical understanding of the nexus between 
competition and efficiency in Africa‘s banking markets. However, empirical studies on the competition and 
efficiency nexus of African banking sector are scanty and limited to the Quiet-Life hypothesis (Sarpong-
Kumankoma et al., 2017). The evidence of possible bidirectional causality will guide regulators and bank 
managers in better policy formulation for greater bank efficiency, especially in a period of growing 
competition amid higher deregulation and cross-border banking. This thesis therefore addresses this gap 
by testing for reverse causality between bank competition and efficiency in Africa and five sub-regional 
markets. 
                                                          
4
 Details of the country composition of the sampled banks are arranged by REC in appendix 1.A. 
5
 This is supported by empirical evidence from Broecker (1990); Keeley (1990); Jimenez et al. (2013). 
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According to Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), the interface between banking markets and the real economy is 
explained by the ‗credit-view‘ which suggests that credit availability significantly affects aggregate demand 
in an economy. Therefore, banks can influence production and innovation through their lending activities, 
which affects output growth (Samolyk, 1991). However, the ability of banks to effectively perform this 
intermediation function largely depends on the profitability and risk inherent in their lending activities. 
According to Bernanke and Lown (1991), the deterioration in bank loan performance and its resultant effect 
on interest revenues clog the credit-channel and may result in a credit crunch. The resulting decline in bank 
lending usually precede a decline in aggregate economic output (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). Therefore, 
understanding the interrelationship between bank lending behavior and economic growth in the nascent 
economies of Africa becomes an important exercise to direct pro-growth monetary and regulatory policies 
which aim at translating the lending activities of banks into development. However, the 2008 global financial 
crisis raise some genuine concerns among developing countries about the desirability of financial 
integration and bank lending growth for their economic welfare. Key among these concerns is the need to 
know whether there are limits to the growth and stability benefits of deeper integration and financial sector 
development for emerging economies and whether some countries in Africa have reached this threshold. In 
view of recent efforts by various regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa to unify their settlement 
systems and promote deeper banking integration and cross-border capital flows, a study of the causal 
nexus between financial integration, bank lending behavior and economic growth in Africa is not only 
timely, but critical to guide the policy decisions of leaders and firms in these sub-regions.  
Also, the African Union has nurtured the dream of harmonizing the activities of Africa‘s financial markets 
and institutions and promoting harmonious and accelerated economic development across the region since 
its establishment in 1963. Deeper financial integration and the convergence of the banking and other 
financial markets are therefore viewed as important markers of Africa‘s economic growth and 
harmonization process. According to Affinito (2011), banking convergence spurs real economic 
convergence among countries in a common market. Deeper financial integration in Africa is therefore 
expected to ensure that capital finds the most optimal uses for greater economic efficiency and growth. 
Besides, the numerous financial sector reforms and efforts made by Africa‘s regional economic 
communities to promote cross border banking and investment activities, highlights the need for policy 
makers to empirically understand the convergence properties of Africa‘s banking and real sectors. This will 
ensure more informed policies that accelerate the process of banking and economic harmonization in 
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Africa6.  To the author‘s best knowledge, studies on Africa have failed to account for the convergence 
properties of the banking sector. This thesis addresses this gap by examining banking and real economic 
convergence in Africa and five regional economic communities.  
In view of the above assertions, this thesis seeks answers to the following pertinent questions: What are 
the effects of de jure and de facto financial integration on bank profitability in Africa? How do financial 
integration and bank competition changes influence bank risk-taking behavior in Africa? What is the causal 
relationship between bank competition and efficiency in Africa? Is there banking and economic 
convergence in Africa? What is the causal nexus between financial integration, bank lending behavior and 
economic growth in Africa? Lastly, are there variations in these relationships across Africa‘s regional 
economic communities? 
 
1.3 Research objectives  
The broad aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between financial integration, bank performance 
and economic growth in Africa and five sub-regional markets. More specifically, the study seeks to achieve 
the following7: 
i. To examine the effect of financial integration on bank profitability in five regional economic communities 
of Africa;  
ii. To assess the effect of financial integration and competition changes on bank risk-taking in five 
regional economic communities of Africa;  
iii. To examine the direction of causality between bank competition and efficiency; 
iv. To examine the causal nexus between financial integration, bank lending behavior and economic 
growth in five regional economic communities of Africa. 
 
                                                          
6
 The World Bank (2007) examined economic convergence in the East African Community and Economic 
Community of West African States while African Development Bank (2010) studied the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa; the Arab Maghreb Union and the Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community.  
7
 Each research objective and associated hypothesis is well motivated by the ensuing arguments in the 
introduction and literature review sections of the related empirical chapters. Therefore, objectives i (H1), ii (H2) iii 
(H3) and iv (H4) are motivated in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. 
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1.4 Research hypothesis  
Based on the above stated objectives, the study seeks to test the following hypotheses: 
H1: Financial integration has a significant positive effect on bank profitability in Africa; 
H2: Financial integration has a negative effect on bank risk-taking behavior in competitive markets; 
H3: There is significant feedback causality between competition and efficiency in Africa‘s banking markets;  
H4: There is significant feedback causality between financial integration, banking sector development and 
economic growth in Africa. 
 
1.5 Organisation of the study 
The thesis comprises seven chapters, four of which are empirical chapters. Chapter One provides a 
background and introduction of the study, outlining the identification and justification of the research 
problem, the objectives and hypothesis of the study as well as the chapter disposition. Chapter Two 
comprises an overview of relevant aspects of the financial sectors of Africa, with emphasis on the variations 
across the regional economic communities. The discussion covers seven thematic areas, namely: financial 
integration and banking sector development, market structure and competition, efficiency, profitability, 
banking stability and economic growth. The empirical chapters, spanning from Chapters Three - Six are 
conceptualized along the framework in Figure 1.1, which illustrates the theoretical relationships between 
the concepts under study: financial integration, bank competition, efficiency, profitability, risk-taking 
behaviour, lending behaviour and economic growth.  
In Chapter Three, the thesis employs several dynamic panel data estimation methods to test the hypothesis 
that bank profitability in emerging markets is positively affected by financial integration. This was done 
using both de jure and de facto measures of financial integration and a composite measure of bank 
profitability constructed using principal components analysis in line with Luo et al. (2017). In addition, the 
chapter examines this relationship across five regional economic communities of Africa.  In Chapter Four, 
the thesis tests the hypothesis that there is a significant inverse relationship between financial integration 
and bank risk-taking behaviour in competitive banking markets using the fixed and random effects models. 
Also, the chapter test the so-called Martínez-Miera and Repullo (2010) theory by examining the nexus 
between competition and bank risk-taking behaviour using the quadratic form of bank Lerner index, 
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controlling for the effect of institutional quality on these relationships across the five regional economic 
communities of Africa.  
In Chapter Five, the study tests the quiet-life hypothesis as well as the efficient structure hypothesis using 
Granger-type causality tests. The chapter employs the stochastic frontier analysis technique to estimate 
both competition and efficiency scores for the 2007 to 2014 period. Additionally, the chapter examines the 
evolution and convergence of bank competition and efficiency in Africa and the five sub-regional markets to 
evaluate the levelling effect of financial integration on bank competition and efficiency after decades of 
financial sector reforms in these markets. In Chapter Six, the thesis tests the hypothesis that deeper 
financial integration and changes in bank lending behaviour promotes economic growth in emerging 
markets and vice versa using panel Vector Autoregressive analysis (PVAR).  The chapter further examines 
banking convergence and economic convergence for the harmonizing benefits of deeper financial 
integration in Africa and the five sub-regions.  Chapter Seven concludes the study by summarizing the core 
findings of the thesis and presenting relevant policy recommendations. Additionally, this last chapter 
presents readers with the key contributions and limitations of the thesis and proposes future research 
agenda based on some of the limitations identified.  
 
Figure 1.1: The conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‘s construct 
Economic Growth 
Bank profitability Bank lending  Bank risk-taking 
Financial integration 
Bank competition 
Bank efficiency 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1.A: Country composition of study sample by Regional Economic Community 
REC Country  
 
No. of 
Banks 
Country  
 
No. of 
Banks 
AMU Algeria  14 Morocco  11 
Libya  8 Tunisia  15 
Mauritania  6    
EAC Burundi  3 South Sudan  3 
Kenya  27 Tanzania  26 
Rwanda  8 Uganda  16 
ECCAS Angola  15 Chad  3 
Cameroon  5 DRC  11 
Central African 
Republic 
 2 Gabon  5 
ECOWAS Benin  5 Liberia  3 
Burkina  8 Mali  6 
Cape Verde  6 Niger  3 
Cote D'Ivoire  6 Nigeria  21 
Gambia  4 Senegal  9 
Ghana  19 Sierra Leone  7 
Guinea  3 Togo  3 
SADC Botswana  7 Namibia  4 
Lesotho  3 Seychelles  4 
Madagascar  4 South Africa  12 
Malawi  5 Swaziland  4 
Mauritius  11 Zambia  14 
Mozambique  7 Zimbabwe  9 
Others Djibouti  4 Ethiopia  9 
Egypt  21 Sudan  6 
Totals Countries  47 Banks   405 
Source: Author‘s collation of data from Bankscope database (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER TWO 
OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS OF FIVE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES 
OF AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a synopsis of relevant aspects of the financial sector of Africa, with emphasis on the 
AMU, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC sub-regions. The analysis covers seven thematic areas, 
namely: financial integration and banking sector development, market structure and competition, efficiency, 
profitability, bank stability and economic growth. The indicators of financial integration include both de jure 
and de facto measures of integration to account for both policy reforms and actual flows of capital and 
institutions across countries. The indicators of banking sector development and financial inclusion capture 
the domestic credit to the banking sector by banks and bank branches per thousand adults. The level of 
bank competition and efficiency measures market structure changes and competitive conduct of banks in 
periods of financial reforms. Additionally, the profitability and stability of the banking sector reflect the 
effects of financial integration and bank behavior on bank performance in an economy while the economic 
growth analysis reflects the effect of banking sector performance and other factors on real sector growth in 
an economy.    
 
2.2 Financial integration and banking sector development in Africa  
Over the past three decades, many African countries have adopted major financial sector reforms to 
unfetter the mobility and growth of capital and banking institutions across national borders. Financial 
integration has been at the heart of Africa‘s regional integration drive and the quest to overcome the 
region‘s political and socio-economic challenges, enhance global competitiveness of member countries and 
improve the livelihoods of their citizens (Ndomo, 2009; Muthoga et al., 2013). The small scale of national 
financial markets and institutions constrains financial sector development and reduces financial inclusion, 
resulting in high intermediation cost and low output growth. In recognition of these constraints, the African 
Union took steps to establish an African Economic Community (AEC)8 in 1980 (Ndomo, 2009). This 
                                                          
8
 This was later modified into the so-called Abuja Treaty of 1991. However, it was not until 1994 that a resolution 
was passed by the OAU Council of Ministers to commence its implementation. In effect, the treaty partitioned AEC 
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decision led to the establishment of a mosaic of regional economic communities, largely based on proximity 
and geographic region. However, the agreements and treaties that configure these regional economic 
communities allow for overlapping memberships due to political dichotomized and other strategic socio-
economic factors, which hinders the overall integration agenda of the AEC. Besides, progress has been 
slow, with mixed results across the regional economic communities.  
However, after years of effort, certain major setbacks have hindered progress towards achieving the stated 
aims of the AEC by the deadline of 2027. The success of financial integration largely depends on the scope 
and speed of reforms, the compliance of participating countries, as well as its effects on the conduct and 
performance of financial intermediaries (Frey and Volz, 2011). The literature on financial integration in 
Africa suggests that some successes have been achieved at the sub-regional level, with the formation of 
monetary unions, tariff agreements among others. Despite these improvements, the speed and scope of 
Africa‘s financial integration still lags behind that of other regions of the world (African Development Bank, 
2010; Cihák et al., 2012; Beck and Maimbo, 2013; Beck and Cull, 2014; Moyo et al., 2014). Figure 2.1 
shows that, for the period 2007 to 2014, while global financial freedom index averaged around 49.75%, that 
of Africa was 42.65%, compared to 42.93% for Asia-Pacific, 50.95% for the Americas and 64.30% for 
Europe. Also, net inflows of foreign direct investment averaged around 3.053% of GDP globally. However, 
Sub-Saharan Africa recorded an average of 2.84% while other regions like Central Europe and the Baltics 
recorded a net FDI inflow of 4.54% of GDP, the Euro Area recorded 4.82 % of GDP among others.  
There were also major variations across and within Africa‘s sub-regional markets. Appendix 2A shows that 
SADC member countries had the most liberalized financial markets in Africa, recording an average financial 
freedom index of 50.80 over the period 2007-2014. This was followed by the EAC financial system (49.97) 
and ECOWAS (46.12). However, the AMU and ECCAS recorded average financial freedom indices of 
34.19 and 36.69 respectively for the same period. Similarly, the ECCAS sub-region recorded the least 
foreign direct investment inflows (0.67 percent of GDP) for the study period. This was most likely due to the 
instability in the central African region among other factors. This was followed by the EAC sub-region (2.72 
percent of GDP), Also, for the 2007-2014 period, the AMU recorded an average FDI net inflow of 3.12 
percent of GDP per annum whiles ECOWAS and SADC respectively recorded averages of 4.17 percent 
and 5.70 percent respectively. Appendix 2A also shows that the AMU had the least regional cross-border 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
into five sub-regional communities: North, West, South, East and Central Africa with the view of establishing the 
AEC over a 34-year period spanning 1994 to 2027 (Ndomo, 2009). 
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banking as well as the least foreign bank activities in Africa.  For the 2007 - 2014 periods, the AMU had 
foreign bank assets making up only 11.88 percent of total bank assets whiles regional bank assets made 
up only 2.37 percent of total bank assets. This was much better in other regions. For instance, in the EAC, 
foreign bank assets accounted for 53.32 percent of total bank assets whiles regional bank assets 
accounted for 32.41 percent. In the ECCASS sub-region, foreign and regional bank assets accounted for 
54.76 percent and 27.09 percent of total bank assets respectively whiles accounted for 63.68 and 35.75 
percent in the SADC financial system respectively. The ECOWAS sub-region was found to maintain the 
highest numbers of both regional (43 percent) and foreign bank assets (65 percent) in Africa over 2007- 
2014.  
Figure 2.1: Financial integration in Africa and the rest of the world 
       
Sources: Data for the financial freedom index is sourced and summarized from the Economic Freedom Database of 
the Heritage Foundation (2016) while data for the Net inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) is sourced from the 
Global Financial Development Database of the World Bank Group (2016).   
 
Appendices 2B (I– IV) present evidence of the intra-REC variations of the financial integration measures 
used in the study. The evidence in Appendices 2 B (i) suggest that the high financial freedom recoded in 
the SADC bloc was largely led by Mauritius and South Africa with annual average financial freedom indices 
of 67.5 and 60 over 2007 - 2014 respectively whiles the least financially free economy is identified as 
Zimbabwe (11.43), followed by Seychelles (30). In the EAC, financial freedom was led by Uganda (58.75), 
Kenya (50) and Tanzania (50) whiles Burundi lagged behind with an average financial freedom index of 30 
per annum over the study period. Data for South Sudan was however not available on the WDI database. 
The study also found that though ECOWAS did not record the highest average financial integration in 
Africa, countries within the region seem to be doing quite well in terms of financial freedom. This was led by 
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Ghana (57.5), Cape Verde (57.5), Cote D‘Ivoire (55) and Benin (53.75) while Liberia (20) and Sierra Leone 
(25.71) lagged behind. In ECCAS, the process of financial freedom was led by Cameroon (50) and Chad 
(42) while the Democratic Republic of Congo (20) and Central African Republic (32.86) lag behind. 
Similarly, the pursuit of financial freedom in the AMU is slower than the rest of Africa. However, Morocco 
(60) and Mauritania (42.86) seem to lead the way while Libya (20) and Algeria (28.75) are the least 
financially free economies in the sub-region for the period under study.  
In terms of FDI inflows, Appendix 2 B (ii) shows that whiles Mozambique and Seychelles attracted the 
highest average net FDI inflows of 21.11 and 20.50 percent of GDP per annum for the study period in the 
sub-region, countries like South Africa (1.91 percent of GDP) and Swaziland (1.95 percent of GDP) 
attracted the least net FDI inflows per annum for the 2007-2014 period. In ECOWAS, FDI inflows were 
greatest in Liberia (34.18 percent of GDP per annum), Sierra Leone (11.33 percent) and Niger (10.17 
percent) while the least FDI net inflows were received by Cote D‘Ivoire (1.52 percent and Burkina Faso 
(1.63 percent). Evidence from the EAC shows that Uganda attracted an average of 4.62 percent of its GDP 
in FDI inflows whiles Tanzania receives 4.04 percent over the period 2007- 2014. However, South Sudan 
had an average annual loss of FDI inflows (-2.21) over the study period while Burundi recorded an average 
of 0.32 percent of its annual GDP as FDI net inflows for the period 2007-2014. Also, Appendix 2 B(ii) shows 
that in the AMU, Mauritania received the highest average annual inflows of net FDI inflows at 10.49 percent 
of GDP while Algeria received the least (1.22 percent of GDP).  Lastly, FDI net inflows in the ECCAS sub-
region is uneven, with Gabon receiving an average of 4.66 percent of its annual GDP as FDI net inflows 
over 2007-2014 while Angola had the lowest FDI net inflows of -2.15 percent of annual GDP for the same 
period.  
Appendix 2 B(iii) shows that within SADC, whiles the banking sectors of Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho 
are largely dominated by Pan-African bank assets, South Africa (0.12% of total bank assets), Mozambique 
(5.10%) and Seychelles (5.25%) are largely dominated by domestic banks. In ECOWAS, Liberia (70.70%), 
Benin (70.18%), Niger (63.08%) and Burkina Faso (61.90%) lead the regional banking integration drive 
while Cape Verde (0.28%) and Togo (16.51%) lag behind the rest. In the ECCAS banking sector, while 
Chad and Central African Republic (CAR) respectively had average regional bank assets of 52.37 per cent 
of total bank assets, Cameroon (5.62%) and Angola (15.87%) had the lowest regional bank assets in that 
sub-region. The EAC had similar disparities among member countries, with South Sudan recording over 90 
per cent of its bank assets belonging to Pan-African banking institutions whiles Kenya and Burundi had less 
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than 10 per cent of their banking assets in Pan-African banks. The situation is even worse in the AMU 
where all countries maintain less than 5 per cent of their assets in Pan-African banks. In the AMU, the 
highest regional bank assets was recorded in Tunisia (8.67%) over 2007-2014. Appendix 2.B (iv) shows 
similar disparities for the various countries‘ foreign bank assets ratios in each REC.   
The relatively low level of financial integration in Africa and its limited scope has adverse consequences for 
the development of Africa‘s financial markets, the competitive conduct of financial intermediaries and their 
profitability (Gamariel, 2015; Sissy et al., 2017). Figure 2.2 show that Africa has the most underdeveloped 
financial markets in the world. While the global average for private credit by deposit money banks stood at 
37.2% of GDP for the study period, Africa had an average of 14.06%. Also, at the sub-regional level, the 
evidence on Appendix 2C(i) suggest that the AMU sub-region recorded an average private credit by banks 
to GPD of 40.19% over the 2007-2014 period, followed by SADC (37.59%) and ECOWAS (19.07%), while 
regions like the EAC and ECCAS recorded average private credit to GDP percentages of 17.55 and 10.22 
respectively. However, the evidence in Appendix 2C(ii) shows that Morocco and Tunisia are leading the 
AMU member states in terms of financial sector development, recording average private credit to the 
domestic sectors of 67.68 and 62.68 percent of their GDPs over 2007-2014. Libya recorded the least 
private credit to the domestic sector by banks (10.51 percent of GDP), followed by Algeria (13.99%). In the 
EAC, average private credit to the domestic sector by banks is generally low, with the highest average in 
Kenya (30.05%). Most other countries in the EAC recorded private credit rates of less than 20 percent of 
their annual GDP values, with the lowest being South Sudan at 0.98 percent of annual GDP. The ECCAS 
sub-region has a much lower financial sector development rate as the 2007-2014 average of no single 
country reached 20 percent of GDP. However, the least private credit to the domestic sector by banks was 
recorded in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In ECOWAS, Cape Verde has the most developed financial 
sector whiles Sierra Leone has the least developed financial sector. Also, average financial sector values in 
ECOWAS across the various countries are low and needs improvement as well. The study finds that in the 
SADC region, the least financially developed market is Malawi, with average private credit to the domestic 
sector by banks of 10.42 percent of annual GDP over 2007-2014. However, Mauritius (86.89%) and South 
Africa (70.83%) led the rest of the SADC members in terms of private credit to the domestic sector by 
banks. 
These findings clearly suggest that whiles there are major challenges with forging inter-REC collaborations 
towards a broad harmonization across Africa‘s financial markets, significant disparities exist within each 
sub-regional bloc, where shared policies and programmes have still failed to promote convergence of key 
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financial market indicators. This reduces the commonalities that are needed to motivate national leaders to 
agree on terms and conditions for deeper integration across Africa.  
 
Figure 2.2: Private credit to domestic sector by banks (as a percentage of GDP): Africa and the 
World 
 
Source: Author‘s computation from the World Bank‘s Global Financial Development Database (2016) 
 
2.3 Market structure and competition in five RECs of Africa 
Prior to the introduction of financial sector reforms, African financial markets were largely government 
controlled and entry restricted to a few large firms. The banking sector, which was largely inherited from the 
erstwhile colonial administration, was dominated by foreign banks and some state-owned banking firms 
(Stiglitz, 1993). However, after years of reforms, there have been some improvements. However, several 
studies still find African bank markets highly concentrated, uncompetitive and very volatile compared to 
most other regions of the world (Beck et al., 2011; Amidu and Wolfe, 2013; Beck and Cull, 2014; Moyo et 
al, 2014; Marchettini, Mecagni and Maino, 2015; Leon, 2016).  
Figure 2.3(A) shows that apart from two geographic regions (East Asia and the Pacific: Middle East and 
North Africa), Africa has one of the most uncompetitive banking sectors in the world with an average Lerner 
index of 0.29 as opposed to the world average of 0.28 and better in other regions over the 2007-2014 
period. Similarly, Figure 2.3(B) shows that bank competition in Africa is greatest in the East African 
community, followed by the ECOWAS and SADC banking sectors, with the ECCAS and AMU banking 
markets lagging the rest of the continent. Competition is mostly considered a positive stimulant in any 
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sector. According to Casu and Girardone (2009), competition fosters innovation and efficiency in the 
banking industry and helps improve the quality of services provided by firms in their bid to stay profitable. 
Besides, Beck and Cull (2014) affirm that lack of competitiveness and other factors which promote 
inefficiencies in banking markets also have a negative effect on bank profitability (Ghosh, 2016). Also, 
Pagano (1993) opines that low levels of competition in banking markets is a recipe for inefficiency and poor 
service delivery, which has the end effect of adversely affecting the rate of economic growth.  
 
Figure 2.3: Bank Lerner index 
A: Africa and the rest of the world 
 
B: Five RECs of Africa 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations from World Bank‘s Global Financial Development (A) and Bankscope Databases (B) 
(2016). 
 
2.4 Bank efficiency in five regions of Africa 
Cost efficiency indicates a firm‘s ability to provide goods and services to its clients at optimal cost. 
According to Fu and Heffernan (2009) a cost-effective bank is better able to provide cheaper and more 
differentiated products to clients to stay profitable. Achieving efficiency in financial markets is therefore a 
desirable goal of regulatory authorities as this enhances the turnover of capital and ensures greater 
productivity in an economy. The evidence from Figure 2.4 shows that African banking markets are the most 
cost-inefficient in the world, recording the highest cost-to-income ratios across all years from 2007-2014. 
Similar tends are recorded in the sub-regional markets in Africa (Appendix 2C). 
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Figure 2.4: Bank cost-to-income ratio 
 
Source: Author‘s computation from the World Bank‘s Global Financial Development Database (2016) 
 
Also, Figure 2.5 shows that banks in Africa shift the excessive cost of their operations to customers in the 
form of high lending-deposit spreads. This further point to the lack of competitiveness of the banking 
industry in Africa and the possible negative effects it has on investment borrowing and economic activities 
(Amidu, 2015).  
 
Figure 2.5: Bank lending-deposit spreads 
 
Source: Author‘s computation from the World Bank‘s Global Financial Development Database (2016). 
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2.5 Financial stability  
A stable financial system is considered a very important ingredient for promoting efficient resource 
distribution for higher economic growth. However, achieving an optimal resolution of the trilemma of 
promoting economic growth through enhanced bank efficiency via greater competitiveness and bank 
stability evades even the most advanced economies. Figure 2.6 shows that Sub-Saharan Africa is among 
the most volatile financial sectors in the world. Over the period 2007-2014, Africa largely maintained the 
second most volatile banking sector globally, only performing better than the European Union and Central 
Asia. 
Figure 2.6: Bank z-scores  
 
Source: Author‘s computation from the World Bank‘s Global Financial Development Database (2016). 
 
Also, Table 2.1 shows that average bank insolvency risk is also generally high, with z-scores averaging 
around 21.23 for the sampled banks over 2007-2014, while bank nonperforming loans ratio averaged 
around 5.32 percent of total loans for the same period. There are also major variations among Africa‘s sub-
regional markets, with the AMU banking market recording the highest distance to default of 31.83 percent, 
followed by the SADC and EAC banking sectors with z-scores of 21.10 and 19.11 percent respectively. The 
ECOWAS and ECCAS regions lag the rest, recording average z-scores of 17.95 and 15.86 percent 
respectively.    
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Africa’s financial and banking sector 
Region Banks’ weighted average Z-Score NPL ratio 
AMU 31.83096 0.0372947 
EAC 19.10615 0.0555854 
ECCAS 15.86275 0.0307917 
ECOWAS 17.94684 0.0802956 
SADC 21.09895 0.0406409 
Full Sample 21.22535 0.0532043 
Source: Author‘s computation from the World Bank‘s Global Financial Development Database (2016). 
   
2.5.1 Bank profitability  
Bank profitability has been identified by the theoretical and empirical literature to provide the necessary 
cushion for economic shocks and provide the needed capital to revamp an ailing economy in times of crisis 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Greater bank profitability breeds innovation and efficiency, which both enhance 
economic growth (Chen and Liao, 2011). However, adverse factors such as the recent financial crisis may 
adversely affect bank profitability and their ability to cushion the economy against major shocks. Figure 2.7 
shows that the banking sector in Africa took a general hit during the 2008 global financial crisis. From 
moderate performance in 2007, all banking markets in Africa realized major reductions in their return on 
asset in the 2008-2009 period, with the effect lasting up to the 2010 fiscal year for the AMU and ECCAS 
banking sectors. Figure 2.7 shows that the ECOWAS region recorded the lowest bank return on assets in 
the 2009 fiscal year, but subsequently rose up to outperform the other banking markets in subsequent 
years. The EAC and SADC regions recovered after the 2009 period to normalize their bank profitability 
following the crisis.   
Figure 2.7: Bank return on assets 
 
Source: Author‘s computation from the Bankscope Database (2016). 
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2.6 Economic growth in Africa: A sub-regional analysis 
Economic growth reflects the ability of a country to effectively and efficiently mobilize and optimize the 
benefits of both local and foreign factors of production. Economic growth is a desirable state for all 
countries as it promotes better living standards and enhances the value of life. Figures 2.8 shows that 
African economies have seen moderate but steady rise in their GDP levels over the years, with a significant 
fall in economic growth over the 2008-2009 period in response to the impulses of the global financial crisis 
of 2008.  However, almost all REC normalized their GDP levels subsequently except the AMU sub-region 
which saw a continuous fall in per capita GDP levels (GDPPC) over the next couple of years till 2013 after 
which per capita GDP begun to rise again. Also, the growth rate in GDP and per capita GDP in the AMU 
saw significant hikes and dips over the period, reducing drastically between 2010 and 2011, with a 
significant rise over the next year (2011-2012) and then falling back to normal after another period (2012-
2013). This could be attributed to the beginning and end of the so-called Arab spring, which saw significant 
political instability in this region over the period.  
Figure 2.8: GDP and per capita GDP in Africa’s regional economic communities 
  
  
Source: Author‘s calculations from World Bank‘s World Development Indicators Database (2016).  
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses starlit facts about Africa‘s financial system. The discussions show that despite years 
of reforms and attempts to foster synergies across countries and sub-regional blocs, Africa‘s financial 
systems are still poorly developed, highly uncompetitive and very volatile compared to most other regions 
of the world (Beck et al., 2011; Amidu and Wolfe, 2013; Beck and Cull, 2014; Moyo et al, 2014; Marchettini, 
Mecagni and Maino, 2015; Leon, 2016; Oduor, Ngoka and Odongo, 2017). Consequently, bank efficiency 
and profitability in Africa are generally low and per capita GDP lags that of many regions of the world. From 
the foregoing discussions the study conjectures that financial market conditions in Africa play a significant 
role in determining the performance of banks and these affect the growth performance of African 
economies. This imposes the need for a continuous empirical interrogation of Africa‘s ongoing financial 
integration process vis-à-vis financial intermediary and general economic performance to guide policy 
initiatives that ensure the region enjoys positive net benefits from integration. In the ensuing chapters, the 
study examines the relationship between Africa‘s financial integration process, bank performance and 
economic growth and compares the results across five regional economic communities for peer-learning 
and better understanding of the sub-regional differences in these relationships.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.A: Financial integration and banking sector development in Africa: inter-REC summary 
              
             
Sources: Authors‘ calculations from Heritage Foundation‘s Economic Freedom (i), World Bank‘s Global Financial Development (ii) and Bankscope (iii and iv) Databases (2016) 
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Appendix 2 B (i): Financial integration in Africa: intra-REC summary: FINFREE 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations from Heritage Foundation‘s Economic Freedom Database (2016) 
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Appendix 2 B (ii): Financial integration in Africa: intra-REC summary: Net FDI inflows 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations from World Bank‘s Global Financial Development Database (2016) 
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Appendix 2 B (iii): Financial integration in Africa: intra-REC summary: Regional Bank Assets 
 
 
Appendix 2 B (iv): Financial integration in Africa: intra-REC summary: Gross Foreign Bank Assets 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations from Bankscope  Database (2016). 
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Appendix 2 C (i): Private credit to domestic sector by banks as a percentage of GDP by REC 
  
 
Appendix 2C (ii): Private credit to domestic sector by banks as a percentage of GDP Intra-REC 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations from World Bank‘s Global Financial Development Database (2016) 
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Appendix 2 D: Bank cost-to-income ratio in Africa’s sub-regional markets 
 
Source: Authors‘ calculations from bank financial statements on the Bankscope Database (2016). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND BANK PROFITABILITY IN FIVE REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITIES OF AFRICA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The last three decades have witnessed a rapid increase in financial integration in both advanced and 
emerging economies (Agenor, 2003). This has been inspired by the long-held view that financial integration 
and other variables which stimulate financial sector development are growth-enhancing (Schumpeter, 
1911; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). For instance, Giannetti and Ongena (2009) argue that financial 
integration enhances capital and institutional mobility across national borders, promotes financial sector 
development and financial inclusion (Beck et al., 2014). Therefore, countries seeking higher and faster 
economic growth view financial integration as an important catalyst for enhancing international 
participation, credit expansion and output growth (Saafi, Mohamed and Doudou, 2016). In view of this, 
many African countries have since the mid-to-late 1980s, implemented several financial reforms that have 
significantly altered the structure and conduct of their baking and other financial services industries 
overtime.  
Over the past two decades, financial integration in Africa has accelerated foreign bank penetration and 
local banking sector growth, intensifying competition among financial intermediaries (Claessens and van 
Horen, 2014). These changes, coupled with the growing network of bank branches and subsidiaries across 
Africa ensures that capital promptly reaches the most rewarding investment opportunities in the region for 
higher efficiency and output growth (Beck et al., 2014; Claessens and van Horen, 2014; Leon, 2016). 
However, prior studies suggest that such a paradigm shift in banking activities has significant effects on 
bank profitability in emerging economies (Weill, 2013). For instance, Leon (2016) and Sissy et al. (2017) 
among others, contend that foreign direct investment and foreign bank penetration promote technology 
transfers to the domestic banking sector and enhances cost efficiencies and profitability. Luo et al. (2017) 
further suggest that increased competition from foreign banks promotes innovation in bank processes and 
products, which enhances profitability. In contrast, Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) contend 
that competitive pressure from foreign bank participation and domestic industry growth places a downward 
pressure on domestic banks‘ lending spreads, which reduces their profitability (Peria and Mody, 2004; Silva 
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and Pirtouscheg, 2015).  Similarly, Ghosh (2016) found that despite improvements in bank cost efficiency, 
financial integration reduces bank profitability in 169 countries studied over the 1998-2013 period. Besides, 
the losses incurred by major banks during the recent global financial crisis have been blamed largely on 
unbridled financial integration and the need for financial intermediaries to increase their margins in a 
saturated marketplace (Lane, 2012). The outcome of the crisis casts major doubts on the often-heralded 
benefits of financial integration for the banking sector.  However, in view of the empirical evidence 
supporting the positive effects of financial integration, Mishkin (2009) opines that the crisis should not be 
viewed as a slur on the benefits of financial integration but an opportunity to pursue a deeper 
understanding of the channels through which integration affects the economy. Also, Kose et al. (2009) 
suggests that the complexity of the risk-benefit nexus between financial integration and financial 
intermediaries‘ performance requires the tailoring of programs to specific country or regional settings to 
succeed. 
In sum, the empirical evidence on the effects of financial integration on bank profitability is still uncertain 
and is compounded by the use of different proxies for bank profitability in the different studies. Also, there is 
a paucity of literature on the effect of financial integration on Africa‘s embryonic banking sector. Coupled 
with the lack of a comparative discourse, this gap clogs the ability of policy makers to harmonize legal 
frameworks and policy initiatives that increase the benefits of greater financial integration in Africa9. Also, 
though Ghosh (2016) includes 45 African countries in their study, several studies10 find significant 
discrepancies in their results when large international samples are broken into regional and/or sub-regional 
samples supporting the argument by Kose et al. (2009). This chapter addresses these gaps by examining 
the effects of the ongoing financial integration in Africa on the overall profitability of banks in emerging 
economies using a sample of 405 banks operating in 47 countries across five regional economic 
communities of Africa for the period 2007-2014. It employs fixed effects and the dynamic two-step system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques to examine the effect of financial integration 
on bank profitability in Africa. The study controls for the effect of an array of firm, industry and 
macroeconomic variables to enhance the managerial, regulatory and policy implications of the findings 
                                                          
9
 Two key studies (AfDB, 2010; World Bank, 2007) which together examined Africa’s financial integration across 
five RECs failed to account for the effect on overall bank profitability. 
10
 See Andersen and Tarp (2003) and Masati et al. (2015) for studies where results vary when samples a limited to 
regional and sub-regional samples respectively. 
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The chapter therefore makes several contributions to the ongoing conversation on bank profitability 
determinants in emerging markets. First, the Standardized Bank Profitability Index (SBPI) constructed using 
principal components analysis allows the study to examine the effect of financial integration and other 
determinants of overall bank profitability from a more holistic perspective. Second, the chapter provides 
evidence of the varying effects of both de jure and de facto measures of financial integration in Africa. 
However, while the effects of the control variables are consistent with other earlier studies, cost-efficiency is 
found to have a negative effect on overall bank profitability in Africa. This could be attributed to the 
increased cost of diversification (Sissy et al., 2017) and higher non-performing loans within the period of the 
global financial crisis. Third, the chapter expands the limited studies on the impact of financial integration in 
Africa by examining the effects of both international and regional financial integration on bank profitability in 
the region. Finally, the chapter provides a comparative dimension by examining the results across five 
regional economic communities (RECs) of Africa, which serve as nodes of financial integration in the 
region. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature 
on financial integration and bank profitability. Section 3.3 explains the data, variables and research 
methodology while Section 3.4 presents and discusses the results. Lastly, Section 3.5 concludes the 
chapter.       
 
3.2 Literature review  
Largely, bank profitability studies are guided by the relationship between bank market structure and 
profitability based on the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis (SCP) and the Chicago Revisionist 
School (Efficient Structure Hypothesis). Proponents of the SCP paradigm argue that the behavior and 
performance of banks is primarily determined by the structure conditions in the market and so, in 
concentrated markets, few large banks collude to charge higher prices for their output (Bain, 1951; Stigler, 
1964) or use their size to offer differentiated products and gain large market shares, thereby earning 
supernormal profits. In contrast, supporters of the Efficient Structure (ES) hypothesis contend that it is 
rather efficiency that determines the profitability of banks and not their market structure conditions 
(Demsetz, 1973).  
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Similarly, the empirical literature on the effect of financial integration on bank profitability is saddled with 
contentions. Theoretically, financial integration is identified as a major catalyst for promoting financial sector 
development, enhancing competition among financial intermediaries and forcing intermediaries to seek 
innovative and efficient ways to distribute capital and stay profitable (Amidu and Wilson, 2014; Moyo et al, 
2014; Sissey et al., 2017). However, a section of the literature advocates that increased foreign bank 
participation and related competitive pressure induced by financial liberalization negatively correlates with 
bank profitability (Chelo and Manlagnit, 2011; Ghosh, 2016)11. For instance, Amidu and Wilson (2014) find 
that increased liberalization and foreign bank entry spur competition in domestic banking markets. This 
places a downward pressure on bank lending spreads (Peria and Mody, 2004; Silva and Pirtouscheg, 
2015) and adversely affects their profitability (Chelo and Manlagnit, 2011; Ghosh, 2016). In response to 
falling market shares and reduced intermediation spreads, banks may engage in risky investment activities 
to maintain their profit profiles (Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Moyo et al., 2014), which to huge losses and a 
negative effect on profitability and bank stability (Aoki and Nikolov, 2015; Sissey et al., 2017). Additionally, 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) argue that foreign banks were largely responsible for the transmission of the 
2007 -2009 financial crises to emerging economies which led to major losses among banks globally. 
Therefore, structural changes resulting from financial integration could affect banks‘ ability to collude and 
reduce financial intermediation spreads, thus, impacting negatively on bank profitability. Moreover, 
Detraiache et al. (2008) suggest that though foreign bank presence may bring with it some efficiency gains 
from technological and managerial know-how spillovers, this is easily eroded by higher compliance cost, 
leading to a negative effect on bank profitability. Sehn, Wu and Lu (2009) added that the excessive cost of 
adopting innovative technologies, providing diversified products and serving new market segments leads to 
profit losses, especially in the short term.  In line with this Ghosh (2016) finds that even though financial 
integration positively affects bank efficiency in 169 countries, profits are negatively affected.  
In contrast, the empirical literature supporting a positive nexus between financial integration and bank 
profitability suggest that efficiency gains from foreign bank entry enhances the profitability of banks in an 
economy.  For instance, Mishkin (2007) intimate that foreign banks from more advanced regulatory 
environments induce prudential regulatory reforms that goes to enhance the overall health of the domestic 
                                                          
11
 This is in line with the SCP hypothesis, which suggest that factors that distort the structure conditions and 
franchise values of banks reduce their pricing power from collusive behaviours or market share advantages and 
negatively affects their profitability.  
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banking sector. Similarly, Pohl (2011) finds that the technological and regulatory spillovers from foreign 
bank entry broadly enhance the efficiency and profitability of banks in Africa (Luo et al., 2017). According to 
Andries and Capraru (2013), foreign bank presence stimulates banking competition and compels domestic 
banks to pursue efficiency goals to stay profitable (Gamariel, 2015). Also, using a sample of 107 Chinese 
commercial banks, Luo et al. (2017) find a positive nexus between foreign bank branch network and bank 
efficiency, profitability and overall performance. In the same vein, Sissy et al. (2017) find evidence 
supporting a positive relationship between foreign bank entry and bank risk adjusted profits gained from 
diversification in a sample of 38 African countries. They argue that competitive pressures from foreign bank 
entry compels banks to diversify into previously untapped market segments, non-traditional income 
generating banking activities and other product innovations that help improve their overall profitability and 
stability. Also, empirical studies using de facto measures of financial integration often conclude that the 
latent benefits from increased foreign capital mobility to an economy as well as higher participation rates 
generally have a positive effect on banking profitability (Mishkin, 2007). 
In sum, the empirical literature on the relationship between financial integration and bank profitability is 
uncertain. While it is still theoretically justifiable for African countries to escalate financial integration in a bid 
to enjoy its growth benefits, the empirical evidence on its effect on the banking sector is not always in 
support of this view. Taking stock of the contrasting arguments on the effect of financial integration on bank 
profitability, it is critical that bank managers, regulatory authorities and policy makers in Africa are 
continually provided with empirical evidence on the effect of the region‘s ongoing integration on bank 
profitability in the region. This will ensure policy initiatives and actions that will allow Africa to enjoy the 
benefits of integration while avoiding the pitfalls.  
 
3.3 Data and methodology 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the effect of financial integration on bank profitability in Africa‘s 
regional economic communities. For this purpose, this study estimates the following static and dynamic 
panel models based on Luo et al. (2017), Garcia and Guerreiro (2016) and Ghosh (2016) among others:  
                     ∑        ∑        ∑                                            
 
                           ∑        ∑        ∑                                         
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where BPi,t  is  the dependent variable representing bank i‘s profitability at time t. This is proxied by the 
standardized bank profitability index (SBPI) and subsequently by return on assets (ROA). FIj,t represents 
financial integration for each country at time t while Xi,t, Zj,t and Mj,t are vectors of bank-level, industry-level 
and macroeconomic controls respectively. Also, αi,t represent the bank-specific intercept; YDit is a year 
dummy while it is the error term. δ represents persistence of bank profits and is between the values of 0 
and 1, with higher values denoting more persistence and a less competitive banking industry12.  
Following the extant literature (Luo et al., 2017; Garcia and Guerreiro, 2016; Ghosh, 2016; Sissy et al., 
2017), the study first estimates the static model in Equation 1 using the panel fixed effects and random 
effects estimation techniques for the full sample. These static models control for the effect of time-variant 
unobserved heterogeneity in the model (Ghosh, 2016). Second, the dynamic framework in Equation 2 is 
implemented using the two-step system GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) with Windmeijer (2005) correction for standard errors.  According to Roodman (2009), the two-
step system GMM estimator helps improve the efficiency of the model by dealing with such challenges as 
endogeneity problems, unobserved heterogeneity and profit persistence. For instance, bank specific 
variables are affected by current and/or previous bank performance and these variables may be 
endogenously determined in the model. Besides, bank performance in one year could affect subsequent 
year bank performance levels which all pose endogeneity concerns. Also, bank profit persistence reveals 
their ability to harness the benefits of their market power through product diversification and innovative 
distribution systems. The two-step system GMM estimator therefore uses lagged values of the dependent 
variables in levels and changes in each dependent variable and each endogenous regressor as 
instruments. Besides, the methodology helps account for effects of the competitive conduct of banks in 
response to market structure changes resulting from increased financial integration on their profitability. It 
also more adequately addresses the issue of unit roots for dynamic panels and produces more efficient 
results for large N and small t panels like our sample (Tan, 2016; Roodman, 2009).  
To measure the dependent variable, the study first estimates four widely used proxies of bank profitability: 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), net interest margin (NIM) and non-interest income margin 
(NON). Second, the study estimates a standardized bank profitability index (SBPI) using principal 
                                                          
12
 The two models are applied on the entire sample, but only the system dynamic two-step system GMM 
methodology is used in the sub-regional estimations. 
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components analysis (PCA) of the four proxies13. Following the work Pradhan et al. (2014), the bank 
profitability index is constructed as follows14:  
        ∑    
 
   
 
    
    
                                                                                                                          
where BPIi,t is the bank profitability index, Sd is the standard deviation of all variables, Xit is the ith original 
proxy for bank profitability in year t; and wit is factor loadings derived from PCA. Equation 3 allows us to 
transform the original variables into uncorrelated components that are orthogonal to each other and helps 
reduce the number of latent variables used to explain bank profitability while accounting for most of the 
variance in the original set of proxies used15.  
However, the study applies the commonly used stopping rule where only those components with an 
eigenvalue of 1 or more are included in the construction of the index. Therefore, conducting a principal 
components analysis of the four proxies, the study finds that the first two principal components (Component 
1 and 2) have eigenvalues greater than 1 each and the cumulatively account for 79.93% of the variations in 
the four bank profitability indicators. Component 1 accounts for 52.47% of the variations while component 2 
accounts for 27.46% of the variations. Therefore, the banking profitability index is constructed using the 
following equation from Luo et al. (2017): 
 
         (
      
      
)  [                    ]  (
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The component scores for each bank is computed based on the work of Pradhan et al. (2014) as follows; 
                                                                                                   
                                                          
13
 The rational for using a composite measure of performance such as the standardized bank profitability index is 
that individually, each original proxy captures a distinct aspect of bank profitability without accounting for the 
overall profitability of a bank. Also, each proxy estimates the benefits of banking operations to peculiar groups of 
stakeholders. In view of this, Luo et al. (2017) argue that a composite measure of bank profitability allows for a 
broader assessment of its determinants and promotes more holistic managerial and policy initiatives that enhance 
total value maximization for a greater spectrum of stakeholders. 
14
 PCA helps solve this problem of multicolinearity by transforming the original variables into uncorrelated 
components that are orthogonal to each other.  
15
 See Pradhan et al. (2014) for a more detailed explanation of the PCA process. For the study sample, BPI captures 
the statistical correlations between the four proxies of bank profitability employed (ROA, ROE, NIM, NON), 
assigning weights to those proxies most correlated with the other proxies in the dataset.  
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where aij are component loadings and Xi refers to the original profitability measures. The component 
loadings represent weights, indicating the contribution of principal components to the variability in the 
original data set. However, as observed by Luo et al (2017) the use of PCA results in either positive of 
negative index values, making interpretation of the results challenging. The study therefore adopts the 
following formula from Shih, Zhang and Liu (2007) to standardize the index: 
          (
                
                  
)                                                                                                    
 
where minBPIi,t and maxBPIi,t  represent the minimum and maximum values of the index in the study 
sample. The resulting standardized banking profitability index has values ranging from 0 to 1, with higher 
values denoting better bank profitability and vice versa. In line with the literature, the study expects financial 
integration to have a positive effect on overall banking profitability in Africa.  
The main test variable, financial integration is estimated using both de jure and de facto measures to 
account for the policy and practical implications of financial integration for bank profitability16. First, the 
study uses the financial freedom index, a widely used measure of capital accounts liberalization, to proxy 
for the degree of financial openness for both foreign and local participation as well as the level of 
independence financial markets and institutions have from government interference. Therefore, higher 
index values denote greater financial freedom and vice versa. Second, the study uses the percentage of 
Net Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP from the WDI database as a de facto measure of financial 
integration. Net FDI inflows reflect the capital, knowledge and technological spillovers and other latent 
benefits that come with FDI inflows and foreign participation in domestic markets. Increased values are 
expected to positively influence capital accumulation, the scale of banking activities as well as bank 
performance in a country (Sissy et al, 2017). The study preferred the Net FDI to GDP over other de facto 
measures like the Lane and Milessi-Ferreti (2007) international financial integration index due to data 
availability for an extensive study of Africa‘s financial integration. Additionally, the study uses the ratio of 
total foreign banks‘ assets to total assets of the banking industry in each country as well as total regional 
                                                          
16
 According to Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) though capital accounts liberalization is expected to promote capital 
mobility, this might not always be the case and the inferences drawn from using one may not always apply to the 
other (Quinn, Schindler and Yoyoda, 2011). The study therefore employs four different measures of financial 
integration in the empirical analysis to account for the effect of capital accounts liberalization policies (de jure 
measures) and actual capital flows across countries (de facto measures). 
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banks‘ assets to total assets of the banking industry to account for the different effects of general 
international cross border banking and regional cross-border banking respectively (Shen et al., 2009)17.   
The study employs several controls shown by prior studies to affect the level of bank profitability (Dietrich 
and Wanzenried, 2014; Luo et al., 2017; Garcia and Guerreiro, 2016; Ghosh, 2016). Firm level controls 
include: bank capitalization measured as the ratio of total equity to total assets (Tan and Floros, 2012; 
Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2014); liquidity is measured as the ratio of liquid assets18 to deposits and short-
term funding (Francis, 2013; Ghosh, 2016); credit risk is estimated as the ratio of non-performing loan to 
total loans (Garcia and Guerreiro, 2016); efficiency is measured as the ratio of bank overhead costs to total 
assets (Masood and Ashraf, 2012; Garcia and Guerreiro, 2016). Income diversification is measured as the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of bank revenue (Ghosh; 2016; Sissy et al, 2017). Also, market 
concentration measured as HHI of gross loans and banking sector development, proxied by the level of 
domestic credit to the private sector by banks are included as industry level controls. The study also 
includes GDP growth rate and inflation to account for the effect of variations in the macroeconomic 
environment of banks.   
The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel comprising data from 405 commercial banks 
operating in 47 countries across five RECs of Africa for the period 2007– 2014. This constitutes some total 
of 2837 bank-year observations. Bank financial statements were collected from the Bankscope database of 
Bureau Van Dijk (2015) while industry and macroeconomic data was collected from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank Group (2016). Additionally, the study sourced financial 
freedom index (FI) data from the Economic Freedom Index database of the Heritage Foundation (2016). 
For computational reasons and consistent with the works of Maechler and McDill (2003), the study sample excluded 
banks for which we could not obtain accurate data for at least half of the study period. Therefore, the study sample 
includes only banks that had data available for at least half of the study period.   
 
                                                          
17
 A foreign bank refers to any bank with majority foreign shareholding and regional bank refers to a foreign bank 
whose majority shareholders are of African origins but outside the country under consideration. Both are 
computed by the authors from the Bankscope data. These are improvements on earlier studies on Africa which use 
dummies to proxy for foreign bank participation. 
18
 This comprises “cash and due from banks, trading securities and at fair value through income, loans and 
advances to banks, as well as reverse repos and cash collaterals” with a year or less maturities (Čihák et al., 2012, 
Ghosh, 2016).  
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3.4 Empirical results 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model. The figures all seem 
reasonable and in line with those reported by previous studies. Table 3.1 shows that net income in African 
banks is generally low, ranging from -0.003% to 0.037% and averaging at 0.017% of total assets value. 
However, the study finds that total profitability of the banks, measured by the SBPI is quite within 
acceptable levels as this falls between 0.448% percent of all income generating activities and ranges from 
0.158 to 0.769%. Comparing the mean return on assets for the five sub-regional settings, the study finds 
that SADC banks lead the region on return on assets while AMU banks seem to be the least performing 
banks in Africa. Also, the pairwise correlation coefficients and their respective statistical significance are 
presented in Tables 3.2. The correlation coefficients for all independent variables used in the study are 
below 0.7, thus show no signs of multicolinearity (Kennedy, 2008). 
The regression results are reported in Tables 3.3 – 3.5. Columns a, b, c and d in these tables examine the 
effects of financial integration by using financial freedom index (FI), net foreign direct investment to GDP 
(FDI), Foreign bank participation (INTFI) and regional bank participation (REGFI) respectively.  Table 3.3 
presents the results for both fixed and random effects models for the benchmark equation (Eqn. 1). In 
Table 3.4, the two-step system GMM estimation results are reported for both the standardized Bank 
Profitability Index (SBPI) and the return on Assets (ROA). Table 3.5 (A and B) compare the results for the 
standardized Bank Profitability Index across the five regional economic communities of Africa. The results 
for the control variables are in line with expectations.  
Table 3.4 shows the results from applying the two-step system GMM estimator to examine the 
determinants of bank profitability in Africa. The first part of Table 3.4 presents regression results for the full 
sample of 405 African banks using the standardized bank profitability index constructed from principal 
components analysis of four key bank profitability measures, ROA, ROE, NIM NONIM. The Wald X2 shows 
the joint significance of the variables and the Hansen test shows no signs of over-identifying restrictions. 
The second part of Table 3.4 presents results for bank return on assets. Though the estimations show the 
presence of first order autocorrelation, they are deemed consistent as they satisfy the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) test for second order autocorrelation. The results show that apart from the net inflows of foreign 
direct investment to GDP, both de jure and de facto measures of international financial integration as well 
as the proxy for regional financial integration positively and significantly affect bank profitability at the 5% 
and 10% respectively. The results suggest that both the liberalization of financial markets in Africa and the 
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activities of foreign and regional banks have positively impacted on the overall profitability of banks in the 
region. The insignificance of net flows of FDI to GDP implies that the technological benefits derived by 
African banks from financial integration could be attributed to the activities of foreign and regional banks 
and not the general inflow of foreign direct investments per se. overall, the results of the four measures of 
financial integration and the broad measure of banking profitability provide robust evidence in support of a 
positive nexus between financial integration and bank profitability in Africa. The study also finds evidence of 
profit persistence in the banking industry in Africa, reflecting the dynamic nature of the model and the low 
level of competition in the banking sector of Africa. This is evidenced by the significance of coefficients of 
the lagged dependent variables which ranges between the values of 0.6445, 0.6541, 0.6645 and 0.6750 for 
the estimations with international bank assets, financial freedom, regional bank assets and foreign direct 
investment to GDP respectively. These results are consistent in both the static and dynamic models.   
On the effects of the control variables, the study finds that the coefficients of bank operating cost to total 
assets are positively and significantly related to the standardized bank profitability index, suggesting that 
increased bank expenses within the study period impacted positively on profitability. This finding is in line 
with Tan (2016) who found a similar relationship for the Chinese banking sector for the period 2003-2011. 
Considering the timing of the two studies, it is intuitive to interpret this to mean that during periods of 
financial crisis and rising non-performing loans, banks that are willing to increase their expenses on loan 
collection and revenue diversification activities increase their profitability. Market share has a significant 
positive effect on bank profitability when financial freedom and foreign bank assets are used as proxies for 
financial integration. This suggest that in the presence of bank globalization, a bank with a large market 
share is in a better position to provide diversified products, beat the competition and stay profitable.  
Regarding the industry-level variables, the study finds that neither competition nor diversification 
significantly determine the overall level of bank profitability in Africa. However, the coefficients of banking 
sector development show that greater banking sector development in Africa has a significant inverse 
relationship with the standardized bank profitability index at the 1% level. Given that the study covers the 
entire period of the global financial crisis of 2008, this finding suggests that in emerging economies, banks 
operating in regions with more developed banking markets are more exposed to the negative effects of a 
global financial crisis and may thus suffer significant loses. This contrasts with earlier studies by Tan (2016) 
who found a positive relationship between banking market development and bank profitability among 
Chinese banks. 
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 Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
 
Table 3.2: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 
Sources: World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank Group and Authors‘ estimation from Bank scope data for 405 banks across 47 African 
countries for the period 2007-2014.  *, **, *** implies statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
Variable FULL SAMPLE (Africa) SUB-REGIONAL MARKETS 
AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
Mean SD. Min Max N Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD. 
SBPI 0.448 0.200 0.158 0.769 2834 0.279 0.160 0.491 0.179 0.500 0.171 0.483 0.185 0.498 0.206 
ROA 0.017 0.013 -0.003 0.037 2834 0.012 0.011 0.018 0.014 0.016 0.013 0.017 0.012 0.019 0.012 
CAR 0.124 0.051 0.061 0.223 2834 0.123 0.060 0.140 0.044 0.118 0.050 0.115 0.048 0.125 0.053 
OCA 0.050 0.027 0.017 0.097 2834 0.026 0.013 0.060 0.024 0.060 0.026 0.057 0.021 0.054 0.027 
NPLR 0.013 0.013 0 0.040 2816 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.011 0.012 
LIQ 0.411 0.205 0.153 0.783 2823 0.448 0.250 0.356 0.180 0.485 0.190 0.375 0.193 0.422 0.203 
DIV 0.360 1.893 -92.89 0.5 2825 0.109 4.882 0.423 0.101 0.398 0.154 0.395 1.120 0.412 0.259 
HHI 0.227 0.137 -0.39 1 2838 0.207 0.084 0.153 0.122 0.276 0.140 0.214 0.135 0.282 0.108 
MSH 0.115 0.114 0.006 0.342 2837 0.102 0.102 0.069 0.088 0.139 0.123 0.144 0.114 0.139 0.124 
FSD 26.62 21.38 0.416 108.02 2661 40.333 25.915 18.58 8.182 12.367 6.887 20.328 12.302 39.136 30.486 
GDP  5.33 7.09 -62.08 104.49 2834 3.647 16.661 5.734 4.312 5.817 5.700 5.940 3.477 4.994 3.254 
INFL 7.60 4.30 1.63 15.22 2829 4.347 2.461 9.065 3.926 7.756 5.087 7.255 4.728 7.003 3.384 
FI 45.24 13.09 10 70 2702 34.189 11.940 49.966 7.451 36.692 10.042 46.119 11.001 50.797 16.008 
FDI 4.17 6.14 -5.98 84.95 2819 3.122 3.820 2.722 1.991 0.669 3.821 5.703 7.712 6.414 8.025 
INTFI 0.502 0.257 0 1 2837 0.155 0.110 0.542 0.193 0.601 0.151 0.641 0.188 0.605 0.204 
REGFI 0.22 0.22 0 1 2837 0.027 0.038 0.201 0.188 0.231 0.162 0.382 0.194 0.260 0.259 
 SBPI ROA CAR OCA NPL LIQ DIV HHI MSH FSD GDPG INFL FI FDI INTFI REGFI 
SBPI 1.000                
ROA 0.727*** 1.000               
CAR 0.291*** 0.262*** 1.000              
OCA 0.476*** -0.113*** 0.227*** 1.000             
NPL 0.133*** -0.188*** 0.054** 0.267*** 1.000            
LIQ 0.070*** 0.028 0.144*** -0.004 0.037* 1.000           
DIV 0.045** 0.041** 0.019 0.035* 0.037** 0.012 1.000          
HHI 0.085*** 0.037** -0.105*** -0.003 -0.021 0.234*** 0.010 1.000         
MSH 0.115*** 0.113*** -0.312*** -0.059** -0.009 -0.091*** 0.026 0.469*** 1.000        
FSD -0.390*** -0.123*** -0.136*** -0.418*** -0.164*** -0.188*** -0.041** -0.089*** -0.097*** 1.000       
GDP 0.094*** 0.048** 0.024 0.095*** 0.040** 0.034* -0.005 -0.083*** -0.049** -0.131*** 1.000      
INFL 0.236*** 0.174*** 0.143*** 0.135*** 0.093*** 0.163*** 0.019 -0.175*** -0.179*** -0.262*** 0.089*** 1.000     
FI 0.006 0.099*** -0.060** -0.049** -0.066*** -0.194*** 0.026 -0.093*** -0.099*** 0.294*** -0.027 0.064*** 1.000    
FDI 0.102*** 0.000 0.004 0.117*** 0.106*** 0.115*** 0.008 0.247*** 0.143*** -0.065*** 0.061*** 0.009 0.028 1.000   
INTFI 0.250*** 0.070*** -0.050** 0.336*** 0.081*** -0.104*** 0.023 0.042** 0.113*** -0.194*** 0.041** 0.005 0.384*** 0.176 1.000  
REGFI 0.275*** 0.086*** -0.040** 0.297*** 0.090*** -0.042** 0.012 0.289*** 0.345*** -0.292*** 0.009 -0.072*** 0.056 0.116 0.603 1.000 
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The results of the macroeconomic controls suggest that GDP growth has a significant positive relationship 
with bank profits at the 5% level. Comparable results are reported in earlier studies by Masood and Ashraf 
(2012) and Perara et al. (2013), who explain that a growing economy is profit-enhancing as it increases 
loan demand and reduces loan default rates. Finally, inflation shows a significant positive coefficient at the 
1% level, reflecting the benefits derived by banks in an environment with high economic volatility, which 
allows them to earn more from their core intermediation activities of lending. Earlier studies by Tan and 
Floros (2012) and Trujillo-Ponce (2013) explain that banks can earn more on their loans and other interest-
earning activities in a high inflation environment. These findings are consistent with the results of prior 
studies and meet the study‘s a-priori expectations. 
The second half of Table 3.4 presents the two-step system GMM estimation results using return on assets 
(ROA) as an alternative proxy for bank profitability. The results show that both de jure and de facto financial 
integration have a positive and statically significant effect on bank profitability. The coefficients of the 
lagged values of return on assets are significant and confirm the dynamic nature of the model. Also, the 
significance of these coefficients, which range between 0.4515 and 0.6894, further affirms that both 
aggregate measures of bank profitability and the ROA persist overtime and that generally, banking markets 
in Africa are at best imperfectly competitive. The results of the ROA are consistent with that of the SBPI 
and show that all measures of financial integration except net flows of FDI to GDP are have a positive and 
significant effect on bank ROA at the 5% level. This reflects the positive effect of financial openness, 
foreign bank participation and regional cross-border banking activities on bank profitability in developing 
economies.  
The results further show that some key control variables affect ROA differently from the overall bank 
profitability measure (SBPI). The coefficient of operating cost is negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level for all measures of financial integration, suggesting that a reduction in bank operating cost due to 
competitive pressures from foreign and regional banks exert a positive influence on bank profitability in 
Africa. This is consistent with earlier studies (Flamini et al., 2009; Francis, 2013; Ghosh, 2016; Sissy et al., 
2017) which find that improved cost management in banks improves profitability. Non-performing loans is 
found to be negatively and significantly related to ROA at the 1% level. This indicates that poor asset 
quality among banks impacts negatively on profitability.  
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Table 3.3: Results for Standardized Bank Profitability Index (SBPI): Fixed and random effects (full 
sample) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   *, **, *** implies statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively and coefficients in bold are statistically significant. The diagnostic test reported include; (1) the 
Hausman specification test p-value; (2) the R square value; (3) F-statistic and Wald-chi to indicate the joint 
significance of the fixed and random effects models respectively; (4) number of observations; and (5) the number of 
banks used in the estimation. 
 
 
 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant 0.2911 0.1992*** 0.2971*** 0.2450*** 0.2682*** 0.1986*** 0.2803*** 0.2246*** 
(0.0313) (0.0262) (0.0227) (0.0207) (0.0296) (0.0229) (0.0236) (0.0208) 
FI 0.0002 0.0010**       
(0.0005) (0.0004)       
FDI   -0.0001 0.0005     
  (0.0005) (0.0005)     
INTFI     0.0587 0.0991***   
    (0.0391) (0.0225)   
REGFI        0.1039** 0.1346*** 
      (0.0419) (0.0254) 
CAR 0.7559*** 0.8265*** 0.7318*** 0.8185*** 0.7308*** 0.8294*** 0.7172*** 0.8014*** 
(0.0827) (0.0740) (0.0821) (0.0736) (0.0819) (0.0732) (0.0820) (0.0731) 
OCA  1.1640*** 1.8700*** 1.0920*** 1.7600*** 1.0930*** 1.6350*** 1.1250*** 1.6560*** 
(0.2215) (0.1826) (0.2219) (0.1820) (0.2212) (0.1835) (0.2213) (0.1820) 
NPL  -0.4752** -0.4299** -0.3540* -0.3159 -0.3441 -0.2834 -0.3698* -0.3247 
(0.2143) (0.2086) (0.2139) (0.2075) (0.2125) (0.2058) (0.2126) (0.2055) 
LIQ  -0.0093 0.0093 -0.0166 0.0006 -0.0200 8.58e-6 -0.0139 0.0043 
(0.0184) (0.0169) (0.0184) (0.0169) (0.0184) (0.0168) (0.0184) (0.0168) 
DIV -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
HHI -0.0934** -0.0770** -0.0561 -0.0345 -0.0552 -0.0307 -0.0594 -0.0482 
(0.0437) (0.0371) (0.0424) (0.0360) (0.0421) (0.0354) (0.0420) (0.0355) 
MSH 0.0575 0.2726*** 0.0535 0.2401*** 0.0470 0.2254*** 0.0375 0.1862*** 
(0.0725) (0.0514) (0.0719) (0.0512) (0.0719) (0.0508) (0.0719) (0.0517) 
FSD -0.0003 -0.0017*** -0.0003 -0.0017*** -0.0003 -0.0015*** -0.0005 -0.0015*** 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) 
GDP 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
INFL 0.0032*** 0.0039*** 0.0038*** 0.0044*** 0.0036*** 0.0042*** 0.0038*** 0.0046*** 
(0.0007) (.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Diagnostics         
R2 0.3250 0.4564 0.3172 0.4254 0.3505 0.4410 0.3875 0.4321 
Hausman test 87.56*** 87.56*** 81.29*** 81.29*** 70.04*** 70.04*** 57.48*** 57.48*** 
F-stat/ Wald    11.11*** 414.19*** 10.93*** 392.75*** 10.64*** 422.34*** 10.83*** 429.08*** 
Observations 2550 2550 2614 2614 2621 2621 2621 2621 
Banks 370 370 385 385 385 385 385 385 
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Table 3.4: Two-step system GMM results for SBPI and ROA 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   *, **, *** implies statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively and coefficients in bold are statistically significant. The diagnostic test reported include; (1) Wald    
for the joint significance of instruments, (2) the instrument count, (3) number of observations, (4) number of banks 
used in the estimation,  (5) p-values of the Arellano-Bond test for first and second order serial correlation in the 
residuals where the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation (6) p-value of the Hansen test of over 
identifying restrictions with the null hypothesis being that instruments are exogenous. 
 
 Standardized Bank Profitability Index Return on Assets 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Constant 0.0057 0.0096 -0.0019 0.0106 0.0050 0.0095*** 0.0038 0.0054* 
(0.0366) (0.0342) (0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0044) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0030) 
DepVar(t-1) 0.6541*** 0.6750*** 0.6445*** 0.6645*** 0.4880*** 0.6894*** 0.4515** 0.4668*** 
(0.1130) (0.1245) (0.1301) (0.1249) (0.1316) (0.0747) (0.1534) (0.1438) 
FI 0.0006*    0.0001**    
(0.0004)    (3.61e-5)    
FDI  0.0002    0.0001   
 (0.0005)    (3.21e-5)   
INTFI   0.0387*    0.0046**  
  (0.0224)    (0.0020)  
REGFI     0.0488**    0.0047** 
   (0.0201)    (0.0016) 
CAR 0.2434 0.3735 0.4210 0.3447 0.0333 -0.0103 0.0651** 0.0599* 
(0.3579) (0.3673) (0.3750) (0.3632) (0.0408) (0.0246) (0.0332) (0.0311) 
OCA  1.3020*** 1.1830*** 1.1470*** 1.1430*** -0.0587** -0.0363** -0.0852** -0.0788*** 
(0.2842) (0.2903) (0.2704) (0.2758) (0.0260) (0.0148) (0.0269) (0.0239) 
NPL  -0.3484 -0.3391 -0.3068 -0.3390 -0.1608*** -0.1503*** -0.1577*** -0.1572*** 
(0.2305) (0.2221) (0.2265) (0.2218) (0.0249) (0.0207) (0.0247) (0.0243) 
LIQ  0.0157 0.0057 0.0102 0.0104 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0007 
(0.0160) (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0153) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
DIV 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0001** 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
HHI -0.0191 -0.0026 -0.0080 -0.0182 -0.0045 -0.0018 -0.0042 -0.0047 
(0.0305) (0.0295) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
MSH 0.1239* 0.1166 0.1220* 0.0930 0.0128* 0.0013 0.0139** 0.0113* 
(0.0704) (0.0720) (0.0708) (0.0653) (0.0076) (0.0049) (0.0068) (0.0063) 
FSD -0.0005** -0.0004* -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0001*** -0.000*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (1.92e-5) (1.39e-5) (0.0001) (1.56e-5) 
GDP 0.0009** 0.0007* 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001*** 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (2.37e-5) (2.42e-5) (2.38e-5) (2.44e-5) 
INFL 0.0034*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Diagnostics         
Wald     2637.54*** 2652.35*** 2416.03*** 2750.92*** 486.38 *** 684.47*** 443.88*** 477.86*** 
Obs. 2171 2207 2214 2214 2171 2207 2214 2214 
Banks 370 380 380 380 370 380 380 380 
Instruments 36 36 36 36 29 33 36 36 
AR(1):  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00) (0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2):  0.222 0.227 0.232 0.230 0.145 0.105 0.152 0.136 
Hansen:  0.769 0.792 0.820 0.841 0.173 0.226 0.130 0.163 
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Similar findings have been reported in previous studies and reflect the adverse effects of information 
asymmetry and its associated perils of poor loan quality on bank profitability. Also, banking sector 
development has a negative and significant coefficient, implying that, higher banking sector development 
and commensurate lending activities of banks in Africa reduces bank profits. This may be explained by the 
high default risk in the region. However, diversification shows a positive effect on ROA. The positive 
coefficient, which is significant at the 5% for models involving financial freedom and international bank 
assets to total bank assets and at the 10% levels for models involving net flows of FDI to GDP and regional 
bank assets to total bank assets respectively. This is explained by the fact that a bank‘s ability to earn 
revenue from non-traditional activities has a positive effect on its return on assets.  These findings are 
similar to the results from the estimations involving the standardized bank profitability index and are 
consistent with the extant literature.   
 
3.4.1 Sub-regional comparison  
Table 3.5 (A and B) presents the results for the five regional economic communities of Africa. The 
comparison is necessary as the RECs in Africa serve as key nodes of regional financial integration, with 
each pursuing different but related financial integration goals with the aim of providing the foundations for 
broader financial integration in Africa. The results show variations in the effects of the different financial 
integration measures on bank profitability as well as that of the control variables.  
The AMU records no significant effect of financial integration on bank profitability. The study finds that 
despite high levels of banking sector development, the region has the lowest average levels of foreign and 
regional bank participation as well as limited financial freedom (Table 3.1). Therefore, despite exerting a 
positive effect on bank profitability, the low levels of financial freedom and FDI inflows have at best, an 
insignificant positive effect on overall bank profitability in the AMU. The effect of foreign and regional bank 
participation is seen to be negative and insignificant. In the EAC, the results show that financial freedom 
and regional banking activities have a significantly positive effect on overall bank profitability at the 5% and 
10% level respectively. This suggest that financial liberalization policies and the regional integration efforts 
in the EAC, coupled with other factors positively and significantly impacts on the profitability of banks 
operating in the sub-region. However, though insignificant, foreign direct investments in the EAC negatively 
affect bank profitability in the region. The results for ECCAS show that apart from the financial freedom 
index, all other measures of financial integration have positive and significant effects on bank profitability. 
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Table 3.5 (A): Financial integration and bank profitability: Sub-regional analysis using two-step 
system GMM 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   *, **, *** implies statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1% respectively and coefficients in bold are statistically significant. The diagnostic tests reported are as in Table 6.
SBPI AMU EAC 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Constant 0.1135* 0.1058* 0.1084** 0.1156* -0.2129** 0.0613 -0.0734 -0.0593 
(0.0689) (0.0576) (0.0542) (0.0592) (0.0842) (0.0888) (0.0711) (0.0637) 
SBPI(t-1) 0.8518*** 0.7689*** 0.8937*** 0.8605*** 0.4010** 0.4481** 0.3897** 0.4767** 
(0.0872) (0.0983) (0.0845) (0.0808) (0.1616) (0.1526) (0.1821) (0.1642) 
FI 0.0004    0.0033**    
(0.0007)    (0.0016)    
FDI  0.0008    -0.0049   
 (0.0009)    (0.0052)   
INTFI   -0.0648    0.0914  
  (0.1309)    (0.0714)  
REGFI     -0.1694    0.1218* 
   (0.1805)    (0.0704) 
CAR -0.2286 0.1681 -0.2420 -0.1853 1.0080* 1.0120** 1.1650** 1.0130** 
(0.4375) (0.3394) (0.4136) (0.3540) (0.5190) (0.3884) (0.4819) (0.4820) 
OCA  0.9306* 0.4121 0.8391 0.9575** 1.1920** 1.1190** 1.0740* 1.1500** 
(0.5247) (0.5835) (0.5402) (0.4726) (0.4899) (0.5291) (0.6176) (0.5189) 
NPL  -0.5679 -0.6324 -0.4978 -0.4458 -1.7470** -1.3520* -1.7900** -1.9590** 
(0.4438) (0.4941) (0.4362) (0.3894) (0.7323) (0.8151) (0.7882) (0.7022) 
LIQ  -0.0425* -0.0437 -0.0410** -0.0408* 0.0431 0.0018 0.0281 0.01980 
(0.0233) (0.0267) (0.0197) (0.0227) (0.0796) (0.0868) (0.0849) (0.0773) 
DIV 0.0002 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0002 0.2235** 0.1172* 0.1596** 0.1597** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0932) (0.0648) (0.0723) (0.0694) 
HHI -0.0704 -0.0049 -0.0573 -0.0984 -0.4177** -0.3742** -0.3193** -0.3387** 
(0.0875) (0.0857) (0.1021) (0.0922) (0.1444) (0.1310) (0.1440) (0.1212) 
MSH -0.1223 -0.1680* -0.1067 -0.1057 0.8565*** 0.6266** 0.7714** 0.6203** 
(0.0886) (0.0959) (0.0754) (0.0787) (0.2567) (0.2202) (0.2521) (0.2001) 
FSD -0.0010 -0.0008* -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0011 -0.0009 0.0014 0.0013 
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017) 
GDP 0.0002 -4.08e-5 0.0002 0.0001 0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0003 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0031) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
INFL 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 0.0022 0.0015 0.0020 
(0.0021) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014) 
Diagnostics        
Wald    1080.27*** 1190.41*** 1372.94*** 1289.18*** 315.67*** 218.23*** 218.00*** 266.07*** 
Obs. 294 289 294 294 445 449 451 451 
Banks 53 53 53 53 72 75 75 75 
Instruments 36 36 36 36 36 42 42 42 
AR(1): 0.009 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.002 
AR(2): 0.334 0.346 0.340 0.335 0.593 0.424 0.445 0.442 
Hansen: 0.690 0.629 0.675 0.710 0.260 0.309 0.268 0.309 
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Table 3.5 (B): Financial integration and bank profitability: Sub-regional analysis using two-step system GMM (Continued) 
SBPI ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Constant 0.3731* 0.3018** 0.2531* 0.2838** -0.0493 0.0707 0.0450 0.0707 -0.0527 0.0061 0.0149 0.0070 
(0.1602) (0.1265) (0.1342) (0.1351) (0.1034) (0.1009) (0.0993) (0.0931) (0.0918) (0.0699) (0.0685) (0.0709) 
SBPI(t-1) 0.4591*** 0.4443*** 0.4620*** 0.4230*** 0.2778* 0.3106** 0.2538 0.2304 0.5406*** 0.5612*** 0.5503*** 0.5446*** 
(0.0816) (0.0787) (0.0938) (0.0900) (0.1570) (.1546) (0.1651) (0.1679) (0.1055) (0.0906) (0.1104) (0.1003) 
FI 0.0014    0.0021**    0.0011    
(0.0020)    (0.0007)    (0.0012)    
FDI  0.0050**    0.0019**    -0.0020*   
 (0.0025)    (0.0009)    (0.0012)   
INTFI   0.0899*    0.0498    -0.0144  
  (0.0530)    (0.0410)    (0.0484)  
REGFI     0.1447**    0.0366    -0.0174 
   (0.0701)    (0.0383)    (0.0252) 
CAR 0.3139 0.0520 0.1060 0.0886 1.1380** 1.2230** 1.1720** 1.2050** 0.1568 0.1903 0.0924 0.1197 
(0.4864) (0.4661) (0.3429) (0.4548) (0.3774) (0.4112) (0.3784) (0.4052) (0.4033) (0.3854) (0.3977) (0.3950) 
OCA  0.6204 0.5441 0.6993 0.5228 1.4680** 1.4230*** 1.4210** 1.4680** 1.9510*** 1.771*** 1.9210*** 1.9570*** 
(0.6294) (0.5561) (0.5833) (0.5549) (0.4700) (0.4471) (0.4702) (0.4884) (0.4595) (0.4214) (0.4621) (0.4281) 
NPL  1.244** 1.270** 0.8146 1.0960* -0.8811 -0.8942* -0.7346 -0.8309 -2.1890** -1.8290* -2.1640** -2.2000** 
(0.5467) (0.5303) (0.6299) (0.6361) (0.5951) (0.5297) (0.5655) (0.5783) (.9237) (0.9395) (1.0270) (0.9412) 
LIQ  -0.1021 -0.1025* -0.1093* -0.0827 0.0523 0.0316 0.0638 0.0637 0.0245 0.0311 0.0235 0.0246 
(0.0665) (0.0602) (0.0607) (0.0547) (0.0503) (0.0465) (0.0533) (0.0519) (0.0330) (0.0303) (0.0331) (0.0325) 
DIV -0.0162 -0.0399 -0.0356 -0.0473 0.0950 0.0669 0.0749 0.0720 0.0244** 0.0204** 0.0218** 0.0220** 
(0.1214) (0.1038) (0.0825) (0.1364) (0.0763) (0.0647) (0.0729) (0.0682) (0.0115) (0.0094) (0.0010) (0.0097) 
HHI 0.0184 0.0664 0.0894 0.0302 -0.0421 -0.0901 -0.0697 -0.0936 0.0763 0.0814 0.0551 0.0552 
(0.0956) (0.0813) (0.0774) (0.1026) (0.0655) (0.0739) (0.0681) (0.0774) (0.0677) (0.0559) (0.0596) (0.0602) 
MSH -0.2960* -0.3253** -0.2946* -0.3061* 0.3346*** 0.2543** 0.2893** 0.2879** 0.1896** 0.1648** 0.1664** 0.1806** 
(0.1715) (0.1593) (0.1696) (0.1730) (0.1047) (0.0933) (0.1007) (0.1041) (0.0739) (0.0623) (0.0670) (0.0659) 
FSD -0.0057* -0.0028 -0.0045* -0.0028 -0.0025** -0.0021** -0.0024** -0.0021** -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
(0.0031) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
GDP 0.0012 0.0019 0.0014 0.0019 0.0009 1.95e-5 0.0007 0.0007 0.0064** 0.0061** 0.0059** 0.0055** 
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0028) 
INFL 0.0044* 0.0056** 0.0051** 0.0055** 0.0075*** 0.0050** 0.0069** 0.0066** 0.0051 0.0056* 0.0066* 0.0068** 
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0032) 
Diagnostics            
Wald    196.84*** 213.31*** 195.94*** 223.37*** 580.34*** 587.87*** 575.39*** 602.84*** 852.32*** 1002.04*** 776.89*** 843.77*** 
Obs. 226 232 232 232 570 572 572 572 422 426 426 426 
Banks 41 41 41 41 103 103 103 103 68 68 68 68 
Instruments 33 33 33 33 36 36 36 36 50 50 50 50 
AR(1):  0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004  0.001  0.001  0.003 (0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2): 0.758 0.611 0.451 0.480  0.102  0.103  0.109  0.105  0.405  0.510  0.402  0.389 
Hansen: 0.347 0.433 0.434 0.373  0.526  0.514  0.051  0.543  0.360  0.504  0.347  0.369 
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In ECOWAS, the results show that both financial freedom and FDI inflows to GDP have positive and 
significant effects on bank profitability at the 5% level. However, the results from the SADC community 
indicate that FDI inflows to GDP have a negative and statistically significant relationship with bank 
profitability. The two measures of cross-border bank participation were at best negative and insignificant 
while the measure of financial freedom was also positive but insignificant for SADC.   
Results for the control variables show that greater capitalization has a significant positive effect on bank 
profitability in the EAC and ECOWAS communities.  Also, operating cost is found to have a significant 
positive effect on overall bank profitability in the EAC, ECOWAS, and SADC sub-regions and when 
financial freedom index and regional bank assets are used as proxies for financial integration in the AMU. 
Operating cost has no significant effect on bank profitability in the ECCAS sub-region and no significant 
effect on profitability in AMU when FDI-to-GDP and foreign bank assets are used as proxies for financial 
integration. Non-performing loans (NPL) which proxies for credit risk has a significant negative effect on 
overall bank profitability in the EAC and SADC sub-regions and a negative but insignificant effect in the 
AMU banking sector. For ECOWAS sub-region, NPL ratio only has a significant effect on profitability when 
FDI-to-GDP is used as proxy for financial integration. However, contrary to the theoretical literature, the 
study finds a positive relationship between non-performing loans and overall bank profitability in the 
ECCAS sub-region. This could be explained by the macroeconomic and political volatility and experienced 
in this region which might be encouraging risky lending activities at high interest rates. Bank liquidity is 
significant and negatively related to profitability in AMU and ECCAS except when FDI-to-GDP is used as a 
proxy for financial integration in AMU and when financial freedom index and regional bank assets are used 
in ECCAS. This negative coefficient suggests that high liquidity reduces bank profitability in the affected 
sub-regional markets as it prevents banks from earning much from the liquid assets. The coefficient for 
diversification is significant and positive for the EAC and SADC banks. This implies that banks in these 
regions increase their profitability by exploring non-traditional sources of revenue. Competition proves to 
play a significant negative role in determining bank profitability in the EAC but has no significant effect on 
bank profitability in the other sub-regional markets. Market share has a significant positive relationship with 
bank profitability in the EAC, ECOWAS and SADC markets, but negative and significant in ECCAS and in 
the AMU when FDI-to-GDP is used to proxy financial integration.  
Moving to the effect of the macroeconomic controls, the study finds a strong inverse relationship between 
banking sector development and bank profitability in ECOWAS. Similar results are found when FDI-to-GDP 
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is used as a proxy for financial integration in AMU and when financial freedom and foreign bank assets are 
used in the ECCAS sub-region. The coefficients of GDP growth also show that a positive and significant 
relationship exist between real sector growth and bank profitability in the SADC region while inflation plays 
a significant positive role in the ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC banking markets. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
Over the past three decades, African countries have implemented several regulatory and structural reforms 
to promote the harmonization and integration of their financial sectors and facilitate the performance and 
ability of financial intermediaries to promote distributive efficiency and greater socio-economic 
development. Against this background, this chapter examines the level and determinants of overall bank 
profitability in Africa‘s banking sector and compares the results across five regional economic communities, 
which form the bedrocks of Africa‘s integration drive. The chapter employs both fixed effects and the two-
step system GMM estimation techniques on bank and country level data for 47 African countries covering 
the 2007 to 2014 period.  
The empirical investigation reveals that increased financial integration has a significantly positive effect on 
the overall profitability of banks in Africa. More specifically, the study finds that financial freedom, 
international and regional cross-border banking activities in Africa significantly increase bank profitability 
across Africa. The findings are in line with a recent study by Luo et al. (2017) for the Chinese banking 
industry. However, a recent study by Ghosh (2016) which included banks from 45 African countries found a 
negative effect of financial integration on bank profitability for the 169 countries studied. A possible 
explanation could be that, given that Africa‘s banking markets are not perfectly competitive, the 
liberalization of financial markets and the competitive pressure help improve their efficiency and force them 
to seek out new clients to stay profitable. Moreover, an underdeveloped equity and credit market system 
allows African banks to explore diversification benefits to improve upon their profitability.  However, a 
comparison of the results across five regional economic communities of Africa reveals that these benefits 
are not enjoyed by banks in all sub-regional markets. The study finds that financial integration in the AMU 
sub-regional market has no significant effect on bank profitability, reflecting both the regions low level of 
financial freedom and cross-border banking activities shown in Chapter Two. Also, the findings show that 
higher operational cost in increasingly integrated financial markets could adversely affect bank ROA but increase 
their overall profitability. These findings suggest that the adverse competitive effects of deeper financial 
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integration on bank ROA could be averted by banks‘ willingness to increase their operational cost through 
investments in product innovation and diversification, credit collection methods and customer mobilization 
activities. . However, an inter-REC comparison of the results shows major variations in the effects of financial 
integration and other factors on bank profitability across Africa‘s sub-regional markets. This proofs the 
disproportionate levels of financial integration in the RECs of Africa and reflects the challenges faced by policy 
makers in their effort to ensure the overall integration of the region‘s financial markets. In the EAC, where 
competition plays a major role in determining bank profitability, the ability of a bank to diversify its revenue 
sources also proves to be significant and critical for a bank‘s profitability. Also, banks in Africa tend to 
benefit significantly from the high inflation regimes in most African countries. However, at the sub-regional 
level, the effect of inflation on bank profitability is predominantly negative. 
From a development finance perspective, the study findings support the view that continuous financial 
integration in Africa is beneficial for the overall profitability of banks and the general economy. However, the 
discrepancies in the results across the five sub-regional markets suggests that wholesale integration 
policies will not auger well for Africa unless they are tailored to fit the settings of the various sub-regional 
banking markets. Specifically, policy makers, regulators and bank managers should work hand in hand to 
promote regional cross-border activities as this significantly enhances bank profitability in the full sample, 
EAC and ECCAS regions. Also, the level of FDI inflows in Africa should be boosted if its benefits for banks 
and the general economy are to be enjoyed. This is especially important in the ECCAS and ECOWAS 
banking sectors since FDI net inflows is found to significantly improve bank profitability in these markets. In 
the SADC banking sector, governments should take steps to curb the negative effects of FDI inflows on the 
domestic banking sector. Our findings also support the continuous pursuit of financial freedom and other 
liberalization policies in Africa, especially in the EAC and ECOWAS sub-regions as this broadly improves 
bank profitability. We conclude that the positive effect of inflation on bank profitability in the full sample does 
not imply that governments in Africa should allow inflation rates to rise. This is because at the sub-regional 
level, except for ECCAS, the relationship is largely negative. Besides, most prior studies find a direct 
positive relation between high inflation rates and high credit default, which reduces bank profits. From a 
policy perspective, regulatory authorities in Africa should take steps to curb inflation rate growth while 
adopting policies to reduce credit risk such as the establishment of credit monitoring systems to reduce 
information asymmetries and the negative repercussions of high loan defaults on bank profitability. Finally, 
the positive effect of GDP growth on bank profitability implies that African countries need to continually 
improve the growth performance of their various economies as this enhances bank profitability. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 3A:  Variables description 
Dependent Variables Description Source 
SBPI  Standardized bank profitability Index constructed using principal components analysis Bankscope data 
ROA Net income/Total assets √ 
ROE Net income/Total equity √ 
NIM (Interest income-interest expense)/Earning assets √ 
Independent variables  
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) Total equity/Total assets √ 
Credit risk (NPL) Non-performing loans/Total loans √ 
Cost efficiency (OCA) Non-interest expense/Total operating income √ 
Liquidity risk (LIQ) Liquid assets/Total deposits √ 
Diversification (DIV)  Noninterest income /Total operating income √ 
Competition (HHI) HHI of gross loans √ 
Market share (MSH) Loans of bank i/Total loans of the banking sector in country j √ 
Financial sector development (FSD) Bank branches per 1000 adults WDI, World Bank 
Economic growth (GDP) Annual real GDP growth rates WDI, World Bank 
Inflation Rates (INFL) Consumer price index WDI, World Bank 
International financial integration  
Financial freedom index (FI) Degree of freedom of financial markets and institutions from government control Heritage Foundation (2016) 
Net inflow of FDI to GDP (DFI) Net Inflows of FDI as a percentage of GDP WDI, World Bank 
Foreign banks deposits (INTERFI) Total deposits in all foreign banks in country j/ Total bank deposits in country j Bankscope Data 
Regional financial integration 
(REGFI) 
Total deposits in all regional banks in country j/ Total bank deposits in country j √ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, COMPETITION AND BANK RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM 
AFRICA’S SUB-REGIONAL MARKETS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Risk is inherent in banking business and the effect of financial integration and competition changes on 
banking stability has been a central issue in the active debate among academics, practitioners and policy 
makers in the financial services industry. This debate is even more critical for emerging economies due to 
the high prevalence of information asymmetry in their largely underdeveloped and bank-dominated financial 
systems (Bourgain et al., 2012). Besides, excessive bank risk-taking does not only pose a threat to 
individual bank profitability and survival, but also imperils the stability and productivity of the economy 
(Rose, 2011; Schoemaker, 2011).19 Therefore, since the recent global financial crisis, the debate has 
largely centered on the role played by financial integration in the crisis and how future occurrences could be 
averted.  
Generally, banking supervision is guided by the fundamental principle that factors which distort bank 
market structure pose a threat to banking stability through influences on the risk-taking conduct of individual 
banks (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990). In view of this, financial integration, which facilitates the mobility of 
capital and financial intermediaries across national borders, has been identified by the extant literature as a 
key factor that imperils the stability of banks (Keeley, 1990; Farroukh, 2013; Cabillas and González, 2014). 
However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between financial integration and bank fragility has 
failed to arrive at a unanimous conclusion and can be described as contentious at best.  
Largely heralded as a vital catalyst for enhancing economic growth, financial integration has been 
embraced by most African countries and other developing economies as a panacea to their capital 
accumulation, allocation and other development challenges (Beck and Cull, 2014).  This saw the adoption 
of major regulatory reforms in favor of financial integration in most African countries since the mid-1980s.  
However, despite these and other acclaimed benefits, Africa‘s financial integration has the potential to 
erode the charter value of individual banks and reduce their ability to charge monopoly rents (Keeley, 
                                                          
19
 The recent global financial crisis, which ostensibly originated from unbridled risk-taking behavior of key financial 
intermediaries, provides evidence in support of this view (Rose, 2011; Schaeck and Cihák, 2014). 
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1990). Affected banks may react by either adopting innovative and efficient banking practices (Boyd and de 
Nicolò, 2005; Berger et al., 2009) or engaging in risky conduct (Keeley, 1990; Rupello, 2004) to maintain 
their profit profiles (Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). A third strand of the literature suggest that the relationship is 
non-linear (Martinez-Mierra and Repullo, 2010; Jiménez et al, 2013). Growing tensions in the empirical 
literature after the GFC, makes it crucial for regulators and policy makers in economic blocs seeking 
greater financial integration to empirically examine the role played by financial integration and resulting 
bank competition changes in determining the risk-taking behavior of banks and financial stability overtime.  
In this chapter, the study analyzes the effects of financial integration and competition changes on bank risk-
taking behavior using a panel dataset from 47 African countries and compare the results across five 
regional economic communities, since these relationships reflect changes in bank competitive conduct in 
response to market structure changes resulting from increased financial freedom and cross-border banking 
in Africa (Farroukh, 2013). To the best of the researcher‘s knowledge, the empirical literature on Africa 
have failed to adequately interrogate the role played by financial integration in shaping bank risk-taking 
behavior in Africa nor has any attempt been made to distinguish between its direct effect and the indirect 
effect that occurs through the channel of bank competition. The study is therefore necessitated by the lack 
of consensus in the literature (Keeley, 1990; Boyd and de Nicolo, 2005; Beck et al., 2006; Martinez-Mierra 
and Repullo, 2010; Jiménez et al., 2013; Goetz, 2018; Norman et al., 2018) as well as the paucity of 
literature on the effect of Africa‘s progressive financial integration on the banking stability (Moyo et al, 
2014)20. The study therefore employs the fixed and random effects models21 on an unbalanced panel of 
405 banks from the 47 African economies to test the effect of financial freedom and bank competition on 
bank risk-taking behavior across Africa and the five sub-regions. Second, the chapter examines whether 
variations in financial freedom and its interaction with variations in bank market structure reduces bank risk-
taking behavior in Africa. The chapter further tests the Martinez-Mierra and Repullo (MMR) (2010) theory of 
a U-shaped relationship between competition and bank risk-taking behavior. The Chapter further examines 
the role of quality institutions in shaping bank risk-taking conduct. Lastly, these relationships are compared 
across five regional economic communities of Africa amid an array of controls.  
                                                          
20
 For instance, though some studies examine the nexus between competition and bank fragility in Africa (Amidu 
and Wolfe, 2013; Brei, et al., 2018), very few have looked at the link between financial integration and bank risk-
taking behavior (Motelle and Bikpe, 2014; Moyo et al., 2014; Sissy et al., 2017). Largely, these studies failed to 
examine the trilemma between deeper financial integration, bank competition and bank stability in Africa. 
21
 Discussion is based on the Hausman specification test results. See Section 4.3.1 for further explanation.  
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The chapter contributes to the literature on bank risk-taking is several ways. First, the study provides new 
empirical evidence on the nexus between financial integration, competition changes and bank risk-taking 
behavior in Africa, especially for five clusters of financial integration projects (RECs) in the region.  To the 
best of the researcher‘s knowledge, this is the first study to conduct a comprehensive sub-regional 
comparison of these relationships. Second, the chapter provides support for the stabilizing role of financial 
integration in banking markets through the competition channel. The findings support the view that in 
competitive banking markets, increased financial freedom and cross-border participation drives banks 
towards greater stability. The chapter also provides evidence of the Martinez-Mierra and Repullo (2010) 
theory of a quadratic effect of competition on bank risk-taking behavior. Additionally, this chapter provides 
evidence of the role of control of corruption and regulatory quality in shaping bank risk-taking conduct in 
emerging economies. The comparison of these relationships across Africa‘s regional economic 
communities is expected to enhance policy and managerial decision making and ensure an optimal 
resolution of the trilemma between promoting greater financial integration and bank competition without 
increasing bank and economic instability. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the pertinent literature. Section 4.3 
describes the research methodology while Section 4.4 presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
The study is motivated by the ongoing contentions in the literature about the effects of financial integration 
on bank stability, coupled with the paucity of literature on the effects Africa‘s integration process. Largely, 
the literature22 on the effect of financial integration on bank risk-taking behavior pivots around its underlying 
effects on the nexus between competition and stability. The ‗franchise-value‘ paradigm contends that by 
stimulating higher competition among banks, financial integration promotes bank risk-taking behavior 
(Marcus, 1984). This ‗competition-fragility‘ view suggests that financial freedom promotes foreign and 
domestic participation, which contracts bank charter values, clogs their ability to charge monopoly rents 
and forces them to engage in risky activities to maintain their profit profiles. In contrast, the ‗competition-
                                                          
22
 See Cubillas and Gonzalez (2014) and Hamdaoui, Zouari and Maktouf (2016) for more comprehensive reviews of 
studies on financial integration and bank stability. 
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stability‘ theory contends that instead of increasing bank fragility, such competitive pressure rather 
promotes greater stability by pushing banks to become more innovative and efficient. Indeed, Boyd and de 
Nicolò (2005) demonstrated that in periods of rising competitive pressure, banks employ cost-leadership 
and differentiation strategies to gain greater market shares for profits without sacrificing their stability (Lui et 
al., 2012). Besides, lower intermediation spreads reduce bank default risks (Beck, et al., 2006). A third 
strand of the literature contends that the relationship is not linear as the earlier theories suggest but U-
shaped (Caminal and Matutes, 2002). According to Martínez-Miera and Repullo (MMR) (2010), as 
competition increases, banks enhance their efficiency and reduce their risk profiles up to an optimum 
threshold, beyond which additional increases in competition leads to increases in risk-taking. 
Empirical studies examining the determinants of bank-risk-taking behavior are also rife with disagreements. 
While the following studies among others all support the franchise-value theory:  Agoraki et al. (2011) for 
546 banks from 13 Central and Eastern European economies; Beck et al. (2013) for a cross-country 
sample of 17,055 banks from 79 countries; Tabak et al. (2015) for the Brazilian banking sector; 
Soedarmono and Tarazi (2016) for 686 banks from 12 Asia-Pacific countries from 1994 to 2009; Shijaku 
(2017) for 16 Albanian banks for the 2008-2015 period; and Kabir and Worthington (2017) for banks from 
16 developing economies over the 2000-2012 period. Others such as Turk-Ariss (2010) for 821 banks from 
60 developing countries for the period 1999-2005; Fu et al. (2014) for 14 Asia-Pacific economies for the 
period 2003-2010; Schaeck and Čihák (2014) for 3,325 European banks for the 1995-2005 period; Kasman 
and Kasman (2015) for Turkish banking industry for the 2002-2012 period; and Goetz (2018) for the United 
States banking sector: all provide evidence in support of the ―competition-stability‖ view. Also, in support of 
the MMR theory, Berger et al. (2009) for 23 developing countries; Tabak et al. (2012) for 10 countries from 
2003 to 2008; Jiménez et al. (2013) for 107 commercial and savings Banks in the Spanish banking sector 
and Brei, Jacolin and Noah (2018) for 221 banks in 33 Sub-Saharan African countries from 2000 to 2015, 
all found a U-shaped or non-linear relationship between competition and bank risk-taking behavior.  
Studies focusing on the role of financial integration in shaping bank risk-taking behavior are saddled with 
similar contentions. For instance, while Rossi (1999) and Joyce (2011) among others supports a negative 
relationship between financial integration and bank risk-taking behavior. Others such as Bourgain et al. 
(2012), Cubillas and Gonzalez (2014), Smaga (2014) and Li and Su (2016) all insist the relationship is 
positive and that deeper financial integration promotes bank risk-taking. However, based on evidence from 
a sample of 49 countries from 1980 to 2010, Hamdaoui et al. (2016) propose that the relationship between 
financial integration and bank fragility is an inverted U-shaped. These studies however failed to account for 
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the channels through which financial integration determines bank risk-taking behavior, limiting the practical 
application of their findings. To remedy the above shortcoming, several recent studies have examined the 
competition and other channels through which financial integration affects bank risk-taking behavior. For 
instance, Cubillas and González (2014) empirically examined the stability effect of financial integration 
through the competition channel using data from 4,333 banks from 83 developed and developing countries 
for 1991-2007. They found that though the full sample results confirmed the competition-fragility view, the 
effect through the competition channel are only significant in developed countries while deeper financial 
integration in developing countries affected bank fragility through the creation of so called opportunities for 
greater risk-taking.  Also, Farroukh (2013) found that financial integration and bank competition changes 
positively influence bank risk-taking behavior in 13 MENA countries for 1980–2009. However, after studying 
180 Southeast Asian banks for the period 1990-2014, Norman et al. (2018) contend that bank regulation 
serves as a moderating factor to reduce bank risk-taking despite rising competition in the banking system.   
Studies on the effect of Africa‘s financial integration have also largely failed to empirically test the effect of 
financial integration on bank fragility through the channel of bank competition. For instance, prior studies on 
the effects of financial integration on the banking sector of Africa by World bank (2007), African 
Development Bank (2010), Motelle and Biekpe (2014), Moyo et al. (2014), Leon (2016) and Sissy et al. 
(2017) all failed to distinguish between its direct and indirect effects on bank risk-taking behavior and to 
account for the moderating role played by integration in shaping the competition-fragility nexus of banking 
in Africa. Specifically, the evidence on the interactive effects of financial integration and bank competition 
changes in determining bank risk-taking conduct in Africa seems non-existent. There also seem to be no 
single recent study explaining the sub-regional disparities in the effect of financial integration on the bank 
competition-fragility nexus in Africa.   
In sum, while financial integration may generate positive effects on the competitiveness and efficiency of 
banks in emerging markets through lower intermediation cost, innovation and efficiency, its effects on bank 
stability are not always desirable. The scanty empirical studies on the effect of Africa‘s financial integration 
process, amid the ongoing tensions in the theoretical and empirical literature therefore highlights the urgent 
need for this study. These relationships are tested amidst an array of controls. This is expected to guide 
policy decisions and actions and promote peer-learning among Africa‘s RECs.  
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Empirical specification 
To examine the effect of financial integration and competition on bank risk-taking behavior, the study 
estimates the following model following the work of Agoraki, et al (2011) and Farroukh (2013):  
                           
  ∑   
 
   
    ∑  
 
   
                                                  
where Ri,t denotes bank i‘s risk-taking behavior at time t. The study interchangeably proxies this using bank 
z-score and non-performing loans ratio; j, indexes country; FIjt is the proxy for financial integration while Lit 
denotes bank market structure, proxied by the Lerner index. In line with Martinez-Mierra and Repullo 
(2010), Fu et al (2014) and Norman et al. (2018), the study includes a quadratic term of the Lerner index 
(Lit)2 to capture the possible nonlinear effect of bank market structure on risk-taking conduct: α, β, γ, ϕ, θ 
are estimated parameters while Xi,t and Mj,t are vectors of bank and country level controls respectively. λ 
represents unobserved individual bank effects while εiit is the idiosyncratic error term. The descriptive 
statistics of these variables are presented in Table 4.1.  
In line with Agoraki, et al. (2011), Farroukh (2013) and Norman et al. (2018), the study includes a 
multiplicative interaction term of financial freedom and Lerner index to account for the effect of financial 
integration on bank risk-taking behavior through the competition channel. According to Brambor et al. 
(2006), failure to account for such an interactive effect may limit the practical application of research 
findings. The study therefore extends the basic model in Equation 7 to include the interaction term as 
follows:  
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                 ∑   
 
   
     ∑  
 
   
                      
where all variables are as defined in Equation 1 except the multiplicative interaction term FIjt *Lit.  
Following the extant literature23, Equations 7 and 8 are estimated using static panel models. Farroukh 
(2013) argue that using the fixed effects model helps account for time and country fixed effects on the risk-
taking conduct of banks. However, since this is a comparative study and the Hausman specification test 
failed to choose one specification for all samples, the study includes results for both fixed and random 
                                                          
23
 See Agoraki, et al. (2011); Farroukh (2013 among others.  
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effects models in its analysis. However, the discussion is based on the results of the model chosen by the 
Hausman test unless otherwise stated. The interpretation of the findings follows the works of Brambor et al. 
(2006), Farroukh (2013) and Norman et al (2018).  
The chapter concentrates on the coefficients β1, β2 and β3 for evidence of the effects of financial integration, 
bank competition and the quadratic form of bank competition on bank risk-taking behavior respectively. The 
coefficient of the multiplicative interaction term (β4) provides evidence of the effect of financial integration in 
a competitive banking system (Norman et al., 2018). For instance, since the z-score measures distance 
from insolvency and higher values denote greater stability, positive and significant values of β1 and β2 in 
either Equation 7 or 8 implies that financial integration and bank competition, respectively promotes bank 
stability and vice versa. However, if the dependent variable is the NPL ratio, since higher NPL ratio implies 
higher bank risk-taking behavior, positive and significant values of β1 and β2 will be evidence of a negative 
effect of financial integration and competition on bank stability. In equation 8, a positive and significant 
value of β4 provides evidence that financial integration promotes bank stability in a competitive banking 
environment and the vice versa is true for the NPL ratio. Also, in both Equations 7 and 8, a negative and 
significant value of β3 when β2 is positive indicates that the relationship between bank competition and risk-
taking is an inverted U and vice versa.  
 
4.3.2 Measuring bank risk-taking behavior 
Following the extant literature24, the chapter employs two widely used proxies of bank risk-taking behavior 
in the empirical analysis. First, the study uses Z-score as the primary proxy of bank insolvency risk since it 
measures the number of standard deviations a bank‘s return on assets must fall below its estimated mean 
value before the bank‘s equity is depleted (Norman et al., 2018). Following Soedarmono et al. (2013), a 
bank‘s z-score is computed as follows: 
                                                     
                  
         
                                                                                  (9)             
where      is bank i‘s insolvency risk at time t and higher Z-score values imply lower insolvency risk or 
greater bank stability and vice versa.; EQTAijt represents a banks capitalization measured as the ratio of 
total equity to total assets; ROAijt is bank return on assets; δROAi,t is the standard deviation of a bank‘s 
                                                          
24
 See Jiménez et al. (2013), Amidu and Wolfe (2013); Goetz (2018) and Norman et al. (2018) among others. 
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return on assets. To normalize the distribution and allow for more optimal estimations, the study follows the 
work of Norman et al. (2018) among others, to use the natural logarithm of the computed z-scores for the 
empirical analysis.  
Additionally, the study uses the log-odds transformation of a bank‘s nonperforming loans ratio (NPLR) 
measured as the ratio of total impaired loans to gross loans to proxy for bank intermediation risk. This 
measures the quality of loans and reveals a bank‘s propensity to lend to subprime or risky borrowers 
(Goetz, 2018). NPLR is mathematically defined as:   
                                                       (
            
              
)                                                             (10) 
where NPLR is the log odds transformation of the NPL ratio of bank i in year t and higher value means 
higher bank credit risk and vice versa. 
 
4.3.3 Measuring bank competition 
To measure competition, the study follows the work of Amidu and Wolfe (2013) to estimate bank market 
power using Lerner Index. The Lerner index measures a bank‘s market power by calculating its markup of 
prices over marginal cost (Berger et al., 2009) as follows:    
    
           
    
                                                                                                                   
where Lit is bank i‘s Lerner index in year t; ARit and MCit are average revenue and marginal cost 
respectively. Average revenue measures the price of total assets, derived as total revenue/total assets 
while the marginal cost is the percentage change in total cost resulting from producing one more unit of 
output. Following Cubillas and González (2014), the study estimates the following transcendental 
logarithmic cost function to derive marginal cost, MCi,t: 
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The above specification assumes that bank i‘s total costs in year t is a function of one standard bank output 
Yit and three input prices W1, W2 and W3 respectively. In line with Amidu and Wolfe (2013) and Cubillas and 
González (2014), the study proxies bank output by total assets and includes prices of labor, funding and 
fixed capital as input prices for labor, capital and fixed assets respectively. T represents the deterministic 
time trend, capturing general time-related changes in technology (Berger et al., 2009). Also, following 
Coccorese (2014), the study includes equity capital (Zit) as an additional control to account for the 
probability that capital is employed as a source of funding by a bank (Hughes and Mester, 1993; Coccorese 
2014). Also, in line with the empirical literature, the study divides all factor prices and total operating cost by 
the price of deposits to impose homogeneity of degree one in the input prices (Coccorese, 2014). Marginal 
cost (MCijt) is then estimated using the first derivative of the translog cost function with respect to output as 
follows: 
      
       
    
[             ∑           
 
   
     (    )]                                          
The value of the Lerner index is interpreted as the market power of each bank in each year, with higher 
values denoting higher pricing power and lower competitive market conditions (Amidu and Wolfe, 2013). 
Financial integration is measured using country level estimates of the degree of financial freedom from the 
Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom database (2015). The financial freedom index measures a 
country‘s degree of financial openness, accounting for freedom of participation by both foreign and local 
banks and the level of freedom financial markets and institutions have from government control. Therefore, 
higher values of the index indicate greater financial freedom and vice versa. In line with the competition-
stability literature, the study conjectures that financial freedom significantly increases bank stability if the 
banking sector is competitive.  
To isolate the impact of financial integration and competition changes on bank risk-taking behavior, the 
study introduces a set of bank and macroeconomic controls based on the literature. Bank level controls 
include management quality, bank size, capitalization, loan ratio, loan quality, and revenue diversification. 
First, management quality, measured as total operation cost-to-income ratio, is expected to positively 
correlate with bank risk-taking as higher values denote lower cost efficiency and vice versa (Fiordelisi and 
Mare, 2014; Schaeck and Cihák, 2014). Bank size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, has 
no unanimously agreed effect of bank risk-taking behavior (Tabak et al., 2012). However, size in Africa‘s 
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embryonic banking systems is expected to negatively affect bank risk-taking due to the relatively small 
sizes of banks in the region, which hardly enjoy the ‗too big to fail‘ condition to warrant unchecked risk-
taking behavior. Besides, in nascent markets, larger banks are better able to diversify their asset portfolios 
to curtail risk compared to smaller banks (Norman et al., 2018). The ratio of total equity to total assets is 
used to proxy bank capitalization and it is expected to improve bank stability by cushioning banks against 
the effects of losses (Moyo et al., 2014). Loan ratio, measured as ratio of gross loans to total assets reflects 
bank lending behavior in reaction to competition changes from a more liberalized financial system and this 
is expected to positively affect bank risk-taking (Kasman and Kasman, 2015). Asset quality is measured 
using loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio to denote potential default risk. This is expected to positively 
correlate with risk-taking (Norman et al., 2018).  
Macroeconomic controls included in the study are annual per capita GDP growth rates as well as inflation 
rates. Annual per capita GDP growth rates account for income growth and informs individuals‘ ability to pay 
their debts (Faroukh, 2013; Fu et al., 2014) while inflation rate accounts for the effect of macroeconomic 
volatility (Cubillas and González, 2014; Norman et al., 2018). The study expects per capita GDP growth to 
negatively impact bank risk-taking while inflation rate positively influences bank risk-taking. The study 
further includes two variables: control of corruption and regulatory quality to assess the effect of institutional 
quality on the relationship between financial integration, competition and bank risk-taking behavior. Both 
variables are expected to improve bank stability in Africa (Farroukh, 2013).   
Data for the study was collected from 405 banks from 47 African countries across five regional economic 
communities for the period 2007 to 2014. The bank level data is collected from the Bankscope database of 
Bureau Van Dijk (2015) and comprises detailed unconsolidated financial statements. The banks were 
selected based on the availability of data on Bankscope for at least half of the study period. The 
macroeconomic data was sourced from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World 
Bank Group (2016) while data on the financial freedom index (FI) was collected from the Economic 
Freedom Index database of the Heritage Foundation (2016). The study sample is further divided into five 
rucks based on regional economic community membership to allow for sub-regional comparison of these 
relationships. Overall, the unbalanced panel contained 2,834 bank-year observations from the 405 banks 
sampled. 
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4.4 Empirical results  
Table 4.1 presents the summary statistics for the regression variables while Appendix 4(A) shows the 
pairwise correlation between these variables. Table 4.1 shows that bank competition in Africa is very low 
since average Lerner index from 2007 to 2014 was 0.267 across all 47 countries sampled. Also, the AMU is 
found to be the least competitive among the sub-regional banking markets, with average Lerner index of 
0.347, which is followed by ECCAS (0.309), SADC (0.269), ECOWAS (0.266) and EAC (0.206).  However, 
Table 4.1 shows that bank solvency risk in Africa is generally low as average z-score are high at 27.120 for 
all countries under study, with the AMU banking system showing the highest stability levels, with z-scores 
averaging at 68.664. Also, SADC, EAC and ECOWAS recorded averages of 22.874, 20.234 and 19.127 
respectively, with ECCAs recording the lowest average z-score of 16.643 for the study period. The study 
also finds that non-performing loans are highest in ECOWAS (8.00% of total loans), followed by the EAC 
(5.56%), SADC (4.06%), AMU (3.72%) and ECCAS (3.08%) respectively.  Financial freedom is also 
generally low in Africa. The regional average is 45.24 and SADC is the most liberalized sub-region, with an 
average of 50.80, followed by the EAC (49.97), ECOWAS (46.12), ECCAS (36.69) and AMU is the least 
finically free economic community with average financial freedom index of 34.18 for the study period.  The 
sub-regional markets show similar disparities in the other variables under study. Also, the correlation matrix 
in Appendix 4(A) shows that the regression variables are normal, with none showing evidence of 
multicollinearity since multicollinearity is only implied when two variables have a significant correlation 
coefficient above 0.7 (Kennedy, 2008).   
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics 
Sample AFRICA AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
        Mean SD. N Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD. Mean SD. 
z-score 27.12 78.21 2834 68.66 206.26 20.23 17.38 16.64 15.99 19.13 18.76 22.87 21.23 
NPLR 0.05 0.09 2816 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.07 
FI 45.24 13.09 2702 34.18 11.93 49.97 7.45 36.69 10.04 46.12 11.00 50.80 16.01 
LI 0.27 0.20 2354 0.35 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.27 0.19 
CIR 0.86 2.78 2825 1.21 6.89 0.93 2.48 0.86 1.06 0.76 0.25 0.75 0.66 
Size 13.18 1.67 2834 14.45 1.67 12.23 1.21 12.97 1.43 13.14 1.45 13.03 1.73 
CAR 0.13 0.11 2834 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.10 
LoanR 0.48 0.19 2834 0.56 0.27 0.50 0.15 0.44 0.17 0.48 0.17 0.50 0.20 
LonQ 0.02 0.04 2816 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 
Divers 0.36 1.89 2825 0.11 4.88 0.42 0.10 0.40 0.15 0.39 1.12 0.41 0.26 
GDPGPC 2.89 7.00 2834 2.21 16.70 2.62 4.23 2.68 5.39 3.17 3.41 2.99 3.07 
Inflation 68.38 1212.6 2829 4.26 2.60 9.98 6.44 7.63 5.57 6.86 6.75 287.83 2603.4 
CC -0.58 0.56 2834 -0.50 0.38 -0.74 0.45 -1.21 0.22 -0.56 0.51 -0.14 0.62 
RQty -0.49 0.56 2834 -0.62 0.57 -0.33 0.26 -1.07 0.27 -0.45 0.37 -0.23 0.80 
Source: WDI Database of the World Bank Group (2015), Heritage Foundation (2015) and Authors‘ estimation from 
Bank scope data for 405 banks across 47 African countries for 2007-2014.   
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4.4.1 Regression results 
Tables 4.2 (A) and (B) present the baseline results for equations 7 and 8 respectively using bank z-score 
as a proxy for risk-taking behavior while Tables 4.3 (A) and (B) present the results for non-performing loans 
ratio. Also, Appendices 4.C and 4.D present results of the varying effects of the two proxies for institutional 
quality (control of corruption and regulatory quality). The diagnostics of the various estimations all prove the 
fitness of the models used in explaining bank risk-taking in Africa and the sub-regional markets and 
discussions are based on the results of the model supported by the Hausman specification test.  
The results show that the direct effect of financial integration on bank risk-taking behavior in Africa is 
positive and significant, supporting the ‗integration-fragility‘ view. However, the sub-regional analyses show 
that financial integration-fragility view is supported in the EAC but rejected in the Arab Maghreb Union 
banking sector. This means that while increased financial freedom directly increases bank solvency risk in 
Africa, especially in the EAC it reduces bank solvency risk in the AMU banking sector. Though Table 4.3 
shows that financial integration directly reduces bank credit risk in Africa, the evidence on Table 4.2(B) 
suggests that its effect on bank solvency risk are less desirable. This implies that though integration and 
cross border banking may be improving banks credit quality, loss of profitability to new entrants may have a 
significant negative effect on overall stability.  These findings suggest that for the period 2007 to 2014, 
which spanned the duration of the recent global financial crisis, increased financial integration in Africa 
largely promoted bank risk-taking behaviour in Africa except for the AMU, which is the least financially free 
banking system in Africa. These findings are consistent with the findings of Agoraki et al. (2011), Farroukh 
(2013) and Cubillas and González (2014) for 546 banks from 13 Central and Eastern European economies, 
the MENA region and 88 developing countries respectively. 
Regarding the direct role of competition in determining bank risk-taking behaviour, the evidence supports 
the competition-fragility hypothesis. The results show that for all samples, bank market power has a 
significant positive effect on bank z-scores. Also, Table 4.3 shows that Lerner index has a significant 
negative effect on nonperforming loans in Africa and all sub-regional banking markets except in the ECCAS 
sub-region where Lerner index has a significant positive effect on nonperforming loans. These findings 
suggest that apart from ECCAS, higher monopoly power reduces bank risk-taking behavior and enhances 
bank stability in Africa‘s banking systems, supporting the ‗competition-fragility‘ hypothesis of Marcus (1984). 
However, the quadratic term of the Lerner index has a significant negative effect on bank z-scores for the 
full sample, EAC ECOWAS and SADC and a significant positive effect on bank non-performing loans in 
SADC, and a significant negative effect on nonperforming loans in the ECCAS sub-region.  
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Table 4.2(A): Effect of financial integration and competition on bank risk-taking (z-score) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   *, **, *** implies statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively and coefficients in bold are 
statistically significant. The diagnostic test reported include; (1) the Hausman specification test p-value; (2) the R square value; (3) F-statistic and Wald-chi to 
indicate the joint significance of the fixed and random effects models respectively; (4) number of observations; and (5) the number of banks used in the estimation. 
 
z-score AFRICA AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant 0.828*** 0.410* 1.166 0.084 1.443** 1.074** 0.722 0.473 1.685** 2.256*** 1.404*** 0.315 
(0.254) (0.237) (1.010) (0.899) (0.541) (0.512) (0.719) (0.650) (0.672) (0.612) (0.436) (0.398) 
FI 
 
-0.001 0.001 0.010** 0.011*** -0.004 -0.002 -0.015 -0.013 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003 0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
LI 1.203*** 1.230*** 0.627 0.501 0.841*** 0.916*** 0.170 0.186 1.605*** 1.392*** 0.767** 0.887*** 
(0.133) (0.133) (0.416) (0.410) (0.218) (0.223) (0.331) (0.336) (0.323) (0.325) (0.240) (0.262) 
LI2 -1.464*** -1.456*** -0.822 -0.613 -1.226** -1.331** 0.262 0.267 -2.555*** -2.247*** -0.682 -0.722 
(0.257) (0.257) (0.720) (0.711) (0.456) (0.466) (0.564) (0.576) (0.594) (0.598) (0.446) (0.488) 
CIR -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.095 -0.098 -0.322*** -0.342*** -0.091*** -0.089*** -0.853*** -0.986*** -0.177*** -0.160*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.117) (0.116) (0.058) (0.058) (0.020) (0.021) (0.139) (0.139) (0.019) (0.021) 
Size 0.081*** 0.105*** 0.079 0.152** 0.058* 0.079** 0.080** 0.091** 0.054 8.54e-5 0.041 0.108*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.071) (0.061) (0.036) (0.033) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.036) (0.029) (0.028) 
CAR 6.090*** 5.923*** 5.341*** 5.205*** 4.459*** 4.464*** 6.046*** 5.856*** 8.390*** 7.765*** 7.270*** 6.497*** 
(0.164) (0.162) (0.398) (0.388) (0.225) ()0.228 (0.424) (0.425) (0.524) (0.506) (0.318) (0.335) 
LoanR 0.142* 0.125 -0.432** -0.513** -0.147 -0.122 0.448** 0.440** 0.064 0.274 0.088 0.030 
(0.080) (0.079) (0.188) (0.182) (0.152) (0.152) (0.188) (0.190) (0.210) (0.205) (0.127) (0.136) 
LonQ -2.451*** -2.508*** -1.428** -1.441** -1.645** -1.586** -1.899*** -1.862*** -3.384*** -3.713*** -3.441*** -4.180*** 
(0.259) (0.261) (0.612) (0.609) (0.549) (0.563) (0.389) (0.398) (0.533) (0.545) (0.625) (0.688) 
Divers -0.006 -0.006 0.677** 0.606** 0.856*** 0.797*** 0.278* 0.243 -0.009 -0.008 -0.039 -0.046 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.261) (0.258) (0.194) (0.197) (0.168) (0.171) (0.015) (0.015) (0.043) (0.048) 
GDPGPC -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.017** 0.014* -0.001 -0.001 -0.011* -0.010* 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Inflation 1.91e-6 7.90e-7 -0.013* -0.013* -0.006** -0.005** 0.009** 0.009** -0.004 -0.005 3.80e-6 1.74e-6 
(5.86e-6) (5.93e-6) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (4.72e-6) (5.23e-6) 
Hausman:  0.000 0.000 0.353 0.353 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-Square 0.472 0.471 0.572 0.569 0.544 0.542 0.660 0.659 0.504 0.499 0.617 0.605 
F-stat./Χ2 150.74*** 1630.97*** 23.45*** 263.72*** 50.52*** 528.52*** 25.93*** 266.62*** 42.35*** 453.16*** 64.91*** 558.39*** 
Banks 354 354 51 51 80 80 31 31 91 91 80 80 
Observs. 2220 2220 255 255 557 557 189 189 561 561 534 534 
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Table 4.2(B): Effect of interaction between financial integration and competition on bank risk-taking (z-score)  
Notes: Same as in Table 4A except interaction term (LI*FI) which indicates the effect of the interaction between competition and financial integration for each 
sample.  
z-score AFRICA AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant 0.943*** 0.491** 0.955 -0.114 1.463** 1.117** 0.406 0.242 1.829** 2.365*** 1.487*** 0.362 
(0.059) (0.242) (1.015) (0.907) (0.540) (0.512) (0.771) (0.663) (0.705) (0.652) (0.440) (0.401) 
FI 
 
-0.004* -0.002 0.018** 0.018** -0.009** -0.007* -0.003 -0.002 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 3.57e-4 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
LI 0.738** 0.881*** 1.156** 1.028* -0.039 0.005 0.848 1.113* 1.177* 1.069 0.334 0.604 
(0.248) (0.246) (0.535) (0.532) (0.522) (0.533) (0.688) (0.653) (0.706) (0.708) (0.400) (0.428) 
LI2 -1.458*** -1.450*** -0.630 -0.443 -1.180** -1.282** 0.155 0.111 -2.570*** -2.260*** -0.759* -0.773 
(0.256) (0.257) (0.727) (0.717) (0.456) (0.465) (0.572) (0.578) (0.595) (0.599) (0.450) (0.491) 
LI*FI 0.010** 0.007* -0.020 -0.019 0.019* 0.020* -0.015 -0.020* 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.006 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
CIR -0.162*** -0.163*** -0.077 -0.082 -0.276*** -0.295*** -0.089*** -0.086*** -0.858*** -0.989*** -0.177*** -0.160*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.118) (0.116) (0.062) (0.063) (0.020) (0.021) (0.139) (0.139) (0.019) (0.021) 
Size 0.083*** 0.107*** 0.076 0.148** 0.065* 0.085** 0.072* 0.078** 0.054 6.16e-5 0.046 0.111*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.071) (0.061) (0.036) (0.033) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.036) (0.030) (0.028) 
CAR 6.104*** 5.930*** 5.237*** 5.115*** 4.510*** 4.513*** 6.039*** 5.881*** 8.433*** 7.796*** 7.328*** 6.540*** 
(0.164) (0.162) (0.402) (0.391) (0.226) (0.229) (0.424) (0.421) (0.528) (0.509) (0.321) (0.337) 
LoanR 0.153* 0.133* -0.411** -0.490** -0.062 -0.036 0.422** 0.394** 0.068 0.277 0.096 0.035 
(0.081) (0.079) (0.188) (0.182) (0.158) (0.158) (0.189) (0.191) (0.210) (0.205) (0.127) (0.136) 
LonQ -2.458*** -2.513*** -1.405** -1.429** -1.658** -1.597** -1.887*** -1.820*** -3.382*** -3.707*** -3.472*** -4.192*** 
(0.259) (0.261) (0.610) (0.607) (0.548) (0.561) (0.389) (0.394) (0.534) (0.545) (0.625) (0.687) 
Divers -0.006 -0.006 0.669** 0.601** 0.873*** 0.815*** 0.232 0.195 -0.009 -0.008 -0.047 -0.051 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.260) (0.257) (0.193) (0.196) (0.173) (0.172) (0.015) (0.015) (0.043) (0.048) 
GDPGPC -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.017** 0.013* -0.001 -0.001 -0.011* -0.010* 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Inflation 1.73e-6 6.03e-7 -0.013* -0.013* -0.006** -0.005** 0.009** 0.010** -0.003 -0.005 3.52e-6 1.54e-6 
(5.85e-6) (5.92e-6) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (4.72e-6) (5.22e-6) 
Hausman: 0.000 0.000 0.370 0.370 0.000 0.000 0.085 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-square 0.473 0.472 0.577 0.574 0.547 0.546 0.663 0.662 0.504 0.500 0.619 0.607 
F-stat./Χ2 138.89*** 1635.18*** 21.86*** 268.17*** 46.84*** 536.20*** 23.92*** 275.19*** 38.81*** 453.65*** 59.77*** 561.40*** 
Banks 354 354 51 51 80 80 31 31 91 91 80 80 
Observs. 2220 2220 255 255 557 557 189 189 561 561 534 534 
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The above findings are consistent with the Martinez-Mierra and Repullo (2010) theory, suggesting a 
nonlinear U-shaped relationship between bank competition and bank risk-taking behavior. Therefore, in 
African banking systems, increases in competition or a loss of market power due to increased financial 
integration promotes bank risk-taking behavior up to a certain threshold, beyond which further increases in 
bank competition will reduce bank risk-taking behavior.  
Accounting for the indirect effect of financial integration on bank risk-taking through the competitive 
channel; Table 4.2(B) and Appendices 4.C and 4.D show that a significant positive nexus between the 
interaction term in Equation 8 and bank z-scores for the full sample and EAC sample and a significant 
negative effect in the ECCAS sub-region. Also, the interaction term has a significant positive effect on bank 
non-performing loans in the full sample and AMU banking sectors but a negative and insignificant effect in 
the EAC banking sector (Table 4.3(B)). This suggests that in concentrated banking markets, increased 
financial freedom and competition changes promotes bank stability even in the face of rising nonperforming 
loans. These findings suggest that competition changes from increased financial integration enhance bank 
stability in Africa. The positive effect on non-performing loans could be due to the global financial crisis 
which led to significant loan losses for most banks globally. However, the two results could mean that 
though the global financial crisis, a product of banking integration, resulted in higher bank non-performing 
loans, the regulatory and other benefits of financial integration led to significant stability gains in the entire 
region.  Besides, Farroukh (2013) suggest that the positive effect on non-performing loans in the face of a 
significant negative effect on insolvency risk could be due to expansions in opportunities for increased 
lending and associated risk in these regions. Also, the findings support the view that deregulation-induced 
changes in bank competition promote bank stability even in a period of rising loan losses. According to this 
view, fear of market share and profitability losses from a more deregulated and competitive banking system 
and a downward movement of intermediation spreads forces banks to pursue efficiency.  
Regarding the effects of institutional quality on bank risk-taking, Appendix 4.C shows that control of 
corruption has a significant positive effect on bank z-scores in the SADC banking sector but a significant 
negative effect in the AMU banking system. This means that a reduction in corruption reduces bank 
insolvency risk in the SADC region but increases insolvency risk in the AMU banking sector. In Appendix 
4.D, the study finds a significant positive relationship between regulatory quality and bank non-performing 
loans in the Africa, especially in the ECOWAS and SADC banking markets. These findings show that 
institutional quality plays a significant role in determining bank risk-taking behavior in Africa, especially in 
the ECOWAS and SADC sub-regional banking markets.  
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Table 4.3(A): Effect of financial integration and competition on bank risk-taking (non-performing loans ratio) 
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.   *, **, *** implies statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively and coefficients in bold are 
statistically significant. The diagnostic test reported include; (1) the Hausman specification test p-value; (2) the R square value; (3) F-statistic and Wald-chi to 
indicate the joint significance of the fixed and random effects models respectively; (4) number of observations; and (5) the number of banks used in the estimation. 
 
NPLR AFRICA AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant -6.141*** -3.983*** 5.152 4.575* -1.877 -0.818 -21.400** -10.330*** -5.374** -1.200 -10.503*** -5.590*** 
(1.005) (0.554) (5.277) (2.578) (2.107) (1.462) (6.756) (2.170) (2.716) (1.247) (2.147) (1.103) 
FI 
 
0.004 -0.009** -0.010 -0.032** -0.023** -0.034*** -0.003 0.054** 0.052*** 0.011 0.051*** -0.005 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.133) (0.022) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) 
LI -0.705 -0.723** -2.157 -2.760 -0.042 -0.258 2.622 4.760** -1.409 -1.630* -2.679** -1.640* 
(0.485) (0.445) (2.122) (1.912) (0.904) (0.860) (2.317) (2.002) (1.069) (0.918) (1.08) (0.956) 
LI2 0.872 0.592 2.841 2.056 -0.586 -0.959 -2.134 -5.803** 1.237 1.694 3.376** 2.706* 
(0.953) (0.858) (2.658) (2.495) (1.988) (1.885) (3.936) (3.549) (1.934) (1.667) (1.719) (1.600) 
CIR 0.001 -0.024 0.012 -0.331 -0.926*** -0.781*** 0.298** 0.255* 0.113 -0.863* 0.221 0.587 
(0.078) (0.075) (1.217) (0.959) (0.224) (0.207) (0.129) (0.134) (0.691) (0.507) (0.398) (0.367) 
Size 0.226*** 0.095** -0.299 -0.181 0.077 -0.023 1.222*** 0.159 -0.064 -0.137** 0.337** 0.121* 
(0.067) (0.035) (0.330) (0.147) (9.133) (0.086) (0.312) (0.169) (0.153) (0.063) (0.140) (0.070) 
CAR 1.176* 0.737 -2.792 -3.351** -2.139* -1.566 5.077 2.863 3.681** 0.960 0.087 0.539 
(0.691) (0.589) (2.528) (1.726) (1.157) (1.048) (4.061) (2.961) (1.515) (1.095) (1.258) (1.132) 
LoanR -0.669** -0.109 -2.937*** -1.922** -1.038* -0.391 -1.022 1.594 0.060 -0.089 -0.026 0.282 
(0.299) (0.241) (0.881) (0.681) (0.582) (0.515) (1.533) (1.164) (0.621) (0.463) (0.507) (0.418) 
LonQ 11.470*** 12.271*** 8.235 10.251* 16.922*** 17.198*** 11.093 12.048* 3.292* 5.856*** 14.377*** 15.587*** 
(1.110) (1.061) (6.341) (6.265) (2.091) (2.015) (6.876) (7.048) (1.834) (1.792) (2.262) (2.147) 
Divers 0.003 0.006 -1.209 -2.499* 1.136 1.390** 0.263 2.873** 0.951 1.000* 0.073 0.189 
(0.042) (0.042) (1.554) (1.358) (0.761) (0.677) (1.849) (1.236) (0.604) (0.561) (0.213) (0.212) 
GDPGPC -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.007 -0.036 -0.020 -0.005 -0.056** 0.040** 0.032** -0.001 -0.001 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.024) (0.022) (0,026) (0.026) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Inflation 4.55e-5** 4.5e-5** -0.016 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.037 -0.055 0.021* -0.001 4.46e-5** 4.87e-5** 
(1.74e-5) (1.7e-5) (0.040) (0.040) (0.009) (0.008) (0.042) (0.038) (0.011) (0.010) (1.59e-5) (1.61e-5) 
Hausman 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.068 0.066 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-Square 0.093 0.085 0.217 0.173 0.303 0.296 0.384 0.243 0.115 0.063 0.220 0.176 
F-stat./Χ2 12.05*** 163.30*** 2.37** 33.92*** 15.11*** 174.73*** 4.25*** 42.04*** 3.63*** 34.36*** 8.25*** 96.46*** 
Banks 287 354 27 27 76 76 20 20 74 74 71 71 
Observs. 1595 2220 132 132 470 470 106 106 392 392 404 404 
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Table 4.3(B): Effect of interaction between financial integration and competition on bank risk-taking (NPL ratio)  
Notes: Same as in Table 5A except interaction term (LI*FI) which indicates the effect of the interaction between competition and financial integration for each 
sample.  
NPLR AFRICA AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant -5.479*** -3.500*** 10.768* 7.716** -2.106 -1.071 -16.055** -9.962*** -5.247* -1.323 -10.190*** -5.336*** 
(1.024) (0.582) (5.789) (2.773) (2.121) (1.484) (6.697) (2.666) (2.805) (1.396) (2.177) (1.128) 
FI 
 
-0.012 -0.020*** -0.079** -0.095*** -0.015 -0.025** -0.199 0.034 0.049** 0.013 0.041** -0.011 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.034) (0.026) (0.013) (0.012) (0.144) (0.034) (0.019) (0.013) (0.019) (0.008) 
LI -3.286*** -2.694*** -8.026** -8.480** 1.977 1.724 -11.274** 2.142 -1.756 -1.378 -3.866** -2.650* 
(0.961) (0.842) (3.416) (2.850) (2.310) (2.207) (5.252) (3.890) (2.148) (1.712) (1.724) (1.511) 
LI2 0.849 0.677 1.886 1.177 -0.663 -0.977 -3.490 -4.915 1.224 1.712 3.110* 2.510 
(0.950) (0.857) (2.644) (2.458) (1.990) (1.886) (3.781) (3.586) (1.938) (1.672) (1.746) (1.608) 
LI*FI 0.055** 0.041** 0.153** 0.154** -0.041 -0.041 0.352** 0.051 0.007 -0.005 0.026 0.022 
(0.018) (0.015) (0.071) (0.058) (0.043) (0.042) (0.121) (0.076) (0.039) (0.031) (0.030) (0.025) 
CIR -0.005 -0.029 -0.982 -1.157 -0.990*** -0.842*** 0.266** 0.252* 0.105 -0.858* 0.168 0.556 
(0.078) (0.075) (1.279) (0.985) (0.234) (0.216) (0.124) (0.131) (0.693) (0.509) (0.403) (0.371) 
Size 0.231*** 0.099** -0.452 -0.179 0.071 -0.028 1.384*** 0.216 -0.064 -0.135** 0.351** 0.124* 
(0.068) (0.035) (0.331) (0.143) (0.133) (0.086) (0.302) (0.178) (0.153) (0.065) (0.141) (0.069) 
CAR 1.156* 0.692 -3.049 -3.569** -2.260** -1.637 5.923 2.725 3.706** 0.979 0.061 0.436 
(0.689) (0.589) (2.483) (1.683) (1.164) (1.051) (3.883) (3.069) (1.523) (1.098) (1.258) (1.138) 
LoanR -0.572* -0.083 -3.235*** -2.324*** -1.107* -0.445 -0.186 1.374 0.060 -0.093 0.031 0.310 
(0.300) (0.241) (0.875) (0.681) (0.587) (0.518) (1.490) (1.205) (0.622) (0.464) (0.511) (0.417) 
LonQ 11.527*** 12.318*** 9.073 10.580* 16.981*** 17.290*** 17.717** 13.583* 3.315* 5.805*** 14.423*** 15.617*** 
(1.106) (1.059) (6.232) (6.124) (2.093) (2.017) (6.938) (7.182) (1.841) (1.799) (2.263) (2.151) 
Divers 0.004 0.008 -0.898 -2.319* 1.168 1.421** 0.173 2.453** 0.953 0.996* 0.048 0.182 
(0.042) (0.042) (1.531) (1.327) (0.762) (0.678) (1.763) (1.252) (0.605) (0.562) (0.215) (0.214) 
GDPGPC -0.004 -0.002 0.004 0.007 -0.035 -0.020 0.009 -0.052** 0.040** 0.033** -0.003 -0.003 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Inflation 4.6e-5** 4.36e-5** 0.002 0.008 -0.004 -0.006 0.031 -0.056 0.021* -0.002 4.42e-5** 4.77e-5** 
(1.73e-5) (1.7e-5) (0.040) (0.039) (0.009) (0.008) (0.040) (0.039) (0.012) (0.010) (1.59e-5) (1.62e-5) 
Hausman 0.000 0.000 0.124 0.124 0.076 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-Square 0.099 0.092 0.255 0.220 0.304 0.297 0.447 0.274 0.115 0.063 0.222 0.180 
F-stat./Χ2 11.92*** 171.44*** 2.65** 42.81*** 13.92*** 175.61*** 4.99*** 40.88*** 3.32*** 34.26*** 7.62*** 97.93*** 
Banks 287 287 27 27 76 76 20 20 74 74 71 71 
Observs. 1595 1595 132 132 470 470 106 106 392 392 404 404 
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The results of the control variables are generally in line with the literature and demonstrate that bank 
management quality, capitalization and loan quality all reduce bank insolvency and credit risks in Africa and 
all sub-regional banking markets. Bank cost-to-income ratio in all samples has a significant negative effect 
on bank z-score except in the AMU where the negative effect was insignificant. This shows that higher 
operating costs or lower management quality increases bank risk-taking behavior in Africa. Similarly, loan 
quality, measured as loan loss provisions to total loans impacts negatively on bank z-scores and positively 
on non-performing loans in almost all samples. This suggests that poor loan quality increases bank risk-
taking behavior and vice versa. Also, bank capitalization is found to exert a significant positive effect on 
bank z-scores in all samples. However, capitalization was found to promote bank nonperforming loans in 
the EAC banking sector. This suggests that highly capitalized banks in the EAC undertook poor lending 
activities within the period 2007-2014. The coefficient of bank size on z-score is positive and significant in 
the full sample, EAC, ECCAS and SADC while its effect on nonperforming loans is positive and significant 
in the full sample and SADC but negative and significant in the ECOWAS banking sector. This suggests 
that though bank size reduces bank insolvency risk in Africa, it also promotes higher credit risk-taking 
among banks, especially in the SADC banking sector. However, for the ECOWAS banking sector, size 
helps reduce credit risk as well as insolvency risk.   
With respect to loan ratio, the coefficients are positive and significant for z-score in the full sample and 
ECCAS but negative and significant in the AMU sample. Also, Table 4.3(A) shows that loan ratio has a 
negative and significant effect on the NPL ratio in the AMU and EAC samples, suggesting that a rise in 
bank lending activities does not lead to greater fragility in Africa. Diversification was found to reduce bank 
insolvency risk in AMU and EAC banking sectors. However, Table 4.4 (A and B) shows that diversification 
increases bank credit risk in ECCAS and ECOWAS banking markets. Per capita GDP growth rate reduces 
bank insolvency risk in the EAC and reduces credit risk in the ECCAS region but increases both credit and 
insolvency risk in the ECOWAS banking sector.  Also, inflation was found to significantly increase bank 
insolvency (Table 4.2(A)) in the AMU, EAC and in the full sample and SADC banking sectors (see Tables 
4.2(A and B), Appendices 4.C and 4.D) and credit risks (Table 4.3(A)) in the full sample and SADC banking 
sectors (Table 4.3(A and B)). However, the effect of inflation on bank z-score was positive in the ECCAS 
sample (Table 4.2.A).     
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4.5 Conclusions  
The chapter examines the effect of financial integration and bank competition changes on bank risk-taking 
behavior in 47 African countries and compared the results across five regional economic communities over 
2007-2014. The results on the direct effect of financial freedom on bank risk-taking behavior support the 
integration-fragility theory in Africa, especially in the East Africa economic community. However, in the 
AMU, the evidence supports the financial integration-stability theory. Also, the evidence on the effect of 
competition on bank risk-taking behavior support the MMR theory, indicating that bank competition 
increases bank risk-taking behavior, but beyond a certain threshold, further rise in bank competition 
reduces bank risk-taking behavior in Africa and all its sub-regional markets. The results also suggest that 
competition changes from increased financial integration enhance bank stability in Africa. The chapter 
therefore concludes that African economies are unable to fully enjoy the stability benefits of financial 
integration due to the lack of competitiveness in their banking systems. The results on the effect of the 
control variables suggest that bank capitalization, management quality and loan quality reduce bank risk-
taking behavior and promote bank stability in Africa. Bank size and loan ratio also proved to play a 
significant role in reducing bank fragility in Africa, implying that in the presence of increasing financial 
freedom, large banks are better able to diversify their loan portfolios and remain stable. The empirical 
analysis further shows that revenue diversification in Africa significantly reduces bank fragility, especially in 
the AMU, EAC and ECCAS banking systems. Inflation however increases bank non-performing loans in 
Africa, especially in the ECOWAS and SADC banking systems.  
These findings have significant implications for academics, bank managers, regulators and policy makers. 
First, contrary to the view that a more liberalized and competitive banking system enhances bank stability, 
the results suggest that increasing local and foreign participation in banking markets through greater 
financial freedom may be detrimental to bank stability up to a certain threshold, beyond which further 
competition changes induced by greater financial liberalization will enhance stability. The sub-regional 
evidence also show that policy initiatives need to be tailored for the specific conditions in each regional 
economic community since the form the epicenters of financial integration in Africa and wholesale policies 
may not always produce equivalent results. The results also show that regulatory authorities should 
continue to ensure that banks in Africa maintain adequate capital levels, and high-quality managers to 
enhance their stability. The maintenance of high quality loan portfolios and a diversified income portfolio 
should also be encouraged among banks in Africa. While these findings may provide some useful insights, 
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the study is not without limitations. Further studies could examine the various thresholds beyond which 
further integration-induced competition reduces bank risk-taking behavior in Africa. The findings also 
provide guidance for further research on the channels through which an optimal resolution of the trilemma 
between greater financial integration and market competitiveness and financial stability can be achieved for 
higher economic growth. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 4.A: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 z-score NPLR FI LI CIR Size CAR LonR LonQ Divers GDPGPC Inflation CC RQty 
z-score 1.000              
NPLR -0.113*** 1.000             
FI -0.003 -0.164*** 1.000            
LI 0.218*** -0.072** -0.052** 1.000           
CIR -0.021 0.057** -0.041** -0.356*** 1.000          
size 0.221*** 0.018 -0.043** 0.208*** -0.089*** 1.000         
CAR 0.168*** -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.030 0.276*** -0.298*** 1.000        
LonR 0.084*** 0.0381 0.090*** -0.041** -0.106*** 0.115*** -0.140*** 1.000       
LonQ -0.160*** 0.281*** -0.0051 0.0254 -0.009 -0.039** -0.025 0.016 1.000      
Divers -0.086 0.058** -0.037* 0.113*** -0.064*** -0.053** -0.093*** 0.014 0.051** 1.000     
GDPGPC -0.019 0.005 -0.027 0.043** 0.042** -0.014 0.015 -0.048** -0.003 0.034* 1.000    
Inflation -0.029 0.029 -0.138*** -0.035* -0.001 -0.012 0.020 0.022 0.008 0.011 -0.010 1.000   
CC 0.053** -0.037 0.461*** 0.010 -0.014 0.039** -0.078*** 0.229*** -0.056 -0.017 0.011 -0.075*** 1.000  
RQty 0.059** -0.071** 0.147*** -0.065** -0.029 0.089*** -0.114*** 0.291*** -0.037* -0.017 -0.012 -0.132*** 0.739*** 1.000 
Source: WDI Database of the World Bank Group, ECONFREE database of Heritage Foundation and authors‘ estimation from Bank scope database for the period 
2007-2014.  Notes: *, **, *** implies statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Appendix 4.B: Sub-regional summary of Lerner index input and output variables 
REC AR W1 W2 W3 TC YTA EQ MC 
AMU 0.0586055 0.0096484 0.9786734 0.0192775 150757.3 4934494 533885.1 0.0345179 
EAC 0.1232441 0.0289684 1.869092 0.0467415 30710.04 378792 56028.78 0.1061419 
ECCAS 0.1079368 0.0216124 1.568615 0.0194602 63996.06 1049252 126605 0.0872157 
ECOWAS 0.1162368 0.022072 1.476843 0.0432562 106302.1 1296216 187614.8 0.0877382 
SADC 0.1240021 0.0267893 2.351427 0.0526478 323465.8 4585242 353811.3 0.0914988 
AFRICA 0.1075302 0.021701 1.666357 0.0399346 151662.1 2537843 250781 0.0846648 
Source: Authors‘ estimation from Bank scope data for 405 banks across 47 African countries for 2007-2014. All variables are as defined under equations 11 and 
12. 
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Appendix 4.C: Effect of control of corruption on the relationship between financial integration, competition and bank risk-taking 
 
 
z-score AFRICA AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
 FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant 0.961*** 0.492** 1.245 0.027 1.460** 1.161** 0.269 0.118 1.895** 2.351*** 1.428*** 0.557 
(0.259) (0.242) (1.023) (0.907) (0.542) (0.513) (0.810) (0.706) (0.707) (0.654) (0.442) (0.401) 
FI 
 
-0.003 -0.002 0.018** 0.019** -0.009** -0.007* -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
LI 0.733** 0.881*** 1.112** 0.984* -0.032 -0.103 0.828 1.091* 1.170* 1.069 0.310 0.465 
(0.133) (0.246) (0.533) (0.529) (0.530) (0.540) (0.690) (0.655) (0.706) (0.708) (0.399) (0.426) 
LI2 -1.449*** -1.452*** -0.524 -0.355 -1.183** -1.221** 0.138 0.097 -2.572*** -2.264*** -0.764* -0.807* 
(0.257) (0.257) (0.726) (0.714) (0.459) (0.467) (0.574) (0.580) (0.594) (0.599) (0.449) (0.486) 
LI*FI 0.010** 0.007* -0.019 -0.019 0.019* 0.022** -0.014 -0.019 0.009 0.007 0.009 0.008 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
CC -0.062 0.017 -0.333* -0.291* 0.007 -0.097 -0.117 -0.110 -0.171 0.031 0.150 0.326*** 
(.017) (0.049) (0.188) (0.176) (0.082) (0.077) (0.207) (0.210) (0.133) (0.116) (0.105) (0.093) 
CIR -0.163*** -0.163*** -0.101 -0.097 -0.276*** -0.302*** -0.088*** -0.086*** -0.849*** -0.988*** -0.176*** -0.160*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.118) (0.116) (0.063) (0.063) (0.020) (0.021) (0.139) (0.139) (0.019) (0.021) 
Size 0.079*** 0.107*** 0.045 0.127** 0.066* 0.077** 0.070* 0.076* 0.043 0.003 0.051* 0.116*** 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.072) (0.062) (0.036) (0.034) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.038) (0.030) (0.028) 
CAR 6.109*** 5.930*** 5.328*** 5.171*** 4.510*** 4.514*** 6.010*** 5.853*** 8.511*** 7.797*** 7.350*** 6.643*** 
(0.164) (0.162) (0.403) (0.390) (0.226) (0.229) (0.428) (0.425) (0.531) (0.509) (0.321) (0.335) 
LoanR 0.150* 0.133* -0.419** -0.484** -0.061 -0.056 0.417** 0.390** 0.059 0.273 0.085 0.016 
(0.081) (0.079) (0.187) (0.181) (0.160) (0.159) (0.190) (0.191) (0.210) (0.206) (0.127) (0.135) 
LonQ -2.464*** -2.511*** -1.313** -1.347** -1.655** -1.643** -1.879*** -1.812*** -3.375*** -3.704*** -3.363*** -3.903*** 
(0.259) (0.261) (0.609) (0.605) (0.549) (0.562) (0.390) (0.395) (0.533) (0.545) (0.629) (0.686) 
Divers -0.006 -0.006 0.697** 0.622** 0.874*** 0.799*** 0.238 0.201 -0.010 -0.008 -0.041 -0.036 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.259) (0.255) (0.194) (0.197) (0.174) (0.173) (0.015) (0.015) (0.044) (0.048) 
GDPGPC -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.017** 0.014** -0.001 -0.001 -0.010* -0.011* 0.001 0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Inflation 1.65e-6 6.40e-7 -0.013* -0.013* -0.006** -0.005** 0.009** 0.010** -0.003 -0.005 3.84e-6 2.53e-6 
(5.85e-6) (5.93e-6) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (4.72e-6) (5.18e-6) 
Hausman 0.000 0.000 0.411 0.411 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-square 0.474 0.472 0.584 0.581 0.547 0.544 0.664 0.663 0.506 0.499 0.621 0.609 
F-stat.Χ2 128.32*** 1635.10*** 20.64*** 274.18*** 43.15*** 538.23*** 22.00*** 274.62*** 36.01*** 453.54*** 55.46*** 584.66*** 
Banks 354 354 51 51 80 80 31 31 91 91 80 80 
Observs. 2220 2220 255 255 557 557 189 189 561 561 534 534 
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Appendix 4.D: Effect of regulation quality on the relationship between financial integration, competition and bank risk-taking 
 AFRICA AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
 FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant 0.985*** 0.600** 1.197 -0.208 1.408** 1.066** 0.284 0.052 2.090** 2.810*** 1.493** 0.798* 
(0.265) (0.250) (1.201) (0.995) (0.544) (0.517) (0.839) (0.768) (0.763) (0.674) (0.479) (0.477) 
FI  
 
-0.004* -0.002 0.018** 0.018** -0.008** -0.006* -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 -0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
LI 0.740** 0.882*** 1.144** 1.039* -0.049 -0.002 0.840 1.135* 1.140* 0.995 0.334 0.512 
(0.248) (0.246) (0.537) (0.534) (0.522) (0.533) (0.690) (0.658) (0.707) (0.706) (0.400) (0.430) 
LI2 -1.460*** -1.450*** -0.621 -0.453 -1.217** -1.313** 0.171 0.128 -2.525*** -2.22*** -0.760* -0.790* 
(0.257) (0.257) (0.729) (0.718) (0.458) (0.467) (0.575) (0.586) (0.597) (0.597) (0.450) (0.490) 
LI*FI 0.010** 0.008* -0.020 -0.019 0.019* 0.020* -0.014 -0.020* 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.007 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
RQty 0.043 0.090* -0.037 0.022 -0.099 -0.083 -0.071 -0.089 0.199 0.433** 0.004 0.176* 
(0.057) (0.052) (0.098) (0.089) (0.110) (0.111) (0.188) (0.191) (0.223) (0.180) (0.126) (0.106) 
CIR -0.162*** -0.162*** -0.082 -0.080 -0.284*** -0.301*** -0.089*** -0.086*** -0.864*** -0.987*** -0.177*** -0.164*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.118) (0.116) (0.063) (0.064) (0.020) (0.021) (0.139) (0.139) (0.019) (0.021) 
Size 0.081*** 0.104*** 0.058 0.155** 0.065* 0.085** 0.075* 0.083** 0.042 -0.013 0.046 0.098*** 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.085) (0.068) (0.036) (0.033) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.037) (0.031) (0.029) 
CAR 6.096*** 5.921*** 5.246*** 5.116*** 4.530*** 4.531*** 6.033*** 5.861*** 8.340*** 7.718*** 7.328*** 6.567*** 
(0.164) (0.162) (0.403) (0.392) (0.227) (0.230) (0.425) (0.425) (0.538) (0.508) (0.321) (0.337) 
LoanR 0.147* 0.116 -0.421** -0.484** -0.056 -0.031 0.425** 0.397** 0.049 0.206 0.094 -0.012 
(0.081) (0.080) (0.190) (0.183) (0.159) (0.158) (0.190) (0.193) (0.211) (0.207) (0.133) (0.139) 
LonQ -2.466*** -2.531*** -1.387** -1.440** -1.633** -1.576** -1.891*** -1.820*** -3.419*** -3.762*** -3.472*** -4.166*** 
(0.259) (0.261) (0.614) (0.609) (0.548) (0.561) (0.390) (0.399) (0.535) (0.544) (0.626) (0.686) 
Divers -0.006 -0.006 0.668** 0.604** 0.889*** 0.830*** 0.234 0.193 -0.008 -0.006 -0.047 -0.050 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.260) (0.257) (0.194) (0.197) (0.174) (0.174) (0.015) (0.015) (0.043) (0.048) 
GDPGPC -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.017** 0.014* -.001 -0.001 -0.012** -0.013** 0.001 6.03e-5 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Inflation 1.69e-6 6.27e-7 -0.014* -0.013* -0.006 -0.006 0.009** 0.010** -0.004 -0.007* 3.52e-6 1.61e-6 
(5.85e-6) (5.92e-6) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (4.73e-6) (5.21e-6) 
Hausman:  0.000 0.000 0.426 0.426 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-Square 0.474 0.472 0.578 0.574 0.548 0.547 0.663 0.662 0.505 0.501 0.619 0.607 
F-stat./Χ2 128.22*** 1639.10*** 20.10*** 267.73*** 43.28*** 537.64*** 21.96*** 268.94*** 35.87*** 462.53*** 55.05*** 567.27*** 
Banks 354 354 51 51 80 80 31 31 91 91 80 80 
Observs. 2220 2220 255 255 557 557 189 189 561 561 534 534 
Notes: Same as in Table 4A except interaction term (LI*FI) for the effects of financial integration in competitive markets as well as the inclusion of a second proxy 
for institutional quality, regulatory quality (RQty) to assess the effect of quality regulatory environments on bank risk-taking behavior in African banking markets. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, COMPETITION AND BANK EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM AFRICA’S 
SUB-REGIONAL MARKETS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the role of financial integration in fostering bank competition and efficiency in 
five regional economic communities (RECs) of Africa for the period 2007-2014. Since the mid-to-late 
1980s, there has been a crusade for the abolishing of repressive financial regulations in favour of 
financial freedom and deeper integration in Africa and other emerging markets (Sarpong-Kumankoma 
et al., 2017). This follows the widely held view that deeper financial integration stimulates competition 
and fosters efficiency in financial markets (Boyd and de Nicolo, 2005; Casu and Girardone, 2009; 
Andries and Capraru, 2012). Besides, the positive nexus between financial integration and economic 
growth is often premised on its ability to optimize resource accumulation and distribution through effects 
on the competitiveness and efficiency of financial intermediaries. Therefore, Africa‘s financial 
integration efforts are generally aimed at promoting economic growth through the stimulation and 
harmonization of competition and efficiency among financial intermediaries.  
According to Hicks (1935) ‗quiet-life‘ hypothesis (QLH), lack of competitiveness in Africa‘s bank 
dominated financial markets is a recipe for managerial inefficiencies since banks can charge monopoly 
rents over and above their marginal cost to stay profitable (Leon, 2015). African financial integration is 
therefore expected to open the banking sector for greater competition and force banks to become 
innovative and efficient to attract demand, gain market share and stay profitable (Fu and Heffernan, 
2009; Sarpong_Kumankoma et al., 2017). However, several recent studies have found evidence of less 
desirable effects of financial integration for bank competition, efficiency and economic growth (Casu 
and Giradone, 2009; Leon, 2015; Sarpong_Kumankoma et al., 2017). Therefore, evaluating the 
evolution and causal nexus between bank competition and efficiency in Africa‘s sub-regional markets is 
important for assessing the overall effects of the recent spate of financial reforms in emerging 
economies25 (Casu and Giradone, 2009; 2010; Andries and Capraru, 2014). However, the literature on 
the effects of Africa‘s financial integration on convergence of efficiency and competiveness of Africa‘s 
                                                          
25
 Leon (2015) opine that lower spreads in a competitive market forces banks to increase the scope and scale 
of their activities, to seek out new clients and to adopt innovative technologies for faster and quality service 
delivery, raising their operational cost, especially in the short-run. Besides, revenue losses from new untested 
clienteles and products all increase bank operational cost. 
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banking markets seem nonexistent and the limited studies on the nexus between competition and bank 
efficiency largely rely on unidirectional regression analysis.   
This chapter seeks answers to the following key questions: Has years of financial reforms and efforts at 
deeper financial integration in Africa improved the competitiveness and efficiency of banks in the region 
and is there a feedback causal relationship between bank competition and efficiency in emerging 
markets? To answer these questions, the study estimates bank Lerner index and two measures of bank 
efficiency (cost and profit efficiency) using the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) technique. The study 
then employs β- and ζ-convergence tests as well as panel granger-causality tests to the competition 
and efficiency scores of 405 banks in 47 African countries for the period 2007-2014. The study further 
compares these results across five major regional economic communities of Africa to account for the 
sub-regional differences in the effect of banking integration on the nexus between bank competition and 
efficiency across Africa. This is because financial integration in Africa is largely centered at the RECs 
and efforts to achieve the gross harmonization of banking operations across Africa has been less 
successful and clogged with several major setbacks. Answers to these questions are therefore 
important to policy makers in Africa and other emerging economies seeking the growth benefits of 
financial integration through improvements in the competitiveness and efficiency of their banking 
sectors.  
The chapter makes several contributions to the on-going conversation about the cost and benefits of 
financial integration in emerging markets. First, the study analyzes the evolution of bank competition 
and efficiency in five sub-regional markets of Africa over 2007-2014 to assess the impact of financial 
integration on bank competition and efficiency. The study follows the work of Casu and Giradone (2009; 
2010), Turk-Aris (2010), Williams (2012) and Sarpong-Kumankoma et al. (2017) to estimate bank 
Lerner index, cost and profit efficiency using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach and test their 
convergence properties using β- and ζ-convergence tests. According to Casu and Giradone (2010) 
banking convergence provides evidence of the levelling effect of financial integration in promoting a 
homogenous banking system in line with the law of one price (Andries and Capraru, 2014). To the best 
of the researcher‘s knowledge, there seem to be no study examining banking convergence in Africa. 
Also, the comparative dimension is novel and allows for peer-learning and the tailoring of policy 
initiatives for optimal results at the REC level while guiding the overall regional integration agenda of 
Africa. Second, the study departs from the convention in the banking literature on Africa by testing for 
reverse causality between bank competition and cost efficiency in Africa in a Granger-causality fashion 
(Casu and Girardone, 2009). These results are also compared across the five regional economic 
communities to account for sub-regional variations in the role of financial integration in determining the 
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competition-efficiency nexus in the banking sector of emerging economies. By examining the reverse 
causal nexus between competition and bank efficiency, the study is able to test the quiet-life hypothesis 
and the efficient-structure hypothesis as well as the feedback theory in African banking markets. To the 
best of the author‘s knowledge, this is the first study to conduct a sub-regional analysis of the causal 
nexus between bank competition and efficiency in Africa and the first to test the three theories in a 
single study.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the relevant literature on financial 
integration, competition and bank efficiency. Section 5.3 describes the research methodology while 
Section 5.4 presents and discusses the results of the study. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2 Literature review 
Studies on the relationship between competition and bank efficiency are guided by two competing 
theories. On one hand, the ‗competition-efficiency‘ view espouse that a positive nexus exist between 
bank competition and efficiency and that in competitive markets, banks pursue efficiency goals to stay 
profitable. This view originates from the ‗efficient-structure‘ hypothesis and flows through various 
channels (Andries and Capraru, 2014).  First, rising competition in the banking sector motivates 
management to either specialize their products to serve certain market niches efficiently (Zarutskie, 
2013) or enhance their credit quality and lower default using new and more efficient technologies 
(Chen, 2007; Dick and Lehnert, 2010). This view is also supported in part by the Hicks‘ (1935) ‗quiet-
life‘ theory, which intimates that the leverage enjoyed by managers to charge monopoly rents in 
uncompetitive banking markets, breeds managerial inefficiencies among banks. Using data from 457 
German banks for the period 1994–2006, Koetter and Vins (2008) found a significant positive nexus 
between higher competition and bank efficiency. Similar results were found by Delis and Tsionas (2009) 
using data from 11 European Union countries and the United States for 2000–2007. Also, Cocoresse 
and Pellechia (2010) found that bank competition enhanced the efficiency of 714 Italian banks for the 
period 1992 -2007. 
In contrast, the ‗competition-inefficiency‘ view contends that rising competition in banking markets 
rather incites inefficiency among banks. For instance, in a competitive banking market, depositors and 
borrowers become more disloyal to banks, increasing the need for banks to attract new clients at 
additional cost (Boot and Schmeijts, 2006). Moreover, the need to seek new clients from unchartered 
and previously untapped markets increases information gathering cost and potential credit risk which 
increases bank operation cost. For instance, Weill (2004) found a negative relationship between 
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competition and bank inefficiency in 12 European countries for the period 1994–1999. Also, Pruteanu-
Podpiera et al. (2008) found that higher competition reduced efficiency in a sample of Czechian banks 
over the period 1994-2005. Similarly, Williams (2012) found a negative effect of bank competition on 
the efficiency of 419 Latin American banks between 1988 and 2008. 
In Africa, only a handful of studies26 have examined the nexus between competition and bank efficiency 
and their findings have failed to provide a unanimous conclusion (Leon, 2015).  For instance, Chen 
(2009) found a significant positive nexus between competition and bank efficiency using data from 77 
banks from 10 middle income countries in Africa. Also, Sunil and Binsheng (2011) found that financial 
reforms promoted spurred competitiveness among Egyptian banks and promoted production efficiency 
in the banking industry between 1992 and 2007. Similarly, Zhao and Murinde (2011) found that banking 
sector reforms had a significant direct positive effect and an indirect effect on bank efficiency through 
the channel of competition in the Nigerian banking industry during the period 1993-2008. Using data 
from the 40 Kenyan banks for the period 1997 to 2009, Kamau (2011) argue that policies that stimulate 
competition in the banking sector enhance bank efficiency in Kenya. Ali and Sghaier (2012) also found 
a significant positive nexus between competition and bank efficiency in the Tunisian banking industry 
between 1990 and 2009. A recent study by Ajisafe and Akinlo (2014) confirmed the positive effect of 
bank competition on efficiency of the Nigerian banking sector for the period 1990 and 2009. They 
concluded that banking sector reforms in Nigeria have stimulated competition in the banking sector and 
this has a positive effect on bank efficiency.  
However, Ningaye et al. (2014) found mixed results, showing that though bank competition favorably 
affected bank profit efficiency, its effect on bank cost efficiency are less desirable in the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) banking sector for the 2003–2010 period. Also, 
Sarpong-Kumankoma, et al. (2017) found an inverse relationship between competition and bank 
efficiency in 11 Sub-Saharan African countries for the 2006-2012 period, though the relationship 
improves with greater financial freedom. In the same vein, Leon (2014) found evidence of a negative 
relationship between increasing competition and bank efficiency.  Despite these limited studies, no 
single study has done a comparative analysis of the causal nexus between bank competition and 
efficiency despite the concentration of integration efforts at the sub-regional markets in Africa. 
Banking convergence analysis has recently emerged as an increasingly important method for 
evaluating the impact and effectiveness of banking integration in driving the competitiveness efficiency 
and other performance metrices of banking industries. It is often used to examine how deregulation and 
                                                          
26
 Largely single country studies doted across the continent.  
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international financial integration affects the leveling of bank competition, efficiency and profitability 
(Casu and Giradone, 2009; Weill, 2009)27 as well as economic growth across countries in a common 
market (Affinito, 2011). For instance, Casu and Giradone (2009; 2010) and Andries and Capraru (2014) 
employed convergence analysis with Granger type causality tests to assess the effects of financial 
integration or deregulation-induced changes in bank competition on bank efficiency. However, there 
seem to be no single study on banking competition and efficiency convergence in Africa. 
In sum, the study is motivated by the gaps identified in the empirical banking literature on Africa. This 
chapter therefore seeks to address these gaps by providing policy makers, regulators and bank 
managers with the evidence on the convergence properties and causal nexus between bank 
competition and efficiency in five major regional economic communities of Africa for the 2007-2014 
period.  
  
5.3 Data and methodology 
In this section, the data and three-step methodological approach used for examining the relationship 
between financial integration, bank competition and efficiency in Africa is described. In the first step, the 
study explains how bank competition, cost and profit efficiency in Africa are estimated using the 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) method of Aigner et al. (1977). Second, the chapter explains how β- 
and ζ-convergence of bank competition and the two efficiency measures are executed in the study. In 
the third step, the Granger-type causality test procedure is explained.  
First, the study uses the SFA framework to estimate bank competition using the Lerner index in line 
with Koetter et al. (2008) and Sarpong-Kumankoma, et al. (2017). According to Berger et al. (2009), 
Lerner index estimates a bank‘s markup of prices over marginal cost, revealing its market power. This 
is mathematically defined as:    
    
           
    
                                                                                                                
where ARit and MCit denote banks i‘s average revenue and marginal cost at time t respectively. AR it 
measures the price of total assets, derived as total revenue/total assets while MCit is the percentage 
change in total cost resulting from producing one more unit of output (see Eqn. 16). Following the work 
                                                          
27
 See also: Fung (2006), Mamatzakis et al., (2008), Weill (2009) and Matthews and Zhang (2010) which all 
studied banking convergence to assess the leveling effect of financial integration in various banking sectors. 
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of Koetter et al. (2008) and Sarpong-Kumamnkoma et al. (2017), the study estimates the following 
transcendental logarithmic (translog) cost function to derive marginal cost, MCijt: 
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The above specification assumes that bank i‘s total costs in year t (    ) is a function of one standard 
bank output (Yit) and three input prices W1, W2 and W3 respectively. In line with Sarpong-Kumankoma et 
al. (2017), the study proxies for bank output by total assets while the input prices include price of labor 
(W1), price of fixed assets (W2) and price of funds (W3).  W1 is computed as personnel expenses 
divided by total assets; W2 as overhead expenses other than personnel expenses by the book value of 
fixed assets and W3 as the ratio of total interest expenses to total borrowed funds. „ln‟ means take the 
natural logarithm of the variable in question. α, β, δ, ϕ, ϑ, and  i,t are respective estimated parameters. 
T represents the deterministic time trend (Trend, T=Year-2006), capturing general time-related changes 
in technology (Berger et al., 2009; Andries and Capraru, 2014). Also, following Coccorese (2014), the 
study includes the equity capital (EQit) as an additional control to account for variations in bank risk 
appetite and the probability that it is used as a source of funding by a bank (Andries and Capraru, 2014; 
Coccorese 2014). Finally, following the convention in the empirical banking literature (Koetter, et al., 
2012 and Coccorese, 2014), the study divides each factor price (W1, W2 and W3), total cost (TCit) by the 
price of funds (W3) to impose homogeneity of degree one in the input and output prices.  
Marginal cost (    ) is therefore estimated using the first derivative of the translog cost function with 
respect to output as follows: 
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where all variables assume the same meanings as in Equation 15 and the value of the Lerner index is 
interpreted as the market power of each bank in each year, with higher values denoting higher pricing 
power and lower competitive market conditions (Casu and Girardone, 2010).  
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The study employs the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) method of Aigner et al. (1977) to compute 
cost and profit efficiencies estimates for the sampled banks28. According to Debreu (1951), bank 
cost/profit efficiency measures the distance of its actual performance from a frontier which reflects the 
maximum possible output the firm can produce given a set of inputs and production technology29 
(Andries and Capraru, 2014). The cost function is specified as follows:    
       (          )                                                                                                               
where it TCi,t represents total cost of bank i at time t,       and Wit are vectors of bank output and input 
prices respectively.  In line with Sarpong-Kumankoma et al. (2017), both input and output variables take 
the same meanings as in Equation 15. This approach separates the error term into its two components, 
with       corresponding to bank inefficiency while      represents the random error term (with a mean 
of zero and a constant variance of   
 ).  The profit efficiency frontier is estimated by replacing     with 
a measure of bank i‘s after tax profits at time t (𝜋Iii,t). However, since some banks in the study sample 
record negative profits for some years, the study opts for an estimation of the alternative profit frontier 
since it assumes an uncompetitive inputs market (Andries and Capraru, 2014). This transforms the 
dependent variable in the profit function from 𝜋   to ‗𝜋     |𝜋|      where   |𝜋| is the minimum 
absolute value of profit of bank ‗i‘ over all banks in the sample.  
The final specification of the transcendental logarithmic (translog) cost/profit function is modeled in line 
with the work of Koetter et al. (2008) and Sarpong-Kumankoma et al. (2017) as follows: 
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28
 This financial intermediation approach is a widely used parametric method in the banking efficiency 
literature as it more accurately accounts for estimation errors and statistical noise by separating the random 
error from the inefficiency term (Aigner et al., 1977, Andries and Capraru, 2014; Sarpong-Kumankoma, et al., 
2017).  
29
 Inefficiency is therefore measured as the percentage reduction in inputs or expansion in outputs that will set 
the bank on the production possibility frontier.  
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Equation 18 follows the general model in equation 17, with all variables assuming the same definitions 
as in Equation 15. Trend, T accounts for time-specific effects; and the error term (      is divided into its 
two components (                to separate the random error term and the inefficiency term. Also, 
in estimating the profit efficiency frontier, the study replaces TCit with ‗𝜋     |𝜋|   ‘.  Equation 18 
is implemented using Battese and Coelli (1995) model which allows us to in one step30, estimate the 
African cost and profit frontiers while accounting for cross country differences in banking. According to 
Andries and Capraru (2014), this model produces more efficient and unbiased estimates since it 
accounts for country level variables that might influence variations in the efficiency of banks in each 
economy. The study follows the Battese and Coelli (1988) framework used in Andries and Capraru 
(2014) to estimate cost and profit efficiency as follows: 
          (
    
 
)                                                                                                    (19) 
 
5.3.1 Financial integration and the evolution of bank competition and efficiency  
In the second stage of the analysis, the chapter assesses the effectiveness of financial integration in 
levelling bank competition and efficiency in Africa‘s banking markets using β- and ζ-convergence tests 
(Casu and Giradone, 2010). In line with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), the study expects β-
convergence to detect the catch-up effect of financial integration on bank competition and efficiency 
while ζ-convergence is expected to detect reductions in disparities among countries in common market 
overtime (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). In line with Andries and Capraru (2014), the study test for β-
convergence as follows: 
               (      )                                                                            (20) 
where, Yj,t represents the mean value of  the variable in question (competition, cost efficiency and profit 
efficiency respectively) for country j in year t. Yj,t-1 is the mean value of the variable in question for 
country j in  year t-1;             (    )    (      ); α, β and ρ are parameters to be estimated 
while εj,t is the error term. According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), β-convergence is absolute if 
initially poor performers increase their marginal performance at a faster rate than initially good 
                                                          
30
 The inefficiency effect      is specified alongside the cost/profit estimation to account for bank industry and 
country specific variables affecting bank inefficiency. Specifically, the study estimates the following model of 
Andries and Capraru (2014):                                                            . To 
account for the effect of GPD per capita (GDPPC), inflation rate (INF), domestic credit to domestic to private 
sector by banks (FSD), bank market concentration (CR5R) and bank capitalization (EQ). 
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performers to catch up with them. Therefore, in a univariate regression, a negative β value is 
interpreted as evidence of absolute β-convergence and higher relative coefficients indicate a greater 
probability for convergence and vice versa.  
Following Casu and Girardone (2010) and Andries and Capraru (2014), the study estimates ζ-
convergence using the following equation:  
                                                                                                             (21) 
where                    ̅  ;                        ̅    ;     and      are defined as 
before in equation 8;  ̅  respectively represents the mean level of the variables in question for the full 
sample and subsequently for the sub-regional samples in year t.   ̅    is the value  ̅ at time t-1; 
                   again α, ζ and ρ are parameters to be estimated while εj,t is the error term. A 
negative value of ζ is interpreted as evidence of ζ-convergence of variable      towards  ̅  and larger 
values of |ζ|<0 indicates a faster rate of ζ-convergence in a comparative analysis. This measures the 
speed at which each country‘s competition and efficiency levels are converging to the African average. 
Following Casu and Girardone (2009), Equations 20 and 21 are estimated using both fixed and random 
effects models. 
 
5.3.2 Causal nexus between competition and bank efficiency in Africa 
To assess the causal nexus between competition and bank efficiency in Africa‘s banking markets, the 
study follows the works of Casu and Girardone (2009) to estimate the following panel vector 
autoregressive distributed linear (PVAR) specification:  
        ∑         
 
   
 ∑         
 
   
                                                                         
where      and       are alternately represented by bank competition and cost efficiency31 respectively 
for country i (i= 1…, N) in year t (t=L+1,..., T); and L represent optimal moment and model lags used, 
selected based on Andrews and Lu (2001) consistent model and moment selection criteria (MMSC) for 
                                                          
31
 Like time series VAR models, the study tested the unit root properties of the variables and they were 
stationary in levels for all samples, allowing us to conduct the Granger-causality test using the variables in 
levels. Besides, Sims (1980) argues that differencing data with small T and large N distorts crucial details about 
the co-movements among variables (Mora and Logan, 2011).   
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PVAR estimations based on Hansen‘s (1982) statistic of over-identifying restrictions32.    is the 
intercept;           are estimated parameters.    is the bank-specific effect and      is the 
disturbance term.  
Equation 22 is implemented using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed Effects (FE), Random Effects 
(RE) estimations as well as Generalized Method of Moments technique using the panel VAR approach 
(pVAR) of Hancock et al. (1995) with the help of the panel VAR estimator advanced by Love and 
Zicchino (2006) and Abrigo and Love (2016) for Stata. The panel VAR model follows Arellano and 
Bover (1995) to account for individual bank heterogeneity, while allowing untransformed lagged 
regressors to be used as instruments by forward mean differencing the variables of interest and 
estimating their coefficients by a system of general method of moments (Mora and Logan, 2011).  The 
pVAR estimator of Abrigo and Love (2016) enables the study to in one step, test both the ―Quiet-life‖ 
hypothesis and the ―Efficient Structure‖ hypothesis of Demsetz (1973) by regressing each dependent 
variable on its own lags, lags of all other dependent regressors and lags of any exogenous variables 
used in the model (Abrigo and Love, 2016).  
Following the literature, a significant joint null ∑  =0 is interpreted as evidence of Granger-causality in 
panel data and it is distributed as χ2 with two degrees of freedom and the sign of the joint null ∑  =0 
denotes the direction of causality (Granger, 1969; Casu and Girardone, 2009; Andries and Capraru, 
2014; Abrigo and Love, 2016). Therefore, in the efficiency equations, a negative and significant sum of 
the coefficients of lagged Lerner index ((∑         )) is viewed as evidence in support of the Quiet-
Life hypothesis because previous values of bank monopoly power negative Granger-causes bank cost 
efficiency. This suggests that banks with higher market power are not being efficient overtime. 
However, a positive and statistically significant sum of coefficients of lagged Lerner index 
((∑         )) is consistent with the rejection of the Quiet-life hypothesis since banks with higher 
monopoly power are deemed to be efficiently managing their operating costs (Casu and Girardone, 
2009; Andries and Capraru, 2014). Similarly, for the competition equations, a positive and statistically 
significant sum of the coefficients of cost efficiency ((∑             )) is viewed as evidence of the 
―Efficient-Structure‖ hypothesis because higher cost efficiency would be preceding higher market power 
and vice versa (Schaeck and Cihak, 2008; Apergis and Polemis, 2016). 
 
 
                                                          
32
 The optimal lag is chosen where the MBIC, MAIC and MQIC are smallest and Hansen p-value is above 0.1 
(Andrews and Lu, 2001; Abrigo and Love, 2016). 
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5.3.3 Data  
The empirical analysis uses annual bank level data from the African banking sector. This comprises 
unconsolidated financial statement data from 405 banks in 47 Africa countries across five regional 
economic communities for the period 2007-2014. The bank level data was collected from 
unconsolidated financial statements of the 405 banks on the Bankscope database of Bureau Van Dijk 
(2015). As is the convention in the literature, despite the presence of many banks in Africa, the study 
was limited to banks which had annual financial statements on the Bankscope database for at least half 
of the study period, resulting in a total of 2834 bank-year observation.  Macroeconomic data is sourced 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank Group (2016). Appendix A 
presents descriptive statistics of the input variables for the translog cost function used in estimating the 
Lerner index, cost and profit efficiency. 
 
5.4 Results 
Table 5.1 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest. This 
includes annual mean values of the Lerner index, cost efficiency and profit efficiency for the full sample 
and sub-regional samples. Both the Lerner index and efficiency scores were derived from the same 
model using the SFA approach. Overall, these scores are in line with scores reported by prior studies, 
especially on Africa economies. However, though banks in Africa seems to improve both cost and profit 
efficiency over the years, there is much room for cost efficiency improvements, especially in ECOWAS 
and EAC banking markets. Table 5.1 further shows that there has been a general improvement in bank 
competition in all five regional economic communities under study. The average Lerner index saw a 
gradual drop for all sub-regional markets. The full sample of 47 African states saw a decrease in bank 
Lerner index from 0.311 in 2007 to 0.243 in 2014, representing a 21.87 percent drop in bank market 
power. Also, the EAC has the least average 8-year average Lerner index (0.206), recording the lowest 
annual average Lerner index in all years under study. This is followed by ECOWAS (0.266), SADC 
(0.269), ECCAS (0.309) and AMU (0.347) respectively.  
Cost efficiency among banks in Africa has also improved over the 2007-2014 period, starting at an 
average of 0.558 in 2007 to an average of 0.767 in 2014. However, the AMU sub-region recorded the 
highest average cost efficiency scores (0.877) over the 2007-2014 period, starting at an average cost 
efficiency score of 0.852 in 2007 to an average of 0.966 in 2014. This is followed by SADC, with a 2007 
average cost efficiency score of 0.592, rising to an average of 0.802 in 2014 and an 8-year average of 
0.706. ECCAS followed with 2007 average cost efficiency score of 0.586, a 2014 average cost 
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efficiency of 0.711 and an 8-year average of 0.646. ECOWAS (0.633) and EAC (0.511) lagged in terms 
of bank cost efficiency.  
Similarly, bank profit efficiency has gradually improved over the 8 years under study, with Africa 
recording average profit efficiency scores of 0.933 in 2007 and improving this to 0.978 in 2014, with a 
2007-2014 average of 0.958. Again, AMU banks showed greater profit efficiency than banks in the 
other regional blocs, starting at an average score of 0.998 in 2007 to an average of 1.000 in 2014, an 8-
year average score of 0.99 9 profit efficiency score. The SADC region followed suit, starting with an 
average of 0.944 in 2007 to 0.987 in 2014, recording an 8-year average profit efficiency score of 0.964. 
ECOWAS followed with an 8-year average of 0.961 and EAC (0.941) and ECCAS (0.924) lagged the 
rest.  
Table 5.1: Evolution of bank market power, cost and profit efficiency in Africa and 5 RECs  
Variable Region 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Lerner Africa 0.311 0.302 0.270 0.265 0.265 0.247 0.246 0.243 0.267 
 AMU 0.342 0.368 0.375 0.353 0.338 0.333 0.350 0.302 0.347 
 EAC 0.275 0.274 0.224 0.235 0.207 0.148 0.155 0.141 0.206 
 ECCAS 0.410 0.335 0.348 0.304 0.290 0.257 0.268 0.302 0.309 
 ECOWAS 0.306 0.315 0.264 0.259 0.251 0.241 0.239 0.253 0.266 
 SADC 0.303 0.277 0.255 0.245 0.280 0.286 0.263 0.257 0.269 
Cost Eff. Africa 0.558 0.585 0.623 0.661 0.678 0.689 0.747 0.767 0.664 
 AMU 0.852 0.853 0.865 0.853 0.866 0.873 0.940 0.966 0.877 
 EAC 0.417 0.438 0.463 0.499 0.507 0.530 0.593 0.627 0.511 
 ECCAS 0.586 0.557 0.599 0.634 0.674 0.681 0.684 0.711 0.646 
 ECOWAS 0.503 0.524 0.553 0.621 0.658 0.679 0.827 0.775 0.633 
 SADC 0.592 0.652 0.709 0.689 0.716 0.726 0.743 0.802 0.706 
Profit Eff. Africa 0.933 0.946 0.951 0.961 0.962 0.964 0.970 0.978 0.958 
 AMU 0.998 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 
 EAC 0.903 0.922 0.931 0.942 0.937 0.949 0.964 0.971 0.941 
 ECCAS 0.934 0.914 0.923 0.927 0.919 0.921 0.927 0.931 0.924 
 ECOWAS 0.926 0.949 0.944 0.959 0.970 0.975 0.989 0.984 0.961 
 SADC 0.944 0.960 0.955 0.964 0.969 0.966 0.965 0.987 0.964 
Notes: Eff. and LI denote bank efficiency and Lerner Index respectively. High relative values of the Lerner index 
(Lerner) imply less competition and lower relative values indicate higher competition in the banking system. Also, 
the benchmark for both profit and cost efficiency is 100% (1.00). 
 
5.4.1 Regression results 
Tables 5.2 to 5.4 present β-convergence and ζ-convergence tests results respectively for bank 
competition, cost efficiency and profit efficiency in Africa and the five sub-regional markets for the 2007-
2014 period using both Fixed and Random Effects regressions. In Table 5.2, the study finds a negative 
and statistically significant β-coefficient for all samples in both models. This suggests that bank 
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competition convergence has occurred in Africa and all five sub-regional banking markets. This shows 
that for the 2007-2014 periods, countries with initially lower competition in 2007 improved their 
competitiveness faster than those with initially higher competition levels to catch-up with the initially 
better performers among all 47 African countries and in each sub-regional market. Also, from a 
comparative perspective, the absolute value of the coefficient of beta shows that AMU banking sector 
had the greatest speed of β-convergence (1.429). This was followed by the ECCAS region (0.726), 
SADC (0.635), ECOWAS (0.358) and EAC (0.244) respectively. This could be because the EAC 
banking sector recorded the highest average level of bank competition, with the lowest Lerner index 
values.  
Sigma (ζ) convergence of bank competition is reported in the second half of Table 5.2. The results 
show that ζ-convergence occurred in Africa and in all sub-regional markets. This is in line with the 
literature as β-convergence is a necessary (though not a sufficient) condition for the occurrence of ζ-
convergence (Sala-i-Martin, 2004). In this case, ζ-convergence measures the rate at which country 
average Lerner indices (LIi,j) converge towards the African average Lerner index (  ̅ ), with higher 
relative absolute values showing faster rate of convergence and vice versa. Again, Table 5.2 shows 
that the AMU has the fastest rate of sigma convergence in Africa (1.281), followed by ECCAS (0.870), 
SADC (0.606), ECOWAS (0.321) and EAC (0.310) respectively.  
These findings suggest that though AMU records the highest levels of bank market power in Africa, its 
country level market power scores are converging faster in this region than in other regions. Also, the 
AMU banking industry Lerner indices of market power are converging faster towards the African 
average than other sub-regional banking markets. The EAC banking sector which leads Africa in terms 
of banking competition lags the other regions in both β and ζ convergence because bank Lerner index 
measures bank monopoly power.  Table 5.3 shows that for the 2007-2014 period, both β and ζ cost 
efficiency convergence occur across Africa and in all five sub-regional banking markets studied. The 
evidence of βeta cost efficiency convergence indicates the catching-up of initially poor performing 
countries banking firms with those that were initially performing well in each sample. The results further 
show that the AMU banking sector records the fastest βeta cost efficiency convergence (0.992). This is 
followed by the ECOWAS banking sector with a β-coefficient of 0.357, SADC (0.326), ECCAS (0.233) 
and EAC (0.052). However, though the AMU banking sector recorded the fastest β cost efficiency 
convergence, it lags all the other sub-regional banking markets in terms of ζ cost efficiency 
convergence (0.259). The ECOWAS region recorded the fastest ζ cost efficiency convergence rate of 
0.472, followed by SADC (0.471) ECCAS (0.470) and the EAC (0.311).  
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Table 5.2: Convergence of bank competition across sub-regional markets 
 β-Convergence 
Region Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
 FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
α -0.595*** -0.257*** -1.454*** -0.165*** -0.525*** -0.604*** -0.935*** -0.608*** -0.550*** -0.316*** -0.869*** -0.377*** 
(0 .038) (0.025) (0.062) (0.034) (0.072) (0.072) (0.120) (0.110) (0.081) (0.053) (0.069) (0.045) 
β -0.401*** -0.155*** -1.429*** -0.147*** -0.244*** -0.306*** -0.726*** -0.474*** -0.358*** -0.191*** -0.635*** -0.274*** 
(0 .028) (0.018) (0.062) (0.032) (0.046) (0.046) (0.100) (0.091) (0.058) (0.037) (0.051) (0.032) 
  -0.173*** -0.137*** 0.154*** -0.021 -0.025 0.173*** 0.563*** 0.566*** -0.304*** -0.147** 0 .059 -0.025 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.033) (0.047) (0.056) (0.054) (0.147) (0.136) (0.060) (0.058) (0.047) (0.044) 
R-Square 0.2441 0.2377 0.6749 0.5632 0.1273 0.0954 0.2925 0.2384 0.2100 0.2099 0.3392 0.3298 
F-stat/ Wald Χ2 287.29*** 190.44*** 278.13*** 22.93*** 28.38*** 46.86*** 31.63*** 27.26*** 58.90*** 44.35*** 97.54*** 83.92*** 
 σ-Convergence 
 Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
α -0.021** -0.010 0.429*** 0.073*** -0.176*** -0.185*** 0.058* 0.040 0.060 -0.019 0.010 0.023** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) (0.033) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) 
σ -0.417*** -0.150*** -1.281*** -0.171*** -0.310*** -0.387*** -0.870*** -0.516*** -0.321*** -0.172*** -0.606*** -0.283*** 
(0.029) (0.018) (0.055) (0.032) (0.054) (0.052) (0.111) (0.100) (0.058) (0.036) (0.046) (0.031) 
  -0.155*** -0.134*** 0.092** 0.009 0.074 0.285*** 0.707*** 0.598*** -0.314*** -0.141** 0.056 -0.012 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.032) (0.047) (0.062) (0.058) (0.155) (0.144) (0.061) (0.059) (0.011) (0.044) 
R-Square 0.2409 0.2322 0.6706 0.6699 0.1182 0.0882 0.3250 0.2702 0.1933 0.1928 0.3518 0.3469 
F-stat./Wald Χ2 282.26*** 177.53*** 272.85*** 28.76*** 26.06*** 55.41*** 36.83*** 27.03*** 53.09*** 37.31*** 103.12*** 90.93*** 
Notes: *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.   
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Table 5.3: Convergence of bank cost efficiency  
 β-Convergence 
Region Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
α -0.070*** 0.009*** -0.124*** 0.010*** 0.031** 0.051*** -0.091*** -3.59e-4 -0.123*** 0.010 -0.079*** 0.010* 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.014) (0.007) (0.018) (0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) 
β -0.253*** -0.065*** -0.992*** -0.015* -0.052** -0.025** -0.233*** -0.074*** -0.357*** -0.066*** -0.326*** -0.075*** 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.043) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010) (0.031) (0.007) (0.025) (0.010) (0.038) (0.011) 
  -0.067*** 0.008 0.101*** 0.076* -0.141*** -0.162*** 0.143** 0.068 -0.067 0.014 -0.134** 0.013 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.027) (0.043) (0.041) (0.037) (0.053) (0.048) (0.043) (0.045) (0.048) (0.049) 
R-Square 0.2178 0.2060 0.6965 0.0162 0.0531 0.0480 0.2729 0.2655 0.4012 0.3803 0.2599 0.2143 
F-stat./Wald Χ2 206.69*** 336.82*** 266.23*** 4.29 10.74*** 24.47*** 29.65*** 114.34*** 103.84*** 47.86*** 47.59*** 44.28*** 
 
 
σ-Convergence 
Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
α -0.016*** -0.008*** 0.041*** -0.026*** -0.073*** 0.008** -0.067*** -0.012** -0.029*** -0.007 0.006 -0.003 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.005) (0.016) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
σ -0.384*** -0.067*** -0.259*** -0.019** -0.311*** -0.027** -0.470*** -0.075*** -0.472*** -0.059*** -0.471*** -0.078*** 
(0.021) (0.004) (0.038) (0.010) (0.055) (0.011) (0.053) (0.009) (0.042) (0.011) (0.071) (0.013) 
  -0.003 -0.019 -0.008 0.028 -0.087** -0.177*** 0.262*** 0.063 0.013 0.011 0.018 -0.017 
(0 .022) (0.019) (0.048) (0.046) (0.042) (0.036) (0.057) (0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.063) (0.049) 
R-Square 0.2037 0.1931 0.1683 0.0585 0.1186 0.0559 0.3399 0.3166 0.2933 0.2867 0.2031 0.1955 
F-stat./Wald Χ2 189.98*** 286.46*** 23.48*** 3.93 25.76*** 28.57*** 40.67*** 82.31*** 64.32*** 29.29*** 34.54*** 39.02*** 
Notes: *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.   
 
 
 
 
 
104 | P a g e  
 
Table 5.4: Convergence of bank profit efficiency  
 β-Convergence 
Region Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
 FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
α -0.008*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 3.21e-5 -0.007*** 6.54e-5 -0.146*** 5.32e-5 0.003* 2.04e-4 -0.026*** -1.18e-4 
(0.001) (2.81e-4) (0.000) (8.33e-5) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (5.32e-5) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
β -0.284*** -0.047*** 0.032 -0.284*** -0.301*** -0.178*** -1.657*** -0.025*** -0.024 -0.107*** -0.568*** -0.020* 
(0.019) (0.004) (0.070) (0.020) (0.020) (0.009) (0.123) (0.006) (0.052) (0.009) (0.070) (0.012) 
  -0.041** 0.047** -0.660*** -0.464*** -0.197*** -0.141*** 0.824*** -0.076 -0.236*** -0.211*** 0.265*** 0.062 
(0.019) (0.018) (0.055) (0.034) (0.029) (0.027) (0.087) (0.071) (0.037) (0.031) (0.058) (0.050) 
R-Square 0.1327 0.0427 0.5168 0.4734 0.3829 0.3788 0.5376 0.0307 0.1276 0.1204 0.1988 0.0223 
F-stat./Wald 
Χ2 
113.56*** 205.99*** 124.07*** 300.34*** 118.81*** 400.01*** 91.84*** 17.18*** 22.67*** 160.58*** 33.63*** 5.63* 
 σ-Convergence 
 Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
α -0.002*** -0.002*** 1.68e-4 0.001 -0.005*** 0.001 -0.026*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.005*** 
(0.000) (2.49e-4) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (3.63e-4) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
σ -0.408*** -0.048*** -0.179*** -0.195*** -0.534*** -0.180*** -0.495*** -0.025*** -0.321*** -0.102*** -0.626*** -0.026** 
(0.023) (0.004) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.010) (0.071) (0.006) (0.068) (0.010) (0.076) (0.012) 
  0.039* 0.067*** -0.299*** -0.286*** -0.124*** -0.102*** 0.073 -0.068 -0.028 -0.091** 0.277*** 0.017 
(0.021) (0.019) (0.054) (0.049) (0.027) (0.030) (0.071) (0.068) (0.047) (0.038) (0.063) (0.051) 
R-Square 0.1764   0.0422 0.1671 0.1655 0.5297 0.4816 0.2409 0.0478 0.0870 0.0630 0.1998 0.1782 
F-stat./Wald 
Χ2 
158.98*** 202.09*** 23.27*** 60.64*** 215.72*** 347.92*** 25.07*** 20.04*** 14.77*** 109.38*** 33.84*** 4.74*** 
Notes: *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.   
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Regarding the convergence of bank profit efficiency, Table 5.4 shows Africa has a β profit efficiency 
rate of 0.284 and ζ profit efficiency convergence rate of 0.408. The results further show that profit 
efficiency convergence occurs in all sub-regional markets, with the ECCAS banking sector recording 
the fastest rate of β-convergence (1.657), followed by the SADC (0.568), EAC (0.301), AMU (0.032) 
and ECOWAS (0.024) banking markets respectively.   However, the SADC region led the sub-regional 
banking markets in terms of bank ζ cost efficiency convergence, with a rate of 0.626. This was 
respectively followed by the EAC (0.534), ECCAS (0.495), ECOWAS (0.321) and AMU (0.179) banking 
markets. 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 present results for the Granger causality and reverse causality tests between bank 
competition and cost efficiency using various estimation techniques. In Table 5.5, the study presents 
the results of the fixed effects and random effects models while Table 5.6 presents the results of the 
panel least squares and pVAR (GMM) models. The results of the F statistics, Wald chi and Hansen J 
test respectively for the fixed effects, random effects and GMM models show that all models were 
correctly specified. The first parts of Tables 5.5 and 5.6 presents the results of the Granger-causality 
test running from bank competition, proxied by bank Lerner index, to cost efficiency while the reverse 
causality test results are displayed in the second part of each table. The results on the first halves of 
both Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 show that the first lags of bank cost efficiency in all samples are 
statistically significant for the competition-efficiency Granger-causality test, indicating that bank cost 
efficiency at time t is affected by cost efficiency in previous years. Similarly, the second half of both 
Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that previous years‘ competition influenced competition at time t in all 
samples. As indicated earlier, Granger-causality is assumed when the joint test of significance (β1 + β2 
=0) of the two lags of the independent variable has a p-value of less than ten percent (ρ<0.10), in which 
case, the study rejects, at the 10 percent significance level, the null hypothesis of no causality (Casu 
and Girardone, 2009; Andries and Capraru, 2014).  
The results on Table 5.5 suggest that market power negatively Granger-causes bank cost efficiency in 
the full sample including all 47 African countries and in the EAC banking sector, but positively Granger-
causes bank cost efficiency in the AMU and ECCAS banking industries. This is because, the sum of the 
coefficients of the two lags of Lerner index (∑      ) is positive and the test of their joint significance 
(∑   0) is jointly different from zero and has a p-value of 0.019 for the full sample and 0.027 for the 
EAC banking industry. Also, the sum of the coefficients of the two lags of Lerner index (∑      ) is 
negative and their test of joint significance (∑   0) is also significantly different from zero and has a 
p-value of 0.005 for the AMU sample and 0.031 for the ECCAS sample. This suggests that the 
reduction in bank market power recorded over the 2007-2014 period (see Table 5.1) has a significant 
positive effect on bank cost efficiency in Africa, especially in the East African Community. 
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Table 5.5: Causal nexus between bank market power and cost efficiency by REC: Fixed and Random Effects 
  Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Cost 
Efficiency 
Cost Efft-1 0 .660*** 1.045*** 0 .167 1.093*** 0 .836*** 1.065*** 0 .826*** 1.289*** 0 .539*** 0 .949*** 0 .578*** 1.004*** 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.134) (0.098) (0.054) (0.051) (0.086) (0.062) (0.067) (0.061) (0.067) (0.061) 
Cost Efft-2 0.036 -0.094*** -0.345*** -0.165* 0.023 -0.068 -0.102 -0.328*** 0 .116* -0.015 0 .008 -0.073 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.098) (0.095) (0.059) (0.052) (0.067) (0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.064) (0.060) 
Lernert-1 -0.058*** -0.016 0 .102* 0 .037 -0.075** -0.043* -0.024 0.013 -0.016 3.11e-4 0.008 0.056 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.062) (0 .056) (0.026) (0.022) (0.034) (0.027) (0.044) (0.039) (0.058) (0.046) 
Lernert-2 0.013 0.013 0.078 -0.020 0.010 0.018 0.063** 0.024 -0.019 -0.023 -0.029 -0.077* 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.055) (0 .055) (0.024) (0.021) (0.031) (0.027) (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) (0.046) 
 ∑       -0.045 -0.003 0.180 0.017 -0.065 -0.025 0.039 0.037 -0.035 -0.023 -0.021 -0.021 
Test of ∑   0 0.019 0.650 0.005 0.500 0.027 0.114 0.321 0.031 0.421 0.295 0.714 0.3185 
R Square 0.555 0.545 0.148 0.003 0.729 0.723 0.722 0.701 0.544 0.532 0.423 0.421 
F-Test/Wald Χ2 301.28*** 31142.76*** 3.86** 1962.05*** 196.62*** 9625.61*** 66.85**
* 
6909.15**
* 
57.76*** 3991.44**
* 
38.33*** 4153.62*** 
 
Lerner 
index 
Lernert-1 0 .364*** 0 .681*** 0 .517** 0 .886*** 0 .342*** 0 .527*** 0 .509*** 0 .868*** 0 .385*** 0 .722*** 0 .420*** 0 .864*** 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.137) (0.112) (0.050) (0.046) (0.079) (0.067) (0.059) (0.055) (0.073) (0.055) 
Lernert-2 0.020 0.122*** -0.204 -0.088 -0.032 0.083* -0.090 -0.044 0.039 0.116** -0.025 0.042 
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.125) (0.107) (0.047) (0.044) (0.072) (0.066) (0.057) (0.056) (0.060) (0.055) 
Cost Efft-1 0.034 0.103** -0.003 0.338 -0.012 0.107 -0.113 0.159 0.071 0.019 0.185** 0 .142* 
 (0 .051) (0.047) (0.299) (0.194) (0.106) (0.105) (0.202) (0.158) (0.094) (0.089) (0.082) (0.075) 
Cost Efft-2 -0.055 -0.051 0.042 -0.270* -0.247** -0.034 0.076 -0.014 0.048 -0.010 -0.179** -0.109 
 (0 .048) (0.046) (0.218) (0.187) (0.115) (0.109) (0.156) (0.154) (0.084) (0.086) (0.082) (0.073) 
 ∑           -0.021 0.052 0.039 0.068 -0.259 0.073 -0.037 0.145 0.119 0.009 0.006 0.033 
Test of ∑     0.532 0.000 0.893 0.156 0.000 0.030 0.724 0.654 0.054 0.735 0.920 0.060 
R Square 0.165 0.161 0.139 0.120 0.211 0.154 0.289 0.276 0.236 0.222 0.182 0.172 
F-Test/ Wald Χ2 49.15*** 2561.12*** 3.75** 232.82*** 19.63*** 268.79*** 10.48*** 434.55*** 16.04*** 610.63*** 12.27*** 1405.91*** 
Note:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. FE and RE denote fixed and random effects estimations 
respectively.  
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Table 5.6: Causal nexus between bank market power and cost efficiency by REC: OLS and GMM 
  Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
  OLS PVAR OLS PVAR OLS PVAR OLS PVAR OLS PVAR OLS PVAR 
Cost 
Efficiency 
Cost Efft-1 1.045*** 1.127*** 1.103*** 1.279*** 1.065*** 1.056** 1.289*** 0.950*** 0 .949*** 0.921*** 1.004*** 1.301*** 
 (0.027) (0.091) (0.096) (0.173) (0.051) (0.474) (0.062) (0.224) (0.061) (0.143) (0.061) (0.205) 
Cost Efft-2 -0.094*** -0.084 -0.170* -0.412** -0.068 0.026 -0.328*** -0.230* -0.015 -0.084 -0.073 -0.122 
 (0.027) (0.062) (0.094) (0.164) (0.052) (0.153) (0.061) (0.140) (0.059) (0.139) (0.060) (0.115) 
Lernert-1 -0.016 0.075 0 .038 -0.094 -0.043* 0.010 0.013 0.017 3.11e-4 0.224 0.056 0.291 
 (0 .015) (0.063) (0.055) (0.156) (0.022) (0.053) (0 .027) (0.084) (0.039) (0.227) (0.046) (0.211) 
Lernert-2 0 .013 0.052* -0.025 0.112* 0.018 0.038 0 .024 0.112** -0.023 0.043 -0.077* -0.057 
 (0 .015) (0.030) (0.054) (0.060) (0.021) (0.042) (0 .027) (0.040) (0.040) (0.068) (0.046) (0.066) 
 ∑       -0.003 0.127 0.013 0.018 -0.025 0.048 0.037 0.129 -0.023 0.267 -0.021 0.234 
Test of ∑   0 0.650 0.181 0.566 0.140 0.115 0.672 0.033 0.017 0.296 0.597 0.319 0.315 
R Squared 0.961  0.951  0.963  0.981  0.938  0.940  
Adj. R Square 0.961  0.950  0.963  0.981  0.937  0.939  
F-Test/Wald Χ2 7785.69*** 615.92*** 2406.40*** 1727.29*** 997.86*** 1038.40*** 
Hansen J.: P-value  0.787  0.643  0.456  0.500  0.227  0.219 
 
Lerner 
index 
Lernert-1 0 .758*** 0.659*** 0 .990*** 1.098** 0.630*** 0.540*** 0 .909*** 0.641*** 0 .802*** 0.590* 0 .864*** 0.984*** 
 (0.025) (0.086) (0 .114) (0.492) (0.047) (0.105) (0.066) (0.201) (0.056) (0.320) (0.055) (0.181) 
Lernert-2 0.100*** 0.082 -0.145 -0.106 0.103** 0.042 -0.057 -0.059 0 .088 0.021 0.042 0.022 
 (0.025) (0.054) (0 .109) (0.184) (0.046) (0.089) (0.066) (0.050) (0.056) (0.098) (0.055) (0.081) 
Cost Efft-1 0.120** -0.066 0 .394** 0.430 0.126 -0.190 0.192 0.555 0.034 0.108 0.142* 0.116 
 (0.048) (0.140) (0 .198) (0.362) (0.108) (0.696) (0.154) (0.419) (0.090) (0.257) (0.075) (0.305) 
Cost Efft-2 -0.074 0.003 -0.351* -0.174 -0.041 0.009 -0.181 -0.159 -0.034 0.022 -0.109 -0.137 
 (0.046) (0.063) (0 .193) (0.393) (0.111) (0.170) (0.152) (0.165) (0.087) (0.135) (0.073) (0.115) 
 ∑           0.046 -0.063 0.043 0.256 0.256 -0.181 0.011 -0.396 0.000 0.130 0.033 -0.021 
Test of ∑     0.000 0.876 0.252 0.069 0.000 0.960 0.727 0.414 0.999 0.847 0.061 0.475 
R Squared 0.758  0.742  0.630  0.817  0.760  0.835  
Adj. R Square 0.757  0.734  0.626  0.811  0.756  0.833  
F-Test/ Wald Χ2 1017.91*** 94.77***  157.77***  145.99***  221.16***  351.48***  
Hansen: P-value  0.787  0.643  0.456  0.500  0.227  0.219 
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. OLS and PVAR denote panel least squares and panel vector 
autoregressive models respectively. Hansen is the Hansen J test of over-identifying restrictions for the PVAR/GMM model. 
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However, the results on the AMU and ECCAS banking sectors suggest that increases in bank market 
power has a significant positive effect on bank cost efficiency and the increases in bank competition in 
these regions over the 2007-2014 period has a significant negative effect on bank cost efficiency. The 
findings are consistent with earlier studies by Casu and Girardone (2009) Andries and Capraru (2014) 
and Sarpong-Kumankuma et al (2017). However, while the results of the full sample of 47 African 
countries and EAC sample support the ‗Quiet-life‘ hypothesis of Hicks (1935), the evidence from the 
AMU and ECCAS banking sectors rejects the ‗Quiet-life‘ hypothesis, as increases in bank monopoly 
power positively Granger-causes cost efficiency in these sub-regions33.  
The second half of Tables 5.5 and 5.6 presents the results of the test of reverse causality from bank 
cost efficiency to competition. The evidence shows that cost efficiency positively Granger-causes bank 
market power for the full sample of 47 African countries and in the AMU and SADC banking markets. 
However, the results from the EAC show sensitivity to model selection. This finding suggests that for 
Africa, especially the AMU and SADC banking industries, an improvement in bank cost efficiency 
enhances bank monopoly power, providing evidence in support of the ‗Efficient Structure‘ hypothesis of 
Demsetz (1973).  
Overall, the results provide empirical evidence of the dynamic nature of African banking markets, 
especially across the various rucks of banking market integration projects (RECs) in the region. 
Generally, the results from the evolution and convergence analysis show that the pursuit of banking 
integration has helped reduce variations in the competitiveness and efficiency of banks across all 
African banking markets.  However, the Granger-causality test show that the various sub-regional 
banking markets are unique, with the evidence supporting the ‗Quiet-Life‘ hypothesis in the full sample 
and EAC, while rejecting the ‗Quiet-Life‘ hypothesis in the AMU and ECCAS sub-regional banking 
markets. Also, the results support the ‗Efficient Structure‘ hypothesis in the full sample, AMU and SADC 
banking markets.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
Several significant issues emerge from the empirical investigation in this chapter. First, the findings 
suggest that the period 2007-2014 saw a significant reduction in bank market power and a gradual rise 
in bank competition in Africa and five regional economic communities. Also, the convergence of 
                                                          
33
 Table 5.1 shows these banking markets are invariably the least competitive in the continent. This could 
mean that sign (+/-) of the effect of bank competition on cost efficiency depends on the level of competition in 
the region under study.   
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competition and bank cost and profit efficiency in all African banking markets provides evidence of the 
positive benefits of financial integration for banking sector harmonization. The findings support the 
‗Quiet-life‘ hypothesis in Africa, especially in the EAC banking market. However, the ‗Quiet-life 
hypothesis is rejected in the AMU and ECCAS sub-regional banking markets. Also, the results of 
reverse causality running from cost efficiency to bank competition suggest that increases in bank cost 
efficiency promotes bank monopoly power in Africa, especially in AMU and SADC banking markets. 
These findings provide evidence of the uniqueness of the causal nexus between bank competition and 
bank efficiency in Africa, especially among the sub-regional banking markets.   
These findings have implications for policy makers in Africa. First, the results suggest that financial 
integration has a generally positive effect on bank competition and cost efficiency. This provides 
incentive for the continuous promotion of financial integration in Africa. However, the variations in the 
convergence rates of bank competition and efficiency indicate the need for increased financial 
integration efforts in sub-regional banking markets with slower rates of β and ζ convergence to bring 
their competition and efficiency convergence levels at par with the other sub-regions.  This will help 
promote greater harmony among African banking markets and pave the way for broader banking 
integration in Africa and greater distributive efficiency. Similarly, the evidence of variations in the causal 
nexus between bank competition and cost efficiency suggest that tailor-made initiatives and policies 
need to be adopted depending on the nature of the relationship in each sub-regional banking market 
rather than whole-sale initiatives. This will ensure the optimization of the competition and efficiency 
benefits of banking integration in Africa.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 5.A: Descriptive statistics of Stochastic Frontier Analysis input variables by REC per 
annum.  
Variable Region 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
TR Africa 165977.8 203713 207345.9 220575.4 212654.4 233561 234194 236504.9 
AMU 203897.3 240461.7 237573.7 245868.6 236290.7 257049.2 283961.2 262482.5 
EAC 29744.8 33134.28 37601.59 39432.22 46153.2 56046.5 62932.0 64103.5 
ECCAS 41555.2 67741.72 81193.11 99862.88 125056.3 127196.1 133975.8 119100.9 
ECOWAS 76893.5 115275.6 152279.9 132079.5 129583.3 165991.6 185871.1 187863.3 
SADC 411967.4 472008.2 443565.4 492795 454612.2 459449.9 398116.1 401280.8 
AR Africa 0.107328 0.108082 0.109774 0.1055682 0.106176 0.108084 0.1076897 0.107647 
AMU 0.063616 0.061031 0.0548652 0.0565073 0.060276 0.054912 0.0583418 0.060151 
EAC 0.122174 0.117487 0.1175965 0.1148013 0.1232 0.136059 0.1291189 0.124729 
ECCAS 0.101000 0.105871 0.1216443 0.111038 0.109261 0.102091 0.1070171 0.1061055 
ECOWAS 0.109590 0.116098 0.1290409 0.1197102 0.113535 0.114254 0.1123206 0.114588 
SADC 0.136194 0.132582 0.1253105 0.1237838 0.119899 0.119749 0.1199325 0.1191224 
TC Africa 116406.9 148554.1 152156.9 159612.6 151374 162315.2 160999.5 161877.5 
AMU 129668.2 150324.4 145556 150103.9 146995 157038.3 169314 154430.1 
EAC 18772.6 21451.14 25574.64 25661.06 30525.3 39087.0 41775.92 42832.68 
ECCAS 24923.7 39313.16 47254.29 60613.71 79343.3 86363.0 94674.0 79483.31 
ECOWAS 52839.7 82254.54 128982.8 107006.5 92769.3 118175.9 133885.3 134502.7 
SADC 294410.5 367989.5 326406.7 374637.3 333688.1 326712.6 279607.8 284274.1 
MC Africa 0.079249 0.080247 0.086952 0.083584 0.08326 0.088669 0.087801 0.086144 
AMU 0.049742 0.036312 0.019904 0.0265417 0.030919 0.038204 0.033551 0.044202 
EAC 0.102149 0.091781 0.099582 0.0951883 0.105216 0.124713 0.11779 0.110815 
ECCAS 0.049714 0.077082 0.10801 0.1005883 0.089365 0.082735 0.097582 0.082596 
ECOWAS 0.075222 0.082650 0.095779 0.0920228 0.089712 0.089324 0.088318 0.088697 
SADC 0.090713 0.094495 0.099794 0.0960631 0.087483 0.088575 0.088510 0.087302 
TA Africa 1859237 2276231 2390215 2652713 2643282 2828342 2874111 2778612 
AMU 4057509 4546983 4665633 5081732 4879473 5451881 5894935 4812598 
EAC 253847.1 277256.3 317990.4 350912.1 401987.9 427375.2 491004.9 509962.1 
ECCAS 448699.1 747063.3 810501.3 950106.2 1167311 1376370 1558268 1335695 
 ECOWAS 815624.3 1282089 1046841 1118038 1246036 1476795 1705860 1678443 
SADC 3375020 4081830 4673361 5294291 5098422 5101808 4550437 4506769 
W1 Africa 0.019198 0.020392 0.02341 0.0230015 0.022351 0.022028 0.021602 0.0210984 
AMU 0.010173 0.010834 0.00958 0.0092802 0.010514 0.009403 0.008350 0.0086898 
EAC 0.024666 0.027547 0.03276 0.0289916 0.029905 0.030503 0.029099 0.0274978 
ECCAS 0.019050 0.020520 0.024189 0.0257724 0.021239 0.019361 0.021572 0.021232 
ECOWAS 0.022031 0.021952 0.024639 0.0234012 0.022240 0.021673 0.020437 0.019768 
SADC 0.021995 0.023666 0.027154 0.0299816 0.028091 0.027818 0.027257 0.026676 
W2 Africa 1.51176 1.45506 1.54889 1.611982 1.805559 1.76047 1.712843 1.902593 
AMU 0.921961 0.710639 1.16891 1.265347 0.917078 1.006439 0.997229 0.78420 
EAC 1.93062 1.77077 1.77621 1.635345 1.920742 1.904703 1.966796 2.057097 
ECCAS 1.36510 1.24139 1.29413 1.728632 1.559327 1.739832 1.783675 1.703069 
ECOWAS 1.08296 1.06203 1.10251 1.252862 1.788978 1.887427 1.682985 1.992302 
SADC 2.05454 2.17841 2.38278 2.355207 2.728116 2.269792 2.136301 2.61598 
W3 Africa 0.04571 0.040380 0.040101 0.040995 0.036871 .0356181 0.044994 0.035297 
AMU 0.026780 0.022507 0.022080 0.0192659 0.016885 0.0138826 0.015295 0.017913 
EAC 0.089535 0.034019 0.036201 0.0290346 0.035757 0.0553964 0.046440 0.051526 
ECCAS 0.01912 0.022694 0.024503 0.0220343 0.019326 0.017897 0.016496 0.014498 
ECOWAS 0.031217 0.048480 0.045960 0.039439 0.030766 0.033993 0.080269 0.034798 
SADC 0.045655 0.056476 0.058039 0.080207 0.065907 0.038630 0.038662 0.036350 
EQ Africa 179006.8 210748.2 206075.8 238885 251467.2 287171.9 299846.4 325657 
AMU 358297.8 387494.3 508685.3 536120.9 533542.2 608501.4 673007.4 663070.8 
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EAC 34034.31 36516.9 42637.16 51885.02 53846.91 63572.1 75195.1 89683.4 
ECCAS 60433.01 75658.9 104656.6 118002 127962.8 143564.9 178867.1 179509.7 
ECOWAS 138713.6 221611.8 81807.33 113698.3 181055.5 224679.2 258542.2 298858.9 
SADC 285817.5 289612 337429.2 377976.8 375962.3 404132 356184.2 374562.9 
Source: Authors‘ estimation of the Tanslog cost function using sfpanel model of Battesi and Coelli (1995); grouped 
by regional economic communities for the 2007-2014 period.  
 
 
Appendix 5.B: Summary statistics of inefficiency equation variables 
Region/Variable GDPPC Inflation FSD Bank 
Concentration 
Capitalization 
Africa Mean 2479.548 68.383 24.946 78.777 250781.000 
SD. 2652.668 1212.611 20.906 14.430 725566.300 
AMU Mean 4465.320 4.263 40.129 82.651 532836.800 
SD. 2425.022 2.597 25.625 13.356 856225.200 
EAC Mean 811.487 9.982 17.546 68.187 56028.780 
SD. 283.175 6.442 9.242 11.154 87048.110 
ECCAS Mean 3195.685 7.632 10.216 83.763 126605.000 
SD. 3168.849 5.571 6.179 6.712 231537.600 
ECOWAS Mean 1319.784 6.865 19.074 77.020 187614.800 
SD. 901.993 6.754 11.985 16.323 513261.800 
SADC Mean 4202.462 287.835 37.594 87.418 353811.300 
SD. 3628.687 2603.414 29.700 11.672 1201862 
Source: WDI Database of the World Bank Group (2015), Heritage Foundation (2015) and Authors‘ estimation from 
Bank scope data for 405 banks across 47 African countries for 2007-2014.   
. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION, BANK LENDING BEHAVIOR AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA: A 
SUB-REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The relationship between financial integration, bank credit and economic growth has important policy 
implications for both advanced and emerging economies. A considerable body of literature identifies the 
scale, scope and accessibility of loanable funds as the fulcrum for driving consumption, production and 
economic growth in a country (Yartey, 2008; Demirguc-kunt ane Levine, 2009; Ngalawa and Viegi, 2011; 
De Nicolo and Juvenal, 2014; Law and Singh, 2014; Menyah et al., 2014; Pradhan et al., 2014a). According 
to the financial repression theory, factors which enhance the volume, scope and quality of financial services 
are growth enhancing (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). Therefore, an integrated and well-developed 
financial system serves as a desirable catalyst for promoting credit expansion and real economic growth 
through effects on market participation, capital mobility and the competitive conduct of financial 
intermediaries (Saafi, Mohamed and Doudou, 2016). There is however conflicting evidence in the empirical 
finance-growth literature on the nature and direction of causality between finance and economic growth. 
Besides, several recent empirical studies blame the onset and scale of the recent global financial crisis on 
growth in risky bank-lending activities resulting from financial integration-induced competitive pressures of 
poorly regulated financial markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Lane, 2012; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). 
These contentions highlight the need for regions seeking the growth benefits of financial integration to 
continually monitor the outcomes of financial integration policies on credit expansion and economic growth 
of participating economies.  
Also, there remains an unresolved contention in the literature concerning the direction of causality between 
bank credit expansion and economic growth.  Proponents of the Schumpeterian school of thought insist on 
a supply-leading nexus, explaining that bank credit expansion precedes real sector growth (Beck and 
Levine, 2004; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012; Law and Singh, 2014). In contrast, those in support of the 
‗demand-following‘ view of Robinson (1952) contend that bank credit growth and banking sector 
development are only passive responses to economic growth and the corresponding need for more finance 
(Kar et al., 2011). A third strand of the literature suggest that the relationship is bidirectional, with benefits 
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from one reinforcing the other (Cheng, 2012; Pradhan et al, 2014a). Also, Lucas (1988) argues that the 
importance of finance for growth is highly ―over-stressed‖.    
Africa‘s need for greater and faster economic growth cannot be overemphasized. The region has some of 
the poorest countries of the world, with many facing such developmental challenges as poor infrastructure, 
poor healthcare, inequality and insecurity among others (World Banks WDI, 2015). Also, African economies 
are largely characterized by fledgling bank-dominated financial systems with embryonic or non-existing 
stock markets (Yartey and Adjasi, 2007; Standley, 2010; Nyantakyi and Sy, 2015). These factors limit 
access to investment capital and slow down economic growth, highlighting the urgent need for appropriate 
interventions to promote economic growth and development in the region. Following the generally held view 
that more finance enhances economic growth, most African countries turned to regional and international 
financial integration as a panacea to their capital accumulation, distribution and economic growth 
challenges. This informs the spate of financial sector reforms adopted by many African countries over the 
last three decades. These reforms are largely aimed at propelling economic growth in the common market 
by harnessing the scale, scope and cost-reduction benefits of international capital mobilization and 
distribution using cross-border banking and investment collaborations (African Development Bank, 2010).  
However, there is a paucity of literature evaluating the outcomes of financial integration in Africa. 
Specifically, cross-country studies on the causal nexus between financial integration, bank lending and 
economic growth in Africa are lacking in the empirical literature (AfDB, 2010). Most studies are limited to 
analysis of single-country or individual regional economic communities‘ (RECs) data. According to Ahmed 
and Mmolainyane (2014), such limitations increase the controversy in the literature on Africa and constrain 
the practical application of the findings for crafting broad-based policy interventions to ensure synergies 
across RECs in the larger agenda of Africa‘s economic emancipation. It is therefore important to provide 
African leaders with the empirical evidence on the nexus between financial integration, bank lending 
behavior and economic growth in the various sub-regional blocs. This will help guide policy choices that 
speeds up the harmonization and expansion of economic growth in Africa.  
The chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the causal nexus between financial integration, bank 
lending behavior and economic growth in five major regional economic communities of Africa. Using data 
from 47 African economies over the 2007-2014 period, the study employs convergence analysis, Granger-
causality tests and impulse response function analysis to respectively analyze evolution of bank lending 
behavior and economic growth after years of financial reforms and assess the causal nexus between 
financial integration, bank lending and economic growth in Africa and five sub-regional markets. The 
118 | P a g e  
 
chapter therefore contributes to the sparse literature on the finance-growth nexus debate in Africa and 
provides guidance for peer-learning across the various rucks of financial integration projects in Africa.  
The novelty of the chapter is in fourfold.  First, the study uses a large sample of 47 African countries across 
five regional economic communities for the period 2007-2014, making this the largest cross-country study 
on the finance-growth nexus in Africa. Second, the chapter combines two strands of literature, highlighting 
both the role of financial integration and bank lending behavior in determining economic growth in emerging 
markets. Third, the chapter tests for a feedback causality between the variables, allowing the chapter to 
examine the supply-leading, the demand-following hypotheses and the feedback theory using panel vector 
auto-regressive (pVAR) models for testing Granger-causality. According to Pradhan et al. (2014a), this 
approach is seldom used in the finance-growth nexus literature in nascent markets. Fourth, the chapter 
allows for a comparison of the findings between the full sample and the sub-regional markets, highlighting 
the relative importance of financial integration and banking lending on economic growth across Africa‘s 
sub-regional markets. The comparative dimension also allows for peer-learning and better policy 
formulation. This understanding is expected to guide the adoption of broad-based policies that will ensure 
greater and a more harmonious growth performance in African economies across the common market.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the pertinent theoretical and empirical 
literature. Section 6.3 describes the data and methodology used while Section 6.4 presents and discusses 
the results. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Literature review 
Theoretically, three main competing, yet complementing views explain the variations in the economic 
growth rates and the wealth of nations across the world. First, the Neo-Classical growth theory of Solow 
(1956) and Swan (1956) postulate that economic growth is determined by labor, capital and technology and 
that variations in economic growth rates depends on the volume and efficient combination of these factors. 
Solow (1956) however emphasized that credit growth only results in temporary spikes in economic growth, 
insisting that sustainable long-run economic growth can only be achieved by improvements in technology34. 
In contrast, the ‗Endogenous-Growth‘ theory contends that economic growth is a function of endogenous 
                                                          
34
 This theory however fails to explain the economic determinants of the technological advancements needed to 
enhance output growth. 
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rather than external factors. Proponents of the endogenous growth model argue that economic growth is a 
factor of investments in innovation, knowledge and human capital development, each with positive 
externalities for output growth (Romer, 1986). The endogenous growth model therefore emphasizes the 
significance of capital markets in promoting investments in innovation and human resource development for 
growth (King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997). A third strand of the literature, which more formally 
emphasized the significance of international finance in the intermediation process, is the ‗Financial 
Repression‘ theory. According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), variations in the level of economic 
growth across countries can largely be explained by the quantity and quality of financial services provided 
in each economy. Notwithstanding the theoretic variances, a common factor identified by these competing 
models is the role played by finance in economic growth. Whether capital originates from within or outside 
an economy and whether it is used directly for production or invested in technological advancement, it 
deemed important for economic growth.  
The empirical growth literature is replete with controversies regarding the nature of the relationship 
between financial integration, bank credit and economic growth35. The standard view, which follows the 
financial repression model, is that a liberalised, integrated and well-developed financial sector promotes the 
formation of international synergies in credit accumulation and distribution for greater and faster economic 
growth in participating economies (Esso, 2010; Affinito, 2011; Saafi et al., 2016). Financial integration also 
provides opportunities for the diffusion of technology from capital abundant and technologically advanced 
economies to capital and technological deficient economies, expanding the opportunities for higher 
economic growth (Badri and Sheshgelani, 2016). This is largely achieved through cross-border banking 
and investment activities. Besides, the law of one price assumes that deeper financial integration will 
stimulate competition among banks, reduce intermediation spreads and upsurge the scale, scope and 
quality of banking services, with positive benefits for output growth in a common market (Affinito, 2011).  
In contrast, several recent studies contend that deeper financial integration and credit growth might 
increase financial fragility and adversely affect economic growth (Swamy and Sreejesh, 2013; Ladime et 
al., 2013; Menyah et al., 2014; Shijaku, 2017)36. For instance, Cucinelli (2015) argue that upsurges in 
international capital flows and the need for banks to maintain their profit profiles often stimulates them to 
                                                          
35
 Moshirian and Wu, 2012; Menyah et al., 2014; Pradhan et al, 2014a, to mention but a few. 
36
This is evidenced by the conduct of financial intermediaries in the well-developed and integrated financial 
markets prior to, during and after the 2008 global financial crisis (Lane, 2012; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014). 
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engage in high-risk lending behavior exposing the financial system to instability and low economic growth. 
Similarly, Petkovski and Kjosevski (2014) found a significant inverse relationship between bank credit to the 
private sector and economic growth in 16 transition economies from Central and South-Eastern Europe for 
the 1991-2011 periods. Also, in a more recent study of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European 
countries over 1995-2014, Bongini et al. (2017) found evidence challenging the ideas that bank lending 
growth spurs real sector growth and foreign banks augment economic growth. Indeed, Frey and Voltz 
(2011) found no significant relationship between regional financial integration and financial sector 
development in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
There is also an unresolved contention in the literature about the direction of causality between bank 
lending behavior and economic growth. Three rucks of arguments are identified. First, the ‗supply-leading‘ 
hypothesis advocates that finance precedes economic growth (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973). This is 
backed by a plethora of empirical studies (Cappiello et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2010; Jalil et al., 2010; Affinito, 
2011; Bojanic, 2012; Chaiechi and Kharroubi, 2012; Hsueh et al., 2013; Menyah et al., 2014; Pradhan et 
al., 2014b among others). According to this hypothesis, bank credit growth enhances investment growth 
and increases in overall economic output. In contrast, the ‗demand-following‘ hypothesis argues that credit 
and financial markets grow in response to economic growth and higher demand for output (Panopoulou, 
2009; Kar, Nazlioglu and Agir, 2011). In support of the demand following hypothesis are studies by Ang and 
McKibbin (2007), Panopoulou (2009) and Odhiambo (2010). A third strand of the literature, which follows 
the ‗feedback‘ theory, argues that the causality is bidirectional and runs in both directions, with each 
reinforcing the other (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Kakilli et al., 2009; Lee and Chang, 2009; Wolde-
Rufael, 2009; Pradhan et al., 2014a). 
However, empirical literature on the finance-growth nexus in Africa is scanty and mostly limited to single-
country, single-sub-regional market or limited cross-country analysis (Gisanabagabo and Ngalawa, 2016). 
For instance, a recent study by Nzioka (2017) found that increased capital flows from deeper financial 
integration have a significant positive effect on economic growth in the East Africa Community. Also, Kouki 
and Rezgui (2017) found that financial integration positively affects economic growth in Maghreb countries 
for the period 1981-2014. However, a combined study of the COMESA and SADC regions by Misati et al. 
(2015) showed that while the full sample revealed no significant relationship between financial integration 
and economic growth for the 1970-2011 period, a disaggregation of the data into COMESA and SADC 
samples showed that financial integration had a significant positive effect on economic growth in both 
regions though the effect was stronger in the COMESA sample.  Also, Ojeaga et al. (2013) found that 
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commercial bank lending in Nigeria negatively affected economic growth over the 1989-2012 period. 
Similarly, Gisanabagabo and Ngalawa (2016) found evidence of the supply leading hypothesis in the 
Rwandan economy, over the period 1996-2010, with shocks in bank credit playing a dominant role in 
determining fluctuations in economic growth. Yet, Kakilli et al. (2009) studied the causal nexus between 
finance and economic growth in 24 Sub-Saharan African countries over 1975-2005 and concluded that a 
feedback causality exists between financial sector development and economic growth in Sub-Saran Africa.  
In view of Africa‘s plan for achieving greater harmonization of its financial and real sectors, the lack of an 
extensive study and a sub-regional critique clogs the broad and holistic empirical understanding needed by 
policy makers to chart the course of Africa‘s integration and growth agenda (AfDB, 2010). It is therefore 
important to provide African leaders with the empirical evidence on the sub-regional differences in the 
nexus between financial integration, bank lending behavior and economic growth to guide policy choices 
that spur financial sector development and economic growth across the common market. To the best of the 
researcher‘s knowledge, this is the first extensive study to combine the two strands of literature by 
empirically examining the nexus between financial integration and bank credit growth on real economic 
growth in Africa and further provide a sub-regional discourse into these relationships. The sub-regional 
markets studied form the bedrocks of Africa‘s regional economic integration and serve as nodes for peer-
learning and policy formulation.  
 
6.3 Data and methodology 
The empirical analysis utilizes annual country level data from 47 African economies over the period 2007-
2014. The data for per capita GDP growth rate and private credit by deposit money banks to GDP are 
obtained from the World Bank Group‘s (2016) World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Financial 
Development Databases (GFDD) respectively. The financial freedom index data is obtained from the 
Economic Freedom Index database of the Heritage Foundation (2016). The study further breaks the 
sample into five sub-strata based on membership of five regional economic communities. The variables 
used for the study are financial freedom index (FI), private credit to the domestic sector by banks (BLB) and 
per capita GDP growth (GDPGPC).  Financial freedom index captures the effects of financial sector 
liberalization on bank lending behavior and economic growth.  Private credit to the domestic sector by 
banks, measured as a percentage of GDP, accounts for changes in bank lending conduct in response to 
either financial integration-induced changes in their competitive environment or reactions to greater 
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economic growth and the subsequent need for more loans.  Also, the study uses annual per capita GDP 
growth as a proxy for economic growth. Per capita GDP growth measures the relative changes in income 
per unit population in a country and accounts for changes in household earnings and investment capacity 
overtime. This could result from either cross-border capital flows or technological transfers resulting from 
greater financial liberalized and deeper integrated or from credit expansion due to competitive banking 
conduct (Pradhan et al., 2014). 
 
6.3.1 Empirical strategy 
The study employs a three-step analytical procedure to unravel the nexus between financial integration, 
bank lending behavior and economic growth in five regions of Africa. First, the study assesses the 
effectiveness of financial integration in leveling bank lending and economic growth across Africa using 
unconditional β- and ζ-convergence tests. The law of one price postulates that a well-integrated economic 
region is expected to promote a harmonious distribution of banking services and growth patterns among 
participating economies. Therefore, in line with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), the continuous pursuance of 
deeper financial integration in Africa is expected to promote a catch-up effect in both bank lending behavior 
and economic growth. Thus, bank lending and economic growth in previously poor performing countries in 
Africa is expected to catch up with initially better performing economies in line with the β-convergence 
framework. All things being equal, the achievement of β-convergence is expected to lead to ζ-
convergence, where the inter-country discrepancies in bank lending behavior and economic growth across 
African economies is reduced overtime allowing each country‘s average bank lending and economic growth 
to move towards the Africa average overtime (Sala-i-Martin, 1996). The study tests for β-convergence as 
follows: 
               (      )                                                                            (23) 
where, Yj,t represents the mean value of  the variable in question (bank lending behavior and per capita 
GDP growth) for country j in year t. Yj,t-1 is the mean value of the variable in question for country j in  year t-
1;             (    )    (      ); α, β and ρ are parameters to be estimated while εj,t is the error term. 
According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), β-convergence is absolute if initially poor performers increase 
their marginal performance at a faster rate than initially good performers to catch up with them. Therefore, 
123 | P a g e  
 
in a univariate regression, a negative β value is interpreted as evidence of absolute β-convergence and 
higher relative coefficients indicate a greater probability for convergence and vice versa.  
The study estimates ζ-convergence using the following equation:  
                                                                                                           (24) 
 
where                   ̅  ;                       ̅    ;     and      are defined as before 
in equation 8;  ̅  respectively represents the mean level of the variables in question for the full sample and 
subsequently for the sub-regional samples in year t.   ̅    is the value  ̅ at time t-1;            
        again α, ζ and ρ are parameters to be estimated while εj,t is the error term. A negative value of ζ is 
interpreted as evidence of ζ-convergence of variable      towards  ̅  and larger values of |ζ|<0 indicates a 
faster rate of ζ-convergence in a comparative analysis. This measures the speed at which each country‘s 
competition and efficiency levels are converging to the African average. Following Casu and Girardone 
(2009) Equations 23 and 24 are estimated using fixed effects model. 
In the second step, the study adopts the following empirical model to examine the causal nexus between 
financial integration, bank lending behavior and economic growth in the five regions of Africa: 
                                                                                                             (25) 
where GDP represents per capita GDP growth; BLB is the measure of bank lending behavior, proxied by 
private credit to the domestic sector expressed as a percentage of GDP; FI denotes a country‘s financial 
integration proxied by financial freedom index; j and t refer to country and time (in years) respectively and 
controls reflect the various control variables. Specifically, the study follows the works of Pradhan et al. 
(2014a; b) to estimate the following panel autoregressive distributed linear (PVAR) specification:  
        ∑         
 
   
 ∑         
 
   
                                                          
where      and       are alternately represented by the three variables under study37 respectively for 
country i (i= 1…, N) in year t (t=L+1,..., T); and L represent optimal moment and model lags used, selected 
                                                          
37
 The panel VAR estimator test for revere causality for all independent variables, therefore alternating the 
regressors to test for causality running in all possible directions. This makes each of the three regressors a 
dependent variable at some point based on what direction of causality is being tested.   
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based on Andrews and Lu (2001) consistent model and moment selection criteria (MMSC) for panel VAR 
estimations based on Hansen‘s (1982) test of over identifying restrictions38.    is the intercept;           
are estimated parameters.    is the bank-specific effect and      is the disturbance term.  
Equation 26 is implemented in line with Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Hancock et al. (1995) 
panel VAR models following Arellano and Bover (1995) system generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimation techniques. Specifically, the study employs the pVAR model of Abringo and Love (2016), which 
allows us to, in one step, test for bidirectional causal relationships for each set of variables. The pVAR 
estimator follows Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimation method, accounting for individual 
bank heterogeneity while allowing untransformed lagged regressors to be used as instruments (Abrigo and 
Love, 2016). This is done by forward mean differencing the variables of interest and estimating their 
coefficients by a system of general method of moments (GMM). The study further uses impulse response 
analysis to examine how each dependent variable responds to shocks in all three variables under study 
following Sims (1980) Cholesky decomposition. These methods both allows the study to examine the 
causal effect of financial integration on bank lending behaviour and economic growth as well as test all 
three theories of the finance-growth nexus debate (the supply leading hypothesis, demand-following 
hypothesis and feedback theory).  
In line with the extant literature, the study implies Granger-causality when the results show a significant 
joint null ∑  =0 and the sign of the causal relationship represents the direction of causality (Granger, 
1988; Casu and Girardone, 2009; Abrigo and Love, 2016). Therefore, in the estimations involving GDP and 
BLB, a positive (or negative) statistically significant sum of the coefficients of lagged BLB is viewed as 
evidence in support of the supply-leading hypothesis because previous increases in bank lending activities 
precede per capita GDP growth (or decline). Also, when BLB is the dependent variable, a positive and 
significant sum of the coefficients of lagged GDPGPC is viewed as evidence of the demand-following 
hypothesis, implying that previous years‘ GDP growth precedes a rise in bank lending behaviour, and thus 
positive Granger-causes bank lending behaviour and vice versa. Similar interpretations are given to the 
estimations involving financial integration and GDP as well as those involving FI and BLB.   
 
 
                                                          
38
 The optimal lag is chosen where the MBIC, MAIC and MQIC are smallest and Hansen-J p-value is above 0.1 
(Andrews and Lu, 2001; Abrigo and Love, 2016). 
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6.4 Results 
Table 6.1 presents a summary of the descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the study and 
Appendix B presents the pairwise correlation between these variables. Table 6.1 shows that average per 
capita GDP growth in Africa for the period 2007-2014 is 1.026. In the sub-regional markets, SADC seems 
to lead the other regions in terms of per capita GDP growth, recording an average per capita GDP growth 
rate of 1.130 percent. This is followed by the ECOWAS region with an 8-year average per capita GDP 
growth rate of 1.017 percent. Also, the EAC recorded an average per capita GDP growth rate of 0.887 
while ECCAS recorded a rate of 0.841 and the AMU sub-region lagged behind with and average per capita 
GDP growth rate of 0.774 percent.   
Table 6.1: Summary statistics on variables 
Variable Mean SD.  Min. Max Median Skew Kurtosis 
Panel 1: Africa 
GDPGPC 1.026 0.872 -2.085 4.651 1.178 -0.637 4.907 
FI 3.705 0.389 2.303 4.248 3.689 -1.274 4.800 
BLB 2.789 0.823 -1.089 4.630 2.783 -0.405 4.605 
Panel 2: AMU 
GDPGPC 0.774 1.068 -1.931 4.651 0.739 1.183 8.721 
FI 3.460 0.351 2.996 4.094 3.401 0.332 2.309 
BLB 3.322 0.837 1.683 4.289 3.315 -0.271 1.721 
Panel 3: EAC 
GDPGPC 0.887 0.854 -1.431 2.135 1.134 -0.756 2.886 
FI 3.802 0.242 3.401 4.248 3.912 -0.316 2.357 
BLB 2.438 0.929 -1.089 3.550 2.519 -2.098 7.768 
Panel 4: ECCAS 
GDPGPC 0.841 0.962 -1.675 2.917 1.058 -0.665 3.835 
FI 3.583 0.307 2.996 3.912 3.689 -0.945 2.709 
BLB 2.034 0.645 0.594 2.987 2.177 -0.441 2.227 
Panel 5: ECOWAS 
GDPGPC 1.017 0.890 -2.085 2.882 1.129 -0.772 4.072 
FI 3.740 0.321 2.996 4.248 3.689 -1.128 3.667 
BLB 2.752 0.632 1.252 4.158 2.801 -0.115 3.296 
Panel 6: SADC 
GDPGPC 1.130 0.734 -1.682 2.376 1.316 -1.300 5.737 
FI 3.797 0.474 2.303 4.248 3.912 -2.151 7.344 
BLB 3.141 0.746 1.596 4.630 3.009 0.436 2.173 
Notes: Values reported are natural logs of the original variables. GDPGPC is per capita GDP growth; BLB is 
domestic credit to private sector by banks expressed as a percentage of GDP; FI is financial freedom index.  
 
126 | P a g e  
 
Table 6.1 further shows that financial freedom is also generally low in Africa. For the study period, the 
regional average financial freedom index is 3.705 while the AMU recorded an average financial freedom 
index of 3.460. The EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC regions recorded averages of 3.802, 3.583, 3.740 
and 3.797 respectively.  Similarly, bank lending has been generally low in Africa, with a regional average of 
2.789 over the period 2007-2014 and peaking at 3.322 in the AMU sub-regional market. This is followed by 
bank lending in the SADC region (3.141), ECOWAS (2.752, EAC (2.438) with ECCAs recording the lowest 
private credit to the domestic sector by banks of 2.034 percent of GDP. The correlation matrix in Appendix 
B shows no evidence of multicollinearity between the three regressors (Kennedy, 2008).   
 
6.4.1 Evolution of financial integration, bank lending behavior and economic growth in Africa 
Table 6.2 presents annual mean values of the three main variables under study for the full sample of 47 
countries (Africa) as well as the sub-regional samples over the period 2007-2014. Table 6.2 shows that 
average per capita GDP growth has reduced in Africa since the onset of the recent global financial crisis. 
Apart from the ECOWAS sub-region, none of the other samples recorded a per capita GDP growth rate as 
high as the 2007 average over the study period. For the full sample, average per capita GDP growth rate 
stood at 4.565 in 2007. This figure dropped to 3.219 in 2008 and further dropped to 1.291 in 2009. 
Subsequently, average per capita GDP growth rose to 3.544 in 2010, but fell back to 1.807 in 2011. In 2012 
the per capita GDP growth rose to 4.413 and dropped again in 2013 (2.370) and further in 2014 (2.040). 
Similar trends are recorded by the sub-regional markets, with the AMU suffering the worse from the 
economic recession and other sub-regional factors. The recessions recorded in the AMU could also be 
attributed to such factors as the so called ‗Arab spring‘ which saw major instability in the Arab Maghreb 
Union countries like Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya among others, further deepening the 
recession from the financial crisis in this sub-region.  
The average domestic credit to private sector by banks expressed as a percentage of GDP (BLB) has 
generally increased in all regions over the years, only seeing a marginal drop in each sample in one year or 
the other. For the full sample (Africa), BLB rose from 21.727 percent of GDP in 2007 to 23.736% of GDP in 
2008 and further to 26.327 in 2009. However, BLB dropped slightly in 2010 to 24.6205 of GDP and rose 
marginally thereafter, reaching an average of 26.958% of GDP in 2014. Generally, the AMU leads Africa in 
terms of bank lending, recording an average private credit to the domestic sector by banks of 40.129% of 
GDP over the 2007-2014 period. This is followed by SADC with an 8-year average of 37.596. The other 
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regions all fall below the African average of 24.946%, with ECOWAS, EAC and ECCAS respectively 
recording an average BLB of 19.074%, 17.546% and 10.216% for the period 2007-2014. However, 
financial freedom seems to be very limited in the AMU for the study period despite the high bank lending 
activities in the region. While the 8-year average for the full sample stands at 45.237 for the period 2007-
2014, that of the AMU is 34.178. The ECCAS sub-region was the second least free financial system in 
Africa with an average financial freedom index (FI) of 36.692 for the 8-year period. This is followed by the 
ECOWAS (46.119), EAC (49.966) and the SADC (50.797) as the most financially free sub-region in Africa.   
Table 6.2: Evolution of financial integration, bank lending and economic growth in Africa 
Variable Region 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
GDPGPC Africa 4.565 3.219 1.291 3.544 1.807 4.413 2.370 2.040 2.886 
AMU 3.257 2.082 0.458 2.512 -7.158 16.715 -0.125 -0.568 2.212 
EAC 4.566 1.814 1.902 3.585 3.830 0.097 2.608 2.866 2.620 
ECCAS 8.484 4.081 -0.726 1.895 1.710 2.696 1.611 2.905 2.678 
ECOWAS 3.106 3.769 1.814 3.622 2.897 4.146 3.638 2.242 3.167 
SADC 4.966 3.149 0.373 4.501 3.587 3.133 2.634 1.869 2.990 
BLB Africa 21.727 23.736 26.327 24.620 24.995 25.556 25.885 26.958 24.946 
AMU 32.350 34.920 39.081 39.348 41.853 41.383 44.410 50.972 40.129 
EAC 15.022 16.011 16.572 17.585 18.275 19.656 18.055 19.013 17.546 
ECCAS 5.994 6.991 10.257 10.339 10.241 11.587 12.670 13.651 10.216 
ECOWAS 16.146 19.151 22.040 18.274 18.313 18.646 19.409 20.666 19.074 
SADC 32.659 35.744 43.428 36.229 36.394 37.976 39.321 40.090 37.594 
FI Africa 46.826 46.677 45.439 45.029 45.259 44.558 44.123 44.367 45.237 
AMU 29.535 32.340 32.826 34.902 36.000 35.714 35.957 35.789 34.178 
EAC 52.090 52.113 50.133 50.141 50.267 50.395 48.158 46.571 49.966 
ECCAS 44.091 41.739 35.484 35.143 35.366 35.250 35.250 36.129 36.692 
ECOWAS 50.617 46.667 45.889 45.455 45.532 44.944 44.886 45.270 46.119 
SADC 55.263 55.156 50.533 49.250 49.512 49.398 49.277 50.256 50.797 
Source: Author‘s calculation from WDI and Economic Freedom databases. Notes: Actual annual mean values of 
each variable are reported here to show the inter-REC variations over time. GDP is the per capita GDP growth, BLB 
is domestic credit to private sector by banks expressed as a percentage of GDP; FI is financial freedom index. 
 
Table 6.3 presents the convergence tests results for the lending behavior of banks and economic growth in 
Africa and for the five sub-regional blocs under study. The theory of one price suggests that integrating 
economies develop synergies that allow for a reduction in the disparities between their key performance 
indicators.  
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Table 6.3: Convergence of bank lending behavior and economic growth in Africa and five sub-regional markets 
Region Africa AMU EAC ECCAS ECOWAS SADC 
 BLB GDP BLB GDP BLB GDP BLB GDP BLB GDP BLB GDP 
 β-Convergence 
α 1.116*** 1.281*** 2.943*** 0.189 0.690** 1.493** 0.667** 0.588 0.939*** 0.927** 1.196*** 0.636 
(0.141) (0.177) (0.616) (0.391) (0.266) (0.470) (0.267) (0.332) (0.216) (0.281) (0.196) (0.594) 
β -0.378*** -1.130*** -0.853*** -0.573 -0.252** -1.511** -0.285** -0.372 -0.332*** -0.732** -0.367*** -0.627 
(0.050) (0.147) (0.185) (0.487) (0.105) (0.451) (0.133) (0.343) (0.079) (0.235) (0.061) (0.429) 
  0.024 0.179* -0.316** -0.789 0.059 0.099 0.225 -0.521 0.378*** 0.171 0.263** -0.168 
(0.060) (0.101) (0.141) (0.402) (0.093) (0.232) (0.196) (0.292) (0.104) (0.171) (0.103) (0.285) 
R-Square 0.223 0.439 0.710 0.861 0.195 0.673 0.149 0.585 0.264 0.268 0.497 0.336 
F-statistic 29.64*** 37.87*** 24.44*** 12.34** 2.90* 13.37*** 2.45* 2.11 11.13*** 5.14** 24.67*** 7.08** 
 σ-Convergence 
α 0.020** 0.175*** 0.529*** -0.200 -0.115** 0.018 -0.252** 0.292** -0.013 0.226** 0.152*** 0.118 
(0.008) (0.049) (0.133) (0.221) (0.045) (0.113) (0.123) (0.093) (0.014) (0.092) (0.027) (0.170) 
σ -0.444*** -1.089*** -0.892*** -0.202 -0.471** -1.376** -0.398** -0.066 -0.423*** -0.706** -0.400*** -0.830* 
(0.058) (0.151) (0.232) (0.694) (0.153) (0.536) (0.149) (0.335) (0.089) (0.228) (0.068) (0.424) 
  0.081 0.146 -0.271 -1.025 0.195* 0.034 0.331* -0.453 0.445*** 0.135 0.360** -0.016 
(0.063) (0.103) (0.166) (0.548) (0.102) (0.279) (0.196) (0.301) (0.111) (0.165) (0.109) (0.290) 
R-Square 0.231 0.423 0.683 0.835 0.304 0.630 0.216 0.456 0.298 0.265 0.475 0.344 
F-statistic 31.14*** 35.53*** 21.51*** 10.14** 5.23** 11.09*** 3.87** 1.26 13.16*** 5.05** 22.62*** 7.33** 
Notes: *, **, *** respectively indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Significant coefficients are in bold and standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis. BLB is bank lending behavior, proxied by domestic credit to private sector by banks expressed as a percentage of GDP and GDPGPC is per capita 
GDP growth.   
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Table 6.3 shows that the continuous pursuit of deeper financial integration in Africa promotes a catch-up 
effect in bank lending behavior across Africa, allowing countries that initially had low bank lending to GDP 
rates to catch-up with initially high performers. This is because the study finds evidence of β-convergence 
of domestic credit to private sector by banks (expressed as a percentage of GDP) in Africa and the five 
sub-regional markets. Comparatively, countries in the AMU sub-region have the fastest converging bank 
lending behavior in Africa (0.853), beating the speed of bank lending convergence in Africa (0.378). This is 
followed by SADC member countries (0.367), ECOWAS sub-region (0.332), ECCAS (0.285) and the EAC 
(0.252) respectively.  Also, the results show evidence of a reduction in the inter-country disparities in the 
lending behavior of banks in all six samples, providing evidence of ζ-convergence of bank lending behavior 
towards the African average in all samples. The results on Table 6.3 further shows evidence of GDP 
convergence in Africa (1.130), especially in the EAC (1.511) and ECOWAS (0.732) sub-regions. This 
shows that increasing financial integration and the harmonization of bank lending behavior across Africa 
has significant benefits for economic growth harmonization across countries in Africa, especially for the 
EAC and ECOWAS sub-regions.      
 
6.4.2 Causal nexus between financial integration, bank lending and economic growth  
In this section, the study discusses the causality between the three variables. Table 6.4 and 6.5 present the 
results for the Granger-causality tests between financial integration, bank lending and economic growth in 
Africa and the five regional economic communities respectively. The analysis was done using the pVAR 
model of Abringo and Love (2016). The results on Table 6.4 show that the coefficients of the one-year lags 
of each independent variable in question have a positive and significant effect on current values of itself. 
This confirms the fact that previous year performance of each independent variable affects its current year 
values. Also, the findings show that for the period 2007-2014, the three variables had a general positive 
effect on each other for all the full sample of 47 African countries studied except in column (c) where per 
capita GDP growth had a negative effect on bank lending behavior. However, these coefficients were not 
significant to imply Granger causality in Africa, supporting the findings of Ahmed and Mmolainyane (2014) 
and Menyah et al. (2014).  
 
 
 
130 | P a g e  
 
Table 6.4: Causality between financial integration, bank lending and economic growth: Full sample 
Dep. 
Variable 
GDPGPC BLB FI 
Models (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Panel 1: Africa 
          0.382***(0.108) 0.406**(0.182) -0.020(0.017)  0.004(0.009)  
       0.877(0.611)  0.951***(0.134) 0.892***(0.182)  0.049(0.059) 
       1.682(4.524)  0.262(0.352) 0.136(0.277) 0.468**(0.157) 
   
GMM 
criterion 
0.073 0.071 0.073 0.093 0.071 0.093 
Observations 140 149 140 205 149 205 
Panels 40 42 40 42 42 42 
Hansen 0.603 0.564 0.603 0.089 0.564 0.089 
Notes: *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Bank lending behavior (BLB) is the 
independent variable in models (a) and (f) while financial freedom index (FI) is the independent variable in models (b) 
and (d). In models (c) and (e), per capita GDP growth (GDPGPC) is the independent variable. The diagnostic test 
reported include; (1) Wald    for the joint significance of instruments, (2) the instrument count, (3) p-values of the 
Arellano-Bond test for first (AR(1)) and second (AR(2)) order serial correlation in the residuals where the null 
hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation (4) p-value of the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions with the 
null hypothesis being that instruments are exogenous.  
 
Table 6.5 shows that there are variations in the nature and direction of the nexuses between financial 
integration, bank lending behavior and economic growth across Africa‘s sub-regional markets. First, the 
results in column (a) and (c) of Table 6.5 lends support to the ―feedback‖ hypothesis in the EAC sample. 
This is because the evidence in column(a) shows that for the period 2007-2014, bank lending behavior 
(BLB) negative Granger-causes per capita GDP growth among EAC member countries and in column (c), 
the study finds that per capita GDP growth negative Granger-causes bank lending behavior in the EAC 
sub-region. This suggests that increases in bank lending (per capita GDP) in previous years have a 
significant negative effect on per capita GDP growth (bank lending) in currents years in the EAC. This 
finding is consistent with the findings of Demetriades and Hussein (1996), Kakilli et al. (2009), Lee and 
Chang (2009), Wolde-Rufael (2009) and Pradhan et al. (2014a).  
However, the results for the AMU, ECCAS and ECOWAS sub-regions support the ―supply-leading 
hypothesis‖ and are consistent with earlier studies by Hsueh et al. (2013), Menyah et al. (2014), and 
Pradhan et al. (2014a: b). This is because the study finds that for the period 2007-2014, bank lending 
behavior (BLB) negative Granger-causes per capita GDP growth in the AMU sample but positive Granger-
causes per capita GDP growth in the ECCAS and ECOWAS samples.  
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Table 6.5: Causality between financial integration, bank lending and economic growth: Sub-regional 
analysis 
Dep. Variable GDPGPC BLB FI 
Models (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Panel 2: AMU 
          0.197(0.152) -0.565***(0.056) 0.081(0.071)  0.008(0.010)  
       -3.858***(0.528)  -0.484(0.345) 0.378**(0.079)  -0.006(0.013) 
       0.855**(0.338)  0.482*(0.293) 0.244***(0.038) 0.198*(0.104) 
 
GMM criterion 0.813 0.776 0.813 0.761 0.776 0.761 
Observations 11 12 11 23 12 23 
Panels 4 4 4 5 4 5 
Hansen 0.708 0.676 0.708 0.132 0.676 0.132 
Panel 3: EAC   
          -0.080(0.143) 0.097(0.141) -0.069*(0.037)  -0.012**(0.004)  
       -2.346***(0.547)  0.969***(0.189) 0.910***(0.121)  -0.061(0.094) 
       8.632(7.467)  0.576*(0.295) 1.919e-4(0.131) 2.954***(0.362) 
 
GMM criterion 0.55 0.482 0.55 0.411 0.482 0.411 
Observations 21 21 21 27 21 27 
Panels 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Hansen 0.482 0.604 0.482 0.520 0.604 0.520 
Panel 4: ECCAS   
          0.579***(0.104) 0.182**(0.078) -0.015(0.066)  -0.003(0.003)  
       1.554***(0.486)  1.433***(0.179) 1.401***(0.151)  -0.017(0.016) 
       -7.394**(2.519)  -0.505(1.623) 0.831***(0.126) -0.302(0.263) 
 
GMM criterion 0.926 0.741 0.926 0.545 0.741 0.545 
Observations 14 13 14 23 13 23 
Panels 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Hansen 0.372 0.649 0.372 0.403 0.649 0.403 
Panel 5: ECOWAS   
          0.173*(0.089) 0.275**(0.087) -0.022(0.015)  -0.003(0.012)  
       2.452**(0.775)  0.142(0.201) -0.023(0.643)  -0.025(0.169) 
       -2.852(2.551)  -0.757(0.674) 0.025(0.096) 0.264(0.225) 
 
GMM criterion 0.215 0.425 0.215 0.204 0.425 0.204 
Observations 45 45 45 66 45 66 
Panels 12 13 12 13 13 13 
Hansen 0.644 0.085 0.644 0.336 0.085 0.336 
Panel 6: SADC   
          -0.176(0.233) 0.768**(0.351) 0.023(0.042)  0.011**(0.005)  
       -0.554(0.650)  0.674***(0.090) 0.663***(0.104)  -0.012(0.026) 
       4.514(4.442)  -0.186(0.371) 0.006(0.140) 0.155*(0.085) 
 
GMM criterion 0.299 0.484 0.299 0.375 0.484 0.375 
Observations 38 44 38 54 44 54 
Panels 10 11 10 11 11 11 
Hansen 0.497 0.460 0.497 0.602 0.460 0.602 
Notes: *, **, ***, indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Bank lending behavior (BLB) is the 
independent variable in models (a) and (f) while Financial freedom index (FI) is the independent variable in models (b) and (d). In 
models (c) and (e), per capita GDP growth (GDPGPC) is the independent variable. The diagnostic test reported include; (1) Wald 
   for the joint significance of instruments, (2) the instrument count, (3) p-values of the Arellano-Bond test for first (AR(1)) and 
second (AR(2)) order serial correlation in the residuals where the null hypothesis is that there is no serial correlation (4) p-value 
of the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions with the null hypothesis being that instruments are exogenous.  
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These findings suggest that increases in bank lending in previous years had a significant negative effect on 
per capita GDP growth in currents years among AMU member countries but a significant positive effect on 
current per capita GDP growth in the ECCAS and ECOWAS sub-regions. The results for the SADC sub-
region show that though BLB had a negative effect on per capita GDP growth over 2007- 2014, it was not 
significant to imply Granger-causality. Also, the study finds that per capita GDP growth has a negative but 
insignificant effect on bank lending in the ECCAS and ECOWAS samples and a positive but insignificant 
effect in the AMU and SADC sub-regions. 
Column b of Table 6.5 shows that the coefficient of the first lag of financial freedom index (FI) is positive 
and significant in the AMU sample but negative and significant in the ECCAS sample. This suggest that 
deeper financial integration positive Granger-causes per capita GDP growth in the AMU sample, supporting 
the findings of Misati et al. (2015) that deeper financial integration might have positive benefits for the real 
sector in sub-regional markets even when the broader common market shows no significant benefits. 
However, the evidence in the ECCAS sample suggest that financial freedom negative Granger-causes per 
capita GDP growth, lending support to the view that deeper financial integration is anti-growth. This finding 
is consistent with the work of Ahmed (2016) for 30 Sub-Saharan countries over 1976-2010. Also, the study 
finds no significant effect of financial integration on GDP growth in the EAC, SADC and ECOWAS sub-
regions.  
Similarly, column (e) on Table 6.5 shows that increases in per capita GDP growth positive Granger-causes 
financial freedom in the SADC sample but negative Granger-causes financial freedom in the EAC sample. 
This suggests that improved economic growth in SADC helps increase financial freedom and the opposite 
is true for the EAC sample. The results from the other samples show that though per capita GDP has a 
positive effect on financial freedom in the AMU and a negative effect in the ECCAS and ECOWAS 
samples, these were not significant to imply Granger-causality.  
In column (d) the study finds that financial integration (FI) positive Granger-causes bank lending (BLB) in 
the AMU and EAC samples. However, these relationships are negative but insignificant in the other sub-
regional markets. This suggests that greater financial freedom in previous years increases bank lending in 
subsequent years in the AMU and EAC sub-regions. These findings support the theory that financial 
integration increases financial sector development and bank lending across countries in a common market 
and are consistent with the findings of Ahmed (2016).  
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Following the work of Mora and Logan (2012) and Pradhan et al. (2014), the study augments the findings of 
the Holtz-Eakin et al (1998) estimation procedure using Abringo and Love (2016) pVAR model with impulse 
response function analysis. According to Pradhan et al. (2014), the Holtz-Eakin et al (1998) panel Granger-
Causality test provides evidence of the direction of causality between the variables of interest but fails to 
account for the timing and extent of impulse response of each variable to a shock in the other variables. 
The study therefore employs the orthogonalized impulse response functions using Sims (1980) Choleski 
decomposition to orthogonalize the shocks (Mora and Logan, 2012; Abringo and Love 2016) to overcome 
this shortcoming. The orderings of the variables are indicated in each Figures 6.1 – 6.3 in Appendix 6.C.  
Generally, the study finds that for the period 2007-2014, which spanned the entire global financial crisis 
period, an unexpected shock in economic growth has a positive and significant initial effect on own 
economic growth and this effect diminishes gradually over the next 4 periods after the shock at which time 
economic growth returns to a steady state. Similar responses to own shocks are recorded in the sub-
regional markets except in the AMU where the initial own-effect response is positive but becomes negative 
after one period following the shock. This positive to negative response is seen over the next two periods 
respectively, after which the effect becomes positive, diminishing overtime towards equilibrium. Similar 
effects were recorded for the effect of bank lending to GDP in the AMU while GDP growth in the sub-region 
had very marginal responses to financial integration. However, the study finds an insignificant negative 
response of GDP growth to a shock in bank lending behavior in Africa. Though the initial response was 
negative, this becomes positive over the 2 periods, falling back to a steady state in the period after. In the 
EAC, GDP initially responded negatively to financial integration, but the effect turns positive after one 
period, diminishing gradually towards equilibrium over the period. The opposite is true for the ECOWAS 
sample while GDP in the SADC sample had an initially negative response to shocks in financial integration, 
becoming positive after one period and steadily improves marginally overtime.  Also, GDP initially 
responded positively to shocks in bank lending behavior in the EAC, but this becomes negative one period 
after, returning to a steady positive response thereafter overtime. In ECOWAS, the initially negative 
response of GDP to shocks in bank lending turns positive after 1.5 periods and gradually returns to a 
steady state by the 3rd period.  
 
 
 
134 | P a g e  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
Financial sector development and increased bank lending have clear benefits for economic growth. 
However, achieving steady and speedy economic growth has proven elusive, for even the most advanced 
economies. The chapter examines the causal nexus between financial integration, bank lending behavior 
and economic growth in 47 African economies and compare the results across five regional economic 
communities over 2007-2014. The results of the convergence analysis show that financial integration is 
largely harmonizing the lending behavior of banks in Africa and all five sub-regional blocs studied. It has 
also reduced the inter-country variations in GDP in Africa, especially in the EAC and ECOWAS sub-
regions. The study also finds that though no significant causal relationship exists between financial 
integration, bank lending and economic growth in Africa, evidence from the sub-regional blocs supports a 
causal role of financial integration and bank lending on economic growth. The study finds evidence 
supporting the feedback hypothesis in the East African Community (EAC) while the evidence from the 
AMU, ECCAS and ECOWAS sub-regions support the ―supply-leading‖ hypothesis. Similarly, the study 
found evidence supporting the positive role of financial integration in the AMU sub-region and the negative 
effect of financial integration in the ECCAS sub-region. The results also support a positive relationship 
between financial integration and bank lending behavior in AMU and EAC banking sectors.  
The findings of the study have important policy and practical implications for Africa and other developing 
regions. First, the significant variations in the effects of financial integration on bank lending behavior and 
economic growth shows the dynamic nature of African banking markets and highlights the need for 
segregation in policy formulation and implementation. Also, the significant role played by bank lending 
behavior and the sub-regional variations these relationships all point to the need for tailoring regulatory 
interventions aimed at promoting higher bank lending in Africa to suit conditions in the various rucks of 
financial integration projects (RECs) in Africa. However, the desire for harmonious economic growth can 
still be achieved in the long run if these policy initiatives are carried out with the view of bringing to par the 
regulatory and other macroeconomic factors that influence banking behavior and output growth in each 
sub-region. This will help promote inter-REC collaborations that will foster long-run economic growth 
optimization through effects on the bank lending channel of financial integration in Africa. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 6.A: Pairwise correlation matrix 
Variable GDPGPC FI BLB 
Panel 1: Africa 
GDPGPC 1.000   
FI -0.140** 1.000  
BLB -0.097 0.385*** 1.000 
Panel 2: AMU 
GDPGPC 1.000   
FI -0.237 1.000  
BLB -0.011 0.623*** 1.000 
Panel 3: EAC 
GDPGPC 1.000   
FI 0.479** 1.000  
BLB -0.336** -0.138 1.000 
Panel 4: ECCAS 
GDPGPC 1.000   
FI -0.267 1.000  
BLB -0.253 0.565*** 1.000 
Panel 5: ECOWAS 
GDPGPC 1.000   
FI -0.152 1.000  
BLB -0.224** 0.381*** 1.000 
Panel 6: SADC 
GDPGPC 1.000   
FI -0.185 1.000  
BLB -0.087 0.409*** 1.000 
Notes: **, *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. GDP is per capita GDP growth; BLB is the 
domestic credit to private sector by banks and FI is the financial freedom index. 
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Appendix 6.B: Summary of directions of short-run Granger-causality 
Direction of relationship Causal nexus tested in the model 
FI vs. BLB FI vs. 
GDPGPC 
BLB vs. 
GDPGPC 
Direction of Relationship observed in Africa NA NA NA 
Direction of Relationship observed in AMU FI => BLB FI => 
GDPGPC 
BLB => GDPGPC 
Direction of Relationship observed in EAC FI =>BLB FI <= 
GDPGPC 
BLB <=> 
GDPGPC 
Direction of Relationship observed in 
ECCAS 
NA FI => 
GDPGPC 
BLB => GDPGPC 
Direction of Relationship observed in 
ECOWAS 
NA NA BLB => GDPGPC 
Direction of Relationship observed in SADC NA FI <= 
GDPGPC 
NA 
Notes: X => Y means unidirectional causality from variable X to Variable Y; X <= Y means unidirectional causality 
from variable Y to Variable X; X <=> Y means bidirectional causality between variables X and Y; NA means No 
causality between X and Y. 
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Appendix 6.C: Figures showing orthogonalized impulse responses of variables to Cholesky one S.D. innovations 
Figure 6.1: Response of GDP to Cholesky one standard deviation innovations 
Africa 
 
AMU 
 
EAC 
 
ECCAS 
 
ECOWAS 
 
SADC 
 
Notes: The PVAR estimation was done using one lag of each variable and the external shocks are estimated using Choleski decomposition. GDP represents per 
capita GDP growth. The by option is year: scale while variable ordering is GDP, BLB and FI and the series are in logs and time-demeaned to control for time 
effects. We also used 200 Monte Carlo draws to obtain the error brands. Following Pradhan et al. (2014), we assume that the impulse response is statistically 
significant where the confidence brands do not straddle the line at zero. 
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Figure 6.2: Response of BLB to Cholesky one standard deviation innovations 
Africa 
 
AMU 
 
EAC 
 
ECCAS 
 
ECOWAS 
 
SADC 
 
Notes: The PVAR estimation was done using one lag of each variable and the external shocks are estimated using Choleski decomposition. GDP represents per 
capita GDP growth. The by option is year: scale while variable ordering is GDP, BLB and FI and the series are in logs and time-demeaned to control for time 
effects. We also used 200 Monte Carlo draws to obtain the error brands. Following Pradhan et al. (2014), we assume that the impulse response is statistically 
significant where the confidence brands do not straddle the line at zero. 
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Figure 6.3:  Response of FI to Cholesky one standard deviation innovations 
Africa 
 
AMU 
 
EAC 
 
ECCAS 
 
ECOWAS 
 
SADC 
 
Notes: The PVAR estimation was done using one lag of each variable and the external shocks are estimated using Choleski decomposition. GDP represents per 
capita GDP growth. The by option is year: scale while variable ordering is GDP, BLB and FI and the series are in logs and time-demeaned to control for time 
effects. We also used 200 Monte Carlo draws to obtain the error brands. Following Pradhan et al. (2014), we assume that the impulse response is statistically 
significant where the confidence brands do not straddle the line at zero. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Financial integration is viewed as one of the important drivers of financial sector development, credit 
expansion and economic growth. Financial integration provides a means of capital and technology transfers 
across countries to enhance output growth. However, the effect of financial integration on financial market 
participation, capital mobility and cross-border banking offer both great opportunities and threats to local 
banking systems and the general economy. This thesis empirically examines the nexus between financial 
integration, bank performance and economic growth in Africa and compares the findings across five major 
regional economic communities in Africa. Specifically, the thesis is a collection of seven chapters, of which 
four empirically examine the nexus between financial integration, bank performance and economic growth 
in Africa using secondary data from a variety of sources over the period 2007-2014.  
Chapter one introduces the research problem and objectives while Chapter two presents an overview of 
financial integration and the financial system in Africa and the five regional economic communities. In the 
first empirical chapter of Chapter three, the thesis examines the relationship between both de jure and de 
facto financial integration and bank profitability using the two-step system GMM technique. In Chapter four, 
the study proceeds to address the nexus between financial integration, competition and bank risk-taking 
behavior, controlling for the effect of quality institutions and other factors. Chapter four also tests the so-
called MMR theory of a U-shaped relationship between competition and risk-taking behavior in African 
banking systems.  
In Chapter five, the thesis employs the Stochastic Frontier Analysis technique to estimate measures of cost 
and profit efficiency in Africa and five sub-regional markets and tests the evolution of bank competition and 
efficiency using trend as well as β and ζ convergence analysis. Also, Chapter five employs panel data 
Granger-causality analysis to test both the ‗Quiet-Life‘ hypothesis and ‗Efficient stricture‘ hypothesis in 
Africa and the five sub-regional markets.  In Chapter six, the thesis empirically examines bank lending and 
per capita GDP convergence as well as the causal nexus between financial integration, bank lending 
behavior and economic growth in Africa and five regional economic communities using panel vector 
autoregressive (PVAR) techniques. The thesis ends with Chapter seven, which presents a summary of the 
key findings of the thesis and discusses the major practical and policy implications of the findings. Chapter 
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seven also summarizes the contributions made by the thesis to the empirical literature on financial 
integration, bank performance and economic growth. Lastly, the thesis discusses the limitations of the 
study and makes some proposals for future research agenda. 
 
7.2 Summary of key findings  
The key findings of the empirical chapters of the thesis are summarized as follows:  
Financial integration and bank profitability: The empirical investigation reveals that increased financial 
integration has a significant positive effect on overall bank profitability in Africa. More specifically, the study 
finds that financial freedom, as well as international and regional cross-border banking activities, has 
significantly increased the profitability of banks across Africa. A possible explanation could be that, given 
Africa‘s banking markets are underdeveloped and highly concentrated, deeper financial integration 
improves bank efficiency and competitive pressure from foreign banks participation forces domestic banks 
to explore new product, diversification and expansion opportunities for greater profitability. Besides, the 
findings suggest that though higher cost is associated with lower return on assets, the effect on overall 
bank profitability is positive. This finding is significant because it suggests that in underdeveloped banking 
markets, rising competition from deeper financial integration might require banks to increase their cost of 
operations for technology, diversification, expansion, and advertising activities to enhance their overall 
profitability. This also shows the benefits of increased spending on overall bank profitability in the face of 
deeper financial integration and rising competition.  
However, a comparison of the results across five regional economic communities of Africa reveals that 
these benefits are not uniform across all sub-regional markets. The study finds no significant effect of either 
de jure or de facto financial integration on bank profitability in the AMU, reflecting the region‘s low level of 
financial freedom and cross-border banking activities. In the EAC, greater financial freedom and regional 
cross-border banking improves bank profitability while foreign direct investment, and foreign bank 
participation proves to have positive and significant benefits for bank profitability in the ECCAS sub-region. 
In the ECOWAS sub-region, the study finds that financial freedom and foreign direct investment have 
positive and significant effects on bank profitability while the only measure of financial integration which has 
a significant effect on bank profitability in the SADC region, foreign direct investment, inversely affects bank 
profitability.  The study also finds that in the EAC and SADC sub-regions, diversification plays a positive 
and significant role while competition is significant and negative on bank profitability in the EAC. Also, 
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banks in Africa tend to benefit significantly from the high inflation regimes in most African countries. 
However, at the sub-regional level, the study found that the effect of inflation on bank is predominantly 
negative. These sub-regional variations have always been a major challenge for policy makers in Africa 
and a hindrance to broad-based regulation and policy direction for the African continent.  
Financial integration, competition and bank risk-taking nexus: The results on the direct effect of financial 
integration on bank risk-taking behavior support the integration-fragility theory in Africa, especially in the 
East African Community. However, in the AMU, the evidence supports the financial integration-stability 
theory. Also, the evidence on the effect of competition on bank risk-taking behavior support the MMR 
theory, indicating that bank competition increases bank risk-taking behavior, but beyond a certain 
threshold, further rise in bank competition reduces bank risk-taking behavior in Africa and all its sub-
regional markets. The findings of the interaction between financial integration and competition suggest that 
competition changes from increased financial integration enhance bank stability in Africa. This suggests 
that African economies are unable to fully enjoy the stability benefits of financial integration due to the lack 
of competitiveness in their banking systems. The results further suggest that control of corruption has a 
significant positive effect on bank z-scores in the SADC banking sector but a significant negative effect in 
the AMU banking system.  Also, regulatory quality has a significant positive effect on bank non-performing 
loans in Africa, especially in the ECOWAS and SADC sub-regions. In addition, management quality, 
capitalization and loan quality are also identified as significant determinants of bank stability in Africa and 
all its sub-regional markets. 
Financial integration, competition and efficiency nexus: Several significant issues emerge from the 
empirical analysis in this chapter. First, the findings suggest that the period 2007-2014 saw a significant 
reduction in bank market power and a gradual rise in bank competition in Africa and the five regional 
economic communities studied. Also, the convergence of competition and bank cost and profit efficiency in 
all samples provide evidence of the positive benefits of financial integration for banking sector 
harmonization in emerging markets. The findings of the Granger-causality tests support the ‗Quiet-life‘ 
hypothesis in Africa, especially in the EAC banking sector. However, the ‗Quiet-life hypothesis is rejected in 
the AMU and ECCAS sub-regions. Also, the results of reverse causality running from cost efficiency to 
bank competition suggest that increases in bank cost efficiency promotes bank monopoly power in Africa, 
especially in AMU and SADC banking markets. These findings provide evidence of the uniqueness of the 
causal nexus between bank competition and bank efficiency across the sub-regional markets of Africa.   
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Financial integration, bank lending behavior and economic growth nexus: The findings of the β and ζ 
convergence tests shows a reduction in the inter-country variations in bank lending and per capita GDP 
growth in Africa and the gradual convergence of lending and GDP performance towards the African 
average. This suggests that financial integration is largely harmonizing the rate of financial market 
development and bank lending activities across Africa and its sub-regional markets. It has also reduced the 
inter-country variations in GDP in Africa, especially in the EAC and ECOWAS sub-regions. Though no 
significant causal relationship exists between financial integration, bank lending and economic growth in 
Africa, evidence from the sub-regional markets supports a causal role of financial integration and bank 
lending on economic growth. The study finds evidence supporting the feedback hypothesis in the East 
African Community (EAC) while the evidence from the AMU, ECCAS and ECOWAS sub-regions support 
the ―supply-leading‖ hypothesis. Similarly, the study finds evidence supporting the positive role of financial 
integration in the AMU sub-region and the negative effect of financial integration in the ECCAS sub-region. 
The results also support a positive relationship between financial integration and bank lending behavior in 
AMU and EAC banking sectors. This suggests that concentration of financial integration efforts at the 
regional economic communities‘ level is yielding positive results for some sub-regions whiles other sub-
regions have negative outcomes, highlighting the need for peer-learning and tailored interventions for net 
benefits.  
 
7.3 Policy implications and recommendations 
The findings of the thesis exude several practical and policy implications. First, from a development finance 
perspective, the study findings support the view that continuous financial integration in Africa and other 
emerging economies is beneficial for the profitability and general performance of banks and the economy at 
large. However, the disparities recorded among five key regional economic communities of Africa suggest 
that wholesale integration policies will not auger well for Africa, unless they are tailored to fit the 
environmental settings of the various regional economic communities. Specifically, policy makers, 
regulators and bank managers should work hand in hand to promote greater financial freedom in Africa, 
especially in the EAC and ECOWAS banking sectors as this has a significant positive impact on bank 
profitability in these regions. Besides, despite being an insignificant determinant of bank profitability in the 
AMU, ECCAS and SADC sub-regions, its impact is generally positive. The low levels of financial freedom 
recorded in the AMU and ECCAS needs to be improved to allow banks in these markets harness the 
profitability benefits of greater financial sector liberalization, especially in countries like Libya, Algeria 
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(AMU), the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic (ECCAS). In the SADC sub-region, 
countries like Zimbabwe and Seychelles also need to boost their levels of financial freedom towards 
convergence at the SADC average. These improvements will allow for greater intra-REC collaborations and 
cross-border banking activities for enhanced bank profitability in each sub-regional banking market.  
Also, the level of FDI inflows in Africa should be boosted if significant benefits are to be enjoyed by banks 
and the general economy from FDI inflows. This is especially important for the ECCAS sub-region, where 
the profitability of banks is significantly improved by higher FDI inflows despite being the least receiver of 
FDI inflows in Africa. In SADC, FDI inflows should be regulated to curb the negative impact on bank 
profitability whiles allowing the country to benefit from the technological and other latent benefits of FDI 
inflows in an economy. In line with this, African governments should adopt policies to encourage more FDI 
flow into the region while curbing any possible negative effects this might have on their domestic banking 
sectors. Similarly, the study recommends that policy makers, regulators and bank managers should adopt 
initiatives that will allow their banking sectors to grow and establish branches in other African economies as 
regional cross-border banking activities broadly enhances bank profitability in most regions. These 
initiatives are especially important in the EAC and ECCAS sub-regions. However, in ECOWAS and SADC, 
despite high regional cross-border banking activities, some of the largest and most developed economies 
such as South Africa, Mozambique (SADC), Togo and Cape Verde (ECOWAS) are dominated by domestic 
banks. This could explain the insignificant effect of regional bank assets on bank profitability, highlighting 
the need for these sub-regions to improve regional cross-border banking activities across all countries to 
allow them enjoy its benefits. Also, despite the positive effect of inflation on bank profitability in Africa, the 
sub-regional evidence suggest that African economies need to curb inflation as this negatively affects bank 
profits and poses a threat to overall economic welfare. Additionally, the significant firm level factors provide 
bank managers insights in focal areas that need greater attention to ensure greater bank profitability.  
Second, the evidence of a U-shaped relationship between competition and bank stability provide regulatory 
authorities in Africa with the empirical confirmation needed to back a continuous pursuit of deeper financial 
integration and greater competitiveness in the banking industry despite temporary negative effects this 
might have on bank stability. Specifically, the study provides empirical support for continuous financial 
sector liberalization across Africa amid improved institutional quality to allow banks enjoy the stability 
benefits of a more liberalized and competitive banking sector. However, since the initial effects of a more 
competitive banking sector may be negative, regulators and bank managers should take steps to manage 
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the temporary surge in bank fragility. For instance, bank managers should rather pursue efficiency, product 
innovation and diversification goals in the wake of rising competition rather than exploiting the so-called 
opportunities for greater risk-taking provided by the underdeveloped nature of African banking systems. 
The results also suggest that regulatory authorities in Africa should improve the quality of institutions as this 
further enhances the long-run benefits of greater competition on bank stability. Regulators need to also 
take steps to increase entrance and participation by both new domestic and foreign banks, especially in the 
AMU, ECCAS and SADC markets as these markets are dominated by a few large banks. Besides, the 
evidence suggests that the concurrent pursuit of liberalization and competition goals improves bank stability 
in Africa.    
Similarly, the results of the competition-efficiency nexus analysis suggest that deeper financial integration 
has a generally positive effect on bank competition and efficiency across the common market, thereby 
reducing the inter-country variations overtime. This provides incentive for the continuous promotion of 
financial integration in Africa as it improves both the competitiveness and efficiency of the banking sector. 
However, the sub-regional variations in the convergence rates of bank competition and efficiency in Africa 
highlight the need for increased financial integration efforts in sub-regional markets with slower comparative 
convergence rates to bring their competition and efficiency convergence rates at par with the other sub-
regions.  For instance, the AMU, ECCAS and SADC markets have a greater bank concentration 
convergence rates than other regions. The faster rate of market concentration convergence in these 
markets suggest the need for a general improvement in the competitiveness of these banking markets to 
enable them enjoy the benefits of greater bank competition. These initiatives will further promote greater 
harmony among Africa‘s banking markets and pave the way for broader banking integration in the region, 
thereby enhancing distributive efficiency for greater economic growth. In addition, evidence of a positive 
causal effect from competition to bank efficiency in Africa and the EAC support the continuous pursuance 
of competition goals in Africa for enhanced efficiency. However, the rejection of the so-called ―Quiet-Life‘ 
hypothesis in the AMU and ECCAS sub-regions suggest that increased competition leads to efficiency 
losses in these markets and points to the need for regulators and bank managers to seek out new sources 
of bank efficiency such as greater technology and management quality. Also, the evidence of a positive 
nexus between efficiency and market power in the AMU and SADC sub-regions suggest that bank 
managers use their efficiency for market power gains instead of using it for greater diversification and 
increased lending activities for economic growth. Overall, the pursuit of differentiation strategies by efficient 
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banks, a reduction in lending rates and a broader scope of lending activities by such banks will be 
beneficial to investors and the general economy. 
The final set of policy issues relate to the nexus between financial integration, bank lending and economic 
growth. First, the lack of a significant nexus between financial integration, bank lending and economic 
growth in Africa, despite the presence of significant relationships in the sub-regional markets all point to the 
fact that overall inter-REC financial integration in Africa is still low. This prevents the region from enjoying 
the benefits of deeper financial integration and financial market development.  Also, there is evidence of 
significant negative causality running from greater bank lending to economic growth in the AMU and EAC 
though the benefits are positive and significant in the ECCAS and ECOWAS sub-regions. However, the 
negative effects could be due to the credit defaults that affected the global financial market during the 2008 
crisis. This study therefore recommends that African economies should continue to pursue policies that 
enhance greater bank lending while taking measures to curb the negative effects of future credit market 
crisis.  Also, countries pursuing expansionary monetary policies should take steps to curb credit defaults as 
this could reduce economic higher credit risk exposure could reduce economic growth. Overall, the desire 
for harmonious and speedy economic growth across Africa and other emerging markets can be achieved if 
these economies tailor their policy initiatives to suit the conditions in their sub-regional markets while 
pursuing goals to bring to par the regulatory and other macroeconomic factors that influence banking 
behavior and output growth in each sub-region through peer-learning and inter-REC collaborations.  
 
7.4 Contributions and limitations of the study 
The enormous importance of banking intermediaries for the economic growth and development of 
emerging markets makes the continuous evaluation of their conduct and performance highly critical for 
policy decision making. Moreover, Africa‘s drive towards greater financial and economic integration 
presents banks with opportunities and threats that affect their performance and the economic performance 
of host countries. This highlights the need for a continuous evaluation of the implications of financial 
integration for bank activities and economic growth. In view of this, the analysis in this dissertation makes 
several contributions to the empirical literature on the cost and benefits of financial integration in emerging 
markets. To the best of the author‘s knowledge, this thesis presents the first comprehensive comparative 
assessment of the effects of financial integration on bank performance and economic growth in five major 
regional economic communities of Africa.  
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The novelty of the thesis therefore comes in several folds. First, the study extends the vast bank profitability 
literature by applying principal components analysis to construct a standardized bank profitability index 
(SBPI) allowing for the broader assessment of bank profitability determinants that fits the interest of a wider 
spectrum of stakeholder groups (Luo et al., 2017). As far as the author knows, this thesis is the first study 
to apply a composite indicator of bank profitability to assess it determinants. This is also the first paper to 
assess the varying roles of de jure and de facto measures of financial integration in determining bank 
profitability in Africa and five regional economic communities.  
Second, the thesis presents the first comprehensive comparative assessment of the effects of financial 
integration on the performance and competitive conduct of banks in Africa. As argued by Mishkin (2009), 
tailoring integration and other policy initiatives to common markets may be better than wholesale policies as 
the later may not always lead to the most optimal outcomes. The relevance of understanding the sub-
regional differences in the role of financial integration seeks to promote peer-learning and better tailoring of 
policy initiatives to ensure greater and more harmonious benefits are derived from Africa‘s on-going 
financial integration process for growth.   
The thesis also presents the first empirical assessment of banking convergence in Africa. To the best 
knowledge of the author, this thesis is the first to apply the theory of convergence to the banking sector in 
Africa. In this study, the issue of banking convergence is applied to assess the evolution of bank 
competition, efficiency and bank lending behaviour from 2007 to 2014 following over three decades of 
financial sector reforms in Africa. Also, the study departs from the convention in the banking literature on 
Africa by testing for reverse causality between bank competition and cost efficiency in Africa in a Granger-
causality fashion. To the best of the author‘s knowledge, this is the first study to test both the quiet-life 
hypothesis and the efficient-structure hypothesis in African banking markets.  
The study is also the first to combine the various strands of the finance-growth literature in one study, 
highlighting the role of both financial integration and bank lending behavior in determining economic growth 
in emerging markets. The study examines the supply-leading, demand-following and feedback hypotheses 
using panel vector auto-regressive models for testing Granger-causality. According to Pradhan et al. 
(2014a), this approach is a seldom used in the finance-growth nexus literature in emerging markets. To the 
best of the author‘s knowledge, this is the first study to examine the feedback hypothesis of the finance-
growth nexus debate in Africa. The comparison of the findings across sub-regional markets highlights the 
relative importance of financial integration and banking lending on economic growth across Africa‘s regional 
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integration projects (RECs). This understanding is expected to guide the adoption of broad-based policies 
that will ensure greater and a more harmonious growth performance in African economies across the 
common market.  
Despite these contributions, this thesis has the following limitations. First, the empirical analysis of the 
thesis is conducted using secondary data and any insights that could be drawn from expert opinions on the 
issues studied is lost. Also, the study data was limited to the period 2007-2014. This data limitation could 
not allow the study to conduct a comparative analysis of the period prior to, during and after the recent 
global financial crisis. This analysis could have enabled the study examine the variations in banks 
competitive conduct and performance and per capita GDP performance in emerging economies under 
these three critical periods.  Such knowledge could guide regulators on the timing of interventions and 
needed changes in times of a financial crisis and after. Finally, the findings and recommendations only 
relate to Africa and the five regional economic communities studied, hence extrapolation of the findings to 
other emerging economies may be limited due to differences in financial integration policies, regulatory 
environments and other market conditions. 
 
7.5 Proposed agenda for future research 
First, the current study did not assess the effect of financial integration on the competitiveness of the 
banking sector in Africa. Future research could examine the determinants of bank competition and examine 
the relationship between financial integration and bank competition in the five regional economic 
communities. Besides, most retail banking in emerging markets emanate from domestic banks except the 
few countries identified to be dominated by foreign banks. An understanding of the effects of banking 
digitalization could prove useful towards a broader comprehension of the effect of technological changes on 
bank competitiveness, efficiency and profitability. Also, as Africa‘s stock market development increases and 
data become more available for more countries, it would be important to examine the effect of financial 
integration on stock market development.  
The effect of financial integration in promoting banking convergence should also be examined into detail. 
Also, the nexus between other bank performance metrics and economic growth would be an interesting 
and vital study. This will bring out the vital aspects of bank performance that significantly determine 
economic growth in Africa. The study also failed to undertake a threshold analysis to provide policy makers 
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with the details on the threshold, beyond which deeper financial integration negatively affects bank stability. 
Such a study will guide more specific policy decisions. 
On the data limitation, other studies could undertake a comparative study to examine the possible changes 
in the role of financial integration and other factors in determining the conduct and performance of banks 
and economic growth in emerging markets. Expert views could also be sought on these issues in emerging 
markets to ensure a more holistic understanding of the linkages between policy propositions, actual policy 
decisions and policy outcomes. Such an insight will guide the formulation of more realistic policies and 
decisions for better outcomes. 
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